1. C.M.P. 7163 of 1951 :
The applicant is entitled to leave to appeal "to the Supreme Court from our final order in --'Narasaraopeta Electric Corporation Ltd. v. State of Madras', (A) under Article 133(1)(b)
of the Constitution, because our order involves directly a claim respecting property of over Rs. 20,000. This is not disputed by the learned Advocate-General. The applicant will further be entitled to leave under Article 132(1) also as the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, in particular, Article 19(1)(b) and Article 31(2). A certificate will issue accordingly
2. C.M.P. No. 7164 of 1951. This is an application by the applicant in C.M.P. No. 7163 of 1951 at whose instance we have given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our order passed in C.M.P. No. 4697 of 1951 paying that this Court may grant stay of the operation of the G. O. dated 2-9-1950 directing the vesting of the petitioner-Corporation pending disposal of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has sought the assistance of Order 45, Rule 13(2), Civil P.C., in support of his application. We are of opinion that this provision does net enable us to grant him the relief which he seeks in this application. Obviously he is not seeking stay of execution of the order passed by us. He is really in effect asking for an injunction restraining the State from taking action in pursuance of an order passed by it directing a vesting of the Corporation in the State. This relief cannot fall within the scope, of Clause (d) of Rule 13(2). That provision only enabled this Court to place the party seeking the assistance of the Court under any conditions which this Court may think fit to impose. And it enables this Court to give such other direction, that is to say, direction other than a direction placing the party under any condition respecting the subject-matter of the appeal, such as for instance, by an order directing the appointment of a Receiver. The provision does not enable this Court to give any direction to the successful party by way of restricting or preventing him from exercis-ing the rights to which he has become entitled under the final order of this Court. The decision of a Division Bench in -- 'Ramanathan v. Viswanathan', ILR (1939) Mad 135 (B) was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. No doubt Clause (d) of Rule 13(2) was invoked to enable the Court to grant stay of execution of the final mortgage decree pending an appeal to the Privy Council against the preliminary decree. The decision may be supported 011 the ground that in effect the Court was staying the execution of the decree appealed from, because an appeal against a preliminary decree is in a sense an appeal against the final decree in so far as the final decree is dependent on the preliminary decree. Moreover, the learned Judges in that case do not appear to have considered the scope of Clause (d), namely, whether it enables the Court to place the party other than the party seeking the assistance of the Court under any conditions or to give any directions to such a parly preventing him from enjoying the fruits of the order against which the appeal is pending. We are of opinion that the luling in the case above referred to would not apply to this case in which the relief asked for has nothing whatever to do with the execution of the final order of this Court and which seeks to prevent the successful respondent from exercising its rights in accordance with the final order of this Court.
3. This application must therefore be dismissed.