1. The management of Mumtaz Agencies, Mettupalayam, is the petitioner in this writ petition. The first respondent claims himself to be a workman within the meaning of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to the first respondent his services were orally terminated. The first respondent filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and the oral order of termination was set aside. Armed with this order, the first respondent approached the second respondent under S. 33C(2) of the Act claiming arrears of wages. The petitioner contested the said application putting forth a substantial contention among other contentions, that the first respondent did not fall within the category of a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act. Earlier, petitioner suffered an ex parte order, but, however, that got set aside pursuant to orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 398 of 1977, and the matter got remitted to the file of the second respondent. The second respondent taking up the matter once again has passed the impugned order under which he has directed the petitioner to pay the first respondent a sum Rs. 6,875 less Rs. 2,000 already paid pursuant to orders passed by this Court in the writ petition.
2. Sri N. Illas Ali, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the second respondent has passed a very cursory and summary order and he has not even adverted to the contentions of he petitioner and in particular the contention as to whether the first respondent is a 'workmen' within the meaning of the Act and has simply guided himself by the fact that the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation has set aside the oral order of termination. Learned Counsel further submits that that would not conclude the matter because apart for the fact as to whether the order of termination is valid or not, for the first respondent to seek the process under S. 33C(2) of the Act, he must fulfil the character of a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Act, and without adjudicating this question there cannot be a grant of any relief under S. 33C(2) of the Act. For the proposition that the adjudication by an authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act (36 of 1947), will not be conclusive with regard to proceedings under the Act, learned Counsel relies on a judgment of Ramanujam, J., in Chandra v. Labour Court (1975) 2 M.L.J. 379. I find that the learned Judges has in fact held that the decision under one statute will not be conclusive with reference to the other statute. It is not claimed before me that the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation did render a finding that the first respondent is a workmen within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Act. Definitely, no such contingency would have arisen before the Commissioner, because the proceedings before him were under the other statute. Hence, it is not possible to derive any support from the decision of he Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation fro deciding the question in issue. This is apart from the question as to whether how far the decision of the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is binding of the second respondent when he adjudicates the matter under S. 33C(2) of the Act. May be, the definitions under the statutes are more or less similar. But the decision of he authority under the Tamil Nadu Ships and Establishments Act (36 of 1947), on the issue cannot be stated to be binding on the second respondent who decides the matter under S. 33C(2) of the Act and he is duly bound to go into the question as to whether the first respondent was a workmen within the meaning of the Act, on merits and on the material placed by the parties before him. The second respondent has not even adverted to the pleadings of he parties and has also not mooted out the points for determination arising on such pleadings and has not cared to refer to any evidence be placed in the case and has rendered a very summary decision. These features do vitiate the order passed by the second respondent and this obliges me to interfere in writ jurisdiction and accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the matter C.P. No. 186 of 1976, will stand remitted back to the file of the second respondent for him to consider the same afresh and in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made in this order. There will be no order as to costs in this writ petition.
3. The second respondent will dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.