1. The only point in these second appeals is one of limitation which depends upon the character of the appellants' claim which arises out of Ex. A, a document called a settlement dead, and dated 9th July 1903, whereby the defendant's grand-father Haraharaswamy Maniagaran settled Rs. 15,000 worth of family properties upon his son Nithyananda Muthuswami Maniyagaran then a minor and retained for himself family properties worth Rs. 7,800 ?odd and also directed the son to pay to each of his three unmarried daughters, of whom the present appellants are the first, namely Nachimuthu Ammal and the third Andi Ammal, Rs. 500 each in the shape of moveable properties on their attaining majority. In the suits which were brought by these daughters for Rs. 500 each, both parties seem to have wandered in a maze of legal intricacies and attempted to get out of their imaginary difficulties in a variety of ways. The plaintiffs conceived that they had to show how the suits were not barred and for it alleged various imaginary payments of so-called interest and so forth all of which have been found against. The defendants on the contrary tried to avoid the claim by setting up various imaginary payments all of which have also been found against. The District Munsif decreed the claims but the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal agreeing with the District Munsif on his finding of fact has dismissed the suits on the ground of limitation. That is the only question DOW before me.
2. Reading the document Ex. A, it is clear that this was an instance of a family settlement in which a trust in favour of three unmarried daughters was created in respect of three sums of Rs. 500 each. All the elements of a trust are here present. The trustor was the owner at any rate of the property which he gave to the daughters, in the sense that he was authorized by Hindu law to make provision in favour of unmarried daughters. The trustee was the son who, through his guardian, the trustor himself accepted the trust, and retained the property subject to the obligations till he died in 1923. The plaintiffs (daughters) are the beneficiaries. I see nothing of an indefinite character as is now contended to make the provision invalid. Sundararaja Iyengar v. Lakshmi Ammal A.I.R. 1914 Mad. 95 is a precedent almost exactly similar, where Oldfield, J., held that a provision in a partition deed providing for the expenses of an unmarried daughter's nuptials and other ceremonies to be paid by the sons who took the properties in shares constituted a trust in favour of the daughter. Following that precedent I hold that this suit was not affected by any period of limitation.
3. The decrees of the lower Court are therefore reversed and those of the District Munsif restored with costs in both this and the lower appellate Court, with the variation that the decrees will be against the properties in Ex. A, in the hands of the defendant instead of against him personally.