Raghava Rao, J.
1. The final decree in the mortgage suit under execution in the present case is of 6th March 1940. On 6th March 1943, E. P. No. 38 of 1943 was filed and it was dismissed on 23rd August 1943 for default of prosecution. The execution petition, out of which this appeal arises, was filed on 15th January 1947. It was ordered as in time. Hence this appeal.
2. What is claimed to save the execution petition from the bar of limitation is the pendency of an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C., by defendant 9, the judgment debtor from whom the appellant claims as purchaser, from somewhere in June 1943 to its dismissal on 13th January 1944. That there can be no suspension of time which has once begun to run except under the heads of deduction specifically recognised and provided for by the statute is, however, too well settled to be disputed.
3. But the way in which the point is further put for the respondent and was accepted by the Court below is that an application under Order 9, Rule 18, Civil P. C., is virtually an application for review within the meaning of cl. 3 of Article 182, Limitation Act, an order on which gives a fresh start of limitation. I cannot accept this contention which goes against and beyond the normal meaning of the word 'review' in that clause of the article. Moreover, in this case there was no order granting review on the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C., but one only refusing it. The case in Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das : AIR1937Pat337 by which the argument is sought to be supported, has been, as pointed put by the Court below itself, doubted and dissented from in Mohamed Naquir v. Alauddin Ahmed : AIR1941Pat213 , Bengali Mal v. Baijnath Prasad, A. I. R. 1942 ALL. 338: 202 I. C. 726 and Harischandra v. Dineschandra, 50 C. W. N. 667: A.I. R. 1946 Cal. 375. The case in Sriramachandra v. Venkataswara Rao : AIR1939Mad157 in which Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das, : AIR1937Pat337 seems to have been, as pointed out by the Court below, accepted by this Court, is surely distinguishable and is no binding precedent for me on the precise point here arising for determination.
4. I have no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Court below and dismissing the execution petition as out of time. The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the Court below.