1. The first respondent herein was adjudicated an insolvent in I.P. No. 46 of 1920 on the file of the District Court of Guntur. As he failed to apply for discharge within the time fixed, his adjudication was annulled. The petitioners are some of the creditors and they applied to the Distinct Court to have the order of annulment reviewed. The learned Judge thought that the petitioners had a good case on the merits but declined to grant the review as he thought that he had no power to review an order made in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction. The petitioners have preferred this revi-'sion petition against his order.
2. Section 5 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920) says:
Subject to the provisions of this Act the Court, in regard to proceedings under this Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction.
3. The Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction has power to review its orders. There is no warrant for the proposition that a Civil Court cannot correct its own orders or cannot modify any order which it has passed when it finds that the order is patently wrong. The power of review is inherent in the Civil Court and in what cases it can be exercised is laid down in Order 47. When an insolvency Court has the same powers and follows the same procedure as a Civil Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it cannot reasonably be contended that the power to review has been taken away. Under the English Bankruptcy Act the power to review is specifically given vide Section 108. Such provision is not specifically enacted in the Provincial Insolvency Act as the Insolvency Court is invested with jurisdiction which an ordinary Civil Court has in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
4. This point has been specifically dealt with by Spencer, J., in The Official Receiver, Tanjore v. Nataraja Sastrial (1922) 44 M.L.J. 251. In Mannu Lal v. Kunj Bihari Lal I.L.R. (1922) A. 605 a bench of the Allahabad High Court held that a District Judge was competent to review his judgment in appeal. They observe at page 606:
We are content to say that, in our opinion, the District Judge had jurisdiction to review his own order, because Section 5 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, No. V of 1920 gave him, when sitting as an appellate Court, the same powers under the Code of Civil Procedure which he would have had if he had been sitting to hear any ordinary appeal.
5. In spite of these two rulings the learned Judge thought that the decision in Arunagiri Mudaliar v. Kandaswami Mudaliar (1923) 19 L.W. 418 was against his power to review his own order and he could not therefore review it. In Arunagiri Mudaliar v. Kandasiwami Mudaliar (1923) 19 L.W. 418 the question of the power of review of an Insolvency Court was not raised. One of the questions there was whether the time fixed for an application for discharge by the insolvent could be extended or not. Krishnan, J., was of opinion that he could; but, Waller, J.,'thought that the Court had no power to extend the time fixed for an application for discharge by the insolvent and that the provisions of Section 43 were obligatory on the Court to annul the adjudication if an application was not made within the time fixed. It is not necessary to deal with this case in detail as the point raised here did not arise for decision there. If an expression of opinion is necessary, we would be inclined to hold with Krishnan, ]., that the Court has power to extend the time for making an application for discharge, provided that the application is made before the order of annulment is made of. The Arunagiri Miidaliar v. Kandaswami Mudaliar (1923) 19 L.W. 418 case does not decide anything about the power to review an order and the learned District judge was not right in thinking that that decision stood in the way of granting a review.
6. The next point is whether the petitioners are persons aggrieved. It has been brought to our notice that at least two of them have tendered their proof. If they have tendered their proof, they are creditors and they are persons aggrieved by the order of the Court annulling adjudication. It was held in In re Henry Langtny I Manson 169 that a creditor who had tendered his proof was a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 104 of the English Bankruptcy Act. In Ex parte Ditton, In re Woods (1879) 2 Ch D 56 the Court of Appeal held that a person who had not tendered his proof was not entitled to appeal as a person aggrieved. Seeing that two of the petitioners have already tendered their proof, they are entitled to maintain this appeal.
7. The appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Judge is set aside and he is directed to restore the application of the petitioner to file and dispose of it on the merits after taking-such evidence as he may think necessary. Costs to abide the result.