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Saminatha Pillai Vs. Krishna Ayyar and Two ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1915)ILR38Mad548
AppellantSaminatha Pillai
RespondentKrishna Ayyar and Two ors.
Cases ReferredHanumanthaiyan v. Meenatchi Naidu I.L.R.
Excerpt:
mortgage - subrogation--third mortgagee advancing money for discharge of first mortgage--application of part only towards discharge--priority over mesne mortgagee to that extent. - .....has been disallowed by the lower courts.3. it is argued before us in second appeal that though the entire mortgage debt has been discharged, as only rs. 300 a portion of the mortgage debt was paid out of the money advanced by the plaintiff, and the balance rs. 50 was paid by the mortgagor himself, he cannot claim a first charge to that extent. it is contended that it is only when the person claiming subrogation discharges the entire debt that he is so entitled. reliance is placed in support of this contention on hanumanthaiyan v. meenatchi naidu i.l.r., (1912) mad., 183 and gurdeo singh v. chandrikah singh i.l.r., (1909) calc., 193.4. it appears to us that this contention cannot be supported and the question is concluded by authority. in rupabhai v. audimulam i.l.r., (1888) mad., 345,.....
Judgment:

1. The plaintiff sues to recover the money due under a mortgage instrument executed by the first defendant in 1905. The amount was advanced to discharge a mortgage debt of Rs. 400 due to one Sivasami Sivan under a mortgage dated November 1901. The finding is that the mortgagor discharged that mortgage by paying the creditor Rs. 300 out of the amount received from the plaintiff and by the execution of a promissory note for Rs. 50, the balance Rs. 50 having been given up by the mortgagee.

2. The appellant claims under a mortgage dated October 1903,. and contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to any priority on account of his discharge of the prior mortgage. His contention has been disallowed by the Lower Courts.

3. It is argued before us in Second Appeal that though the entire mortgage debt has been discharged, as only Rs. 300 a portion of the mortgage debt was paid out of the money advanced by the plaintiff, and the balance Rs. 50 was paid by the mortgagor himself, he cannot claim a first charge to that extent. It is contended that it is only when the person claiming subrogation discharges the entire debt that he is so entitled. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on Hanumanthaiyan v. Meenatchi Naidu I.L.R., (1912) Mad., 183 and Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh I.L.R., (1909) Calc., 193.

4. It appears to us that this contention cannot be supported and the question is concluded by authority. In Rupabhai v. Audimulam I.L.R., (1888) Mad., 345, the debt due to one Minakshi Naik the first mortgagee under a hypothecation deed (Exhibit XII) was discharged to the extent of Rs. 27,713 by the fourth defendant in that suit and the balance which came to over a lakh of rupees by the mortgagor himself, and it was argued that the fourth defendant had not therefore acquired any priority over an intermediate mortgagee. The learned Judges pointed out that if the whole amount lent by the fourth defendant has been applied to pay off the entire debt due under Exhibit XII he would have priority of that charge to the full amount. Then they said 'but only Rs. 27,713 was so applied, and the question is, does that fact prevent the application of the rule above stated,' and they replied 'we do not think it does.' They pointed out that the hypothecation under Exhibit XII, i.e., the whole charge was released and the mortgagee after that had no hypothecation on the villages. The case according to them was therefore governed by the Privy Council judgment in Gokuldoss Gopaldoss v. Rambux Seochand and the defendant No. 4 in that case who had paid a part of the amount of the first charge ranked to that extent and interest in the priority of that first charge.

5. The decision is thus directly in point and is not overruled by Hanumanthaiyan v. Meenatchi Naidu I.L.R., (1912) Mad., 183.

6. We see no reason to doubt its soundness.

7. We accordingly dismiss the Second Appeal with costs.


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