1. The plaintiff in O. S. No. 358 of 1964, on the file of the court of the District Munsif, Chidambaram, is the appellant before this court. The plaintiff is a temple, and the suit was for recovery of Rs. 976, being arrears of rent, on the allegation that the respondent had agreed to pay an annual rent of 70 kalams of paddy and 62 bundles of straw. The respondent contended that there was no such agreement and that in any event he had paid the arrears of rent claimed. The learned District Munsif found that no such agreement as pleaded by the appellant was established, but came to the conclusion that the respondent was liable to pay 60 per cent of the gross produce by way of rent to the appellant. In this view, on the 28th September 1965, he decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 672,50. As against the judgment of the learned District Munsif, the appellant as well as the respondent preferred appeals to the learned Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram. The learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the two appeals on the 18th June 1966. The learned Subordinate Judge, while agreeing with the conclusion of the learned District Munsif that there was no agreement, as contended for by the appellant-plaintiff, came to the conclusion that the learned District Munsif erred in providing for the payment of 60 per cent of the gross produce by the respondent to the appellant-plaintiff. He took the view that under Section 24 (1) of the Madras Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act 1961 (LVII of 1961), the respondent was liable to pay only 40 per cent of the normal gross produce or its value in money as rent. It is as against this judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, the present second appeal has been preferred.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that sub-section (3) of Section 24 of Madras Act LVII of 1961 provides-
''Where the contract of tenancy provides for payment of a rent lower than the fair rent payable under the above provisions, the contract rent alone shall be payable during the contract period.'' and that, by way of analogy, if the contract had actually provided for the payment of a higher rent than the fair rent payable under the provisions of the Act, then the tenant will be liable to pay the contract rent. I am unable to find any rule of construction of statutes which can support such an interpretation or argument put forward by the learned counsel. Sub-section (3) of Section 24 is an express provision, and while giving effect to that express provision no analogy can be imported so as to destroy the very basis of the Act itself. Section 3 of the Act categorically states- ''The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority''.
Therefore, the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of the Statute must have an overriding effect, and no contract can be relied upon to destroy the effect of the provisions of the statue. But only by way of an exception to this overriding effect of the statutory provision read with Section 3, sub-section (3) of Section 24 has been introduced. Hence, to accept the argument of the learned counsel will be to destroy the effect of Section 3 of the Act itself. On no principle such a contraction can be adopted.
3. Hence the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave.
4. Appeal dismissed.