1. There are no merits in this application. There was an application for eviction of the petnr. from the premises of which he was in occupation and he failed in both the Courts. In execution of the order of eviction it turned out that the premises of which the petnr. is admittedly in occupation and which admittedly belongs to the landlord, was given a wrong door number. So, the landlord filed an application for amendment of the description of the property by correcting the door number. The learned Subordinate Judge, who was the appellate tribunal, has directed an amendment of the petition, the order of the lower Court and the order of the appellate tribunal. This application is to quash this order.
2. It was contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the petnr. that the application was made under Section 151, Civil P. C. which did not apply and also that the landlord should have approached the Rent Controller and not the appellate tribunal for an amendment, even assuming that he was entitled to that relief. We see no substance in either of these contentions. It may be that Section 151, Civil P. C. by itself does not apply to proceedings under the Madras Rent Control Act XY  of 1946. But we are of opinion that a quasi-judicial tribunal like the Rent Controller or the appellate tribunal has an inherent power to set right mistakes made by inadvertance so long as the amendment does not amount to a review of the adjudication already made. In this case it is not denied that both the landlord and the tenant knew to which property the proceedings related. In fact, when the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the petnr., he filed an appeal to the appellate tribunal, presumably on the assumption that the proceedings related to the house which he was occupying. It does not lie in hia mouth to oppose the present application for amendment. It is true that an amendment of both the orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate tribunal was not necessary, because the Rent Controller's order was merged in the order of the appellate tribunal, but we see nothing wrong in making such a direction out of abundant caution. The application is dismissed.