Arnold White, C.J.
1. These are suits for rent; and the Munsif sitting as a Small Cause Judge has decided that the suits are barred by limitation, The question I have to consider is was he right in law in so holding?
2. The tenants say that the suits are barred because the arrears become due within the meaning of Article 110 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act on the date of a judgment which was delivered on a first appeal by this Court, the date of the judgment being the 7th August, 1902. The landlord says that the arrears did not become due within the meaning of that article until a later date, viz., the 24th May 1904 that being the date of a judgment by the Sub-Collector in certain proceedings before the Revenue Court under the Rent Recovery Act, The judgment of this High Court to which I have referred is a judgment in a suit in which the tenants sued the landlord for a declaration that the landlord was not entitled to vary the terms of previous puttas--the puttas in that suit relating to the same lands as the lands for which rent is now sought to be recovered in the present suits. The judgment by the Revenue Court was a judgment in a suit by the landlord in the Revenue Court which was instituted in 1902 and in which, as I have said, judgment was given by the Sub -Collector on the 24th May 1904.
3. The Munsif in deciding that the suits were time-barred has relied upon the decision of this Court in Arunaahellam Chettiar v. Kader Rowthend I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 556 in which the learned Judges distinguished the case before them on the facts from the decision of the Privy Council in Rangayya Appa Rao v. Bobba Sriramulu I.L.R. (1904) Mad. 143. If the present case is on all fours with the case decided in Arunachallam Chettiar v. Rader Rowthen I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 556 sitting as a single Judge, I should of course follow it. But it seems to me that the present case is not on all fours with Arunachellam Chettiar v. Kader Rowthen I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 556, That is a case in which the crcumstances are somewhat special and in which it was shown that by custom the rents were payable in kind, not at the end of the fasli which I understand to be the ordinary rule, but at the time of the harvest. And it was there held that the rent was ascertained as soon as the harvest was reaped, The question I have to determine is not whether rent was ascertained at the end of the fasli or at some date before the end of the fasli, but whether the rent was ascertained at the date of the judgment of the High Court in the tenants' declaratory suits, or whether it was ascertained at the date of the judgment of the Sub-Collector in the Revenue Proceedings brought by the landlord. Consequently it seems to me I am not bound by the decision in Arunachellam Chettiar v. Kader Rowthen I.L.R. (1906) Mad. 556,
4. Then I go back to the decision of Privy Council case in Rangayya Appa Rao v. Bobba Sriramulu I.L.R. (1904) Mad. 143. It must be borne in mind that in the present cases, the Revenue proceedings were pending at the date of the judgment in the High Court in the suits by the tenants. I am not at all satisfied that the judgment in the declaratory suit by the tenants did determine once and for all the rate of rent which was payable in respect of these lands. The declaration given is in somewhat guarded terms. At the end there is this provision 'A general declaration will not, of course, prevent either party from claiming a modification of the pattah should circumstances arise.' But even supposing that this judgment did determine the rate of rent, it does not seem to me necessarily to follow from that, that in the steate of things which existed here, where, at the date, of the judgment of the i High Court, proceedings properly brought by the landlord were pending in the Revenue Court, the date of the judgment of the High Court must be the date from which the statute of limitation begins to run as against the landlord.
5. In the case of Rangayya Appa Rao v. Bobba Sriramulu I.L.R. (1904) Mad. 143 their Lordships after examining the provisions of the Rent Recovery Act say 'Under this procedure it seems clear that as long as proceedings are pending before the Collector and on appeal from him before the Civil Courts, the rate of rent is in suspense, for no one can say what it will prove to be, and that therefore no arrear of rent can be said to have become due within the meaning of the Limitation Act. 'I think I must apply that proposition to the facts here. Of course it is argued that the rate of rent is not in suspense, because it has been held that it is a certain amount in the High Court proceedings. I say I am not satisfied as to that. My attention has been drawn on behalf of the tenants to another passage. 'In their Lordships' opinion this whole series of sections applies to ascertained rents, not to rents at rates which have yet to be determined.' That passage in the judgment occurs after the examination of the provisions of the Bent Recovery Act. And I think when their Lordships apeak about ' ascertained rents' they mean rants which have been ascertained by means of the procedure provided by the Rent Recovery Act.
6. Now it is beyond question that the landlord cannot get his rent until he has tendered a pattah which the tenant has accepted or with regard to which the Courts have held that he is bound to accept it. And I think it is anomalous that limitation should begin to run against him at a date anterior to the date when he can enforce his claim for rent,
7. I think the Munsif was wrong in his view of the law.
8. In Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 739, 740 and 743 the decrees of the Munsif will be set aside and the cases will go back to be dealt with according to law. Costs will abide the event.
9. Civil Revision Petition No. 744 is dismissed with costs.
10. In Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 741, 742 and 745 there will be a decree for rent with coats throughout.