1. The question for determination is whether when the appellant's vendor and respondent (defendant)' had agreed in writing in December 1912 that the vendor would re-deliver certain property to respondent for which respondent had paid the purchase money, Ex. 7, the respondent can set up that contract against the appellants' subsequent vendee in a suit for ejectment. When this question came before Anantakrishna Iyyar, J., all the Courts in India were following the equitable doctrine of part performance which has since been held not to apply to India in Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar 1931 P.C. 79. It is no longer argued that in the light of that judgment the judgment under appeal can be sustained, but it is urged that, as in-deed is set forth on p. 1246 of the Privy Council judgment, if a party has an effective contract which he can register and use as a bar to ejectment he will be given the relief set forth in Walsh v. Lanadale (1882) 21 Ch.D. 9.
2. That argument might be available to respondent except for the fact that his contract to re-deliver is now time barred under Article 113, Lim. Act. It was argued that plaintiff's vendor having given respondent a stamp paper after time had run, revived the contract, but we find no authority for that plea either in the statute or the case law. The decree of the Subordinate Judge accordingly is restored and the appeal allowed with costs in this Letters Patent Appeal. Each party to pay his costs in second appeal.