1. We must accept the Subordinate Judge's finding that the sales in 1st plaintiffs favour were real transactions and that the first plaintiff was not the benamidar of any other person.
2. As regards the lands (items 1 and 2), we think that the Subordinate Judge (on appeal) intended to accept and did accept the evidence of the first plaintiff and his witnesses that the 1st plaintiff directly enjoyed the lands till ten years before suit. The decision of the question whether there was an oral lease afterwards of the lands to the defendants becomes unnecessary.
3. Coming to the house site item 3, the Subordinate Judge accepts the evidence of P.W. 7 which proves that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the 1st plaintiff and Venkanna in about 1892. Oral evidence to prove such relationship is admissible even if the rental agreement is not admissible in evidence and even if the terms of the tenancy (such as the period, the rate of rent, the covenants of the lease, etc.) cannot be proved by oral evidence. See Ameer Ali v. Yakub Alt Khan I.L.R. (1914) C. 347. Under S.109 of the Evidence Act it is for the 1st defendant to prove that relationship ceased to exist before Venkanna's death which took place within twelve years before suit. The 1st plaintiff's possession, therefore, of the house site continued till 12 years before suit and his claim is not barred even as regards the house site. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The decree of this Court will however make it clear that the site alone of item 3 is decreed to the plaintiffs and the defendants are at liberty to remove the superstructure at any time before delivery through court is made to the plaintiffs of the site.