1. The petitioner is the employer. He employed the second respondent as an offset printer. Towards the end of May 1960 after having been in the service of the petitioner for about nine months, the second respondent asked to be relieved from service at once, that is to say with effect from 1st June 1980. The petitioner did not accept the resignation but nevertheless the second respondent stopped away from service on the following day. Thereafter the second respondent moved the appropriate authority for payment of the wages for the month of May 1960.
2. Before this authority the petitioner contended that under the Standing Orders governing the contract of service the second respondent was bound to give him fourteen days' notice and that his failure to do so should disentitle him to wages for that period. The Additional commissioner for Workmen's Compensation however took the view that though Standing order 18 required giving of days notice, it did not in terms state that for want of that notice of the wages for that period should be cut. The other contentions of the petitioner-employer that the second respondent had taken advances during the period employment and was also in possession of certain tools rejected by that authority. The result was that the petitioner was directed to pay the wages of Rs. 125 for the entire month of May to the second respondent.
3. It is this order that is attacked in this writ petition. The only contention that has been urged before me is that the view taken by the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation that despite the lack of notice which the Standing order insists upon the workmen should still be paid the wages for the full month is an error of law apparent on the record. On the other side for the second respondent it is contended that the Standing order does not apply, that the second respondent is neither a permanent) employee nor a probationer to whom alone the standing, order can be made applicable. The Standing Order is lip these terms:
'Any permanent or a probationary employee desirous of leaving the service shall give 14 days notice in writing to the proprietor. The wages due to such employee' will be paid on the day the notice expires and in any case, within two days after the expiry of the notice.'
4. The first contention on behalf of the second respondent was that he is not a probationer. I think this contention is without substance. The expression probation is defined in the Standing Orders themselves to Bo a person not in the permanent employ and nothing more, in second respondent's claim that he asked for only a temporary job pending such time as his dispute with his previous employer terminated in his favour, and that therefore, he is not a probationer is without substance. The Standing order states that every employee is a probationer will be completes six months service with the employer, than second respondent is a probationer can hardly be gainsaid.
5. The Standing Order enjoins upon the employee to give 14 days notice. The absence of any provision (sic) for deducting the salary for this period, if such notice is not given is no doubt not expressly stated in the standing, order. It would however be meaningless to insist upon the requirement of this notice unless there was a corresponding liability on the employee to forego the wages for tins, period of the notice not given. The learned counsel for the second respondent suggested that under the rules framed under the' Payment of Wages Act, no deduction.' for such reason is possible. Rule 16(2) states-
'No deduction for breach of contract shall be made from the wages of any employed' person unless there is provision in writing forming part of the terms of the contract of employment requiring the employee to give notice on the termination of such employment and the period of' notice does not exceed.....'
It is not In dispute that the Standing orders formed part of the terms of the contract of employment. What ins- rule requires in order to enable deduction in the wages claimed is only that there should exist a provision for the giving of the notice. It does not further expressly require that there should be a stipulation that for want of the notice the pay is deductible for the period of the notice That is inherent in the provision for the giving of the notice and the rule clearly brings this out. It follows therefore that the view taken by the Additional commissioner for Workmen's Compensation that unless a Standing order specifically provided for withholding of the salary for' the notice period such salary should not be withheld op deducted is clearly erroneous.
6. In so far as the other grounds advanced by we petitioner namely that amounts by way of advances has been taken by the second respondent, or that lie was in possession of articles belonging to the press are concerned, the contentions of the petitioner have been clearly found against on the evidence. It is not possible for the court to interfere therewith.
7. It follows therefore that the Tribunal below acted erroneously in not permitting the deduction of the wages for the 14 days. The order to the extent to which, it conflicts with the view expressed above is necessarily bad and has to be quashed.
8. It is open to the Addl. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation to make such consequential alteration in the order granting the payment of wages to the second respondent. There will be no order as to costs.