1. The lower appellate Court was clearly in error in thinking that the object of the agreement was to stifle non-compoundable offences. The complaint that was made by the defendant is Ex. P-2. He gave a sworn statement which was recorded by the Magistrate on the 2nd August, 1940. Though he implicated as many as six persons as the accused in the complaint, when examined by the Magistrate he attributed specific acts only to four persons. He said that Pavayammal and Athayqmmal, accused 4 and 5, prevented him from baling out water by holding the rope and unyoking and driving away the bulls. Then he said that Kahyanna Goundan and Marappa Goundan, accused 1 and 3, removed the baling stand and threw it into the Well. No doubt in between these two statements there is another statement that the first three accused removed the baling stand and threw it into the well. That apparently was a general statement which did not satisfy the Magistrate. So he appears to have asked the complainant who it was that actually removed the baling stand and threw it into the well. Then the complainant said that it was the first and third accused. No other acts are attributed either to the second or sixth accused. Seeing that specific acts were attributed only to accused 1,3,4 and 5, the Sub-Magistrate was justified in taking the complaint on file under Sections 447 and 426 of the Indian Penal Code. These two offences are admittedly compoundable offences. Summonses were issued to the accused only of offences under these two Sections and that was all that they were called upon to meet. Hence even if the real object of the agreement, which is now in suit, was to compound the offences in respect of which summonses were issued to the accused, the validity of the agreement cannot be impugned. The parties were at perfect liberty to compound compoundable offences. The learned District Judge is not justified in stating that there was really a complaint of rioting and unlawful assembly under Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and that the object of the agreement was to stifle those offences. Complaints are often exaggerated and the object of a sworn statement is to see whether there is any justification for taking action in respect of all the offences disclosed by the complaint. If in the sworn statement only minor offences are disclosed the Magistrate is perfectly justified in taking action only as regards the offences disclosed in the sworn statement. This is what was done in this case. The District Judge seems to have been carried away by the fact that the agreement in question was entered into in the presence of the Sub-Inspector. His remarks against the Sub-Magistrate are entirely unjustified. I find that the real object of the suit agreement was not to stifle non-compoundable offences.
2. The result is that the decree of the lower appellate Court is reversed and that of the trial Court is restored. I make no order as to costs here or in the lower appellate Court.
3. No leave.