1. It is objected in this case that the District Munsif passed the decree without allowing the ten clear days provided by Article 158, Lim. Act, to expire for applications to set aside the award filed. The award was filed in Court on the 30th June and notice on the same day given to the parties for the 11th July, that date being clearly fixed in order to comply with the article in question. The defendant's case is that the following day, the 1st July, was a Sunday, and that on the 2nd July he applied for a copy of the award, which was not obtained until the 9th. Accordingly he had only the interval between the 9th and the 11th instead of the ten clear days allowed. Under Section 12(4), Limi. Act, the period required for obtaining copy is to be excluded in computing the time allowed by Article 158. It is clear accordingly that the Court did in fact pass the decree before the defendant had had his ten days for applying to set the award aside.
2. In this case however I am asked not to interfere, notwithstanding that the matter may be one of jurisdiction, because the defendant failed to bring the circumstance to the notice of the Court. It appears that on the 11th, the day when the decree was passed, the plaintiff filed objections to the award but the defendant's vakil was absent and he appeared in person and asked for further time for filing his objections. This was refused and the decree was passed. Nothing apparently was said by him' or on his behalf about the time which had been taken for obtaining copies or that the statutory time allowed for filing the award had not by then expired. It could only be accordingly by holding that the Court ought sue motu to have made some inquiry of him in this matter that I can hold that it was not justified in passing the order which it did. I think however that that is clearly an untenable position, A Court is not bound to go beyond the prima facie facts in matters of limitation and, in an instance of this kind, to inquire how long he took to obtain copies. There are many ways in which limitation, as fixed by definite periods of time, may be extended, but if the appropriate plea is not put forward, it is not the business of the Court to conduct an investigation in order to satisfy itself before acting that it has complied with all the provisions of the law. A somewhat similar case came before Napier, J., in Subramania Aiyar v. Peepparam Lala  29 I.C. 860. In that case an application to set aside an award was filed which on the face of it was out of time. The Court's attention was not drawn to any application for copy which would have enabled the application of Section 12(4), Lim. Act. In point of fact such an application had been made and the party was entitled to claim that the time required for it should be excluded. It did not so compute it, and the learned Judge considered that it was his own fault and that the decision could not be interfered with in revision upon such a ground. I have come to the same conclusion and accordingly I dismiss the Civil Revision Petition with costs.