Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. This suit is a speculative suit. Both the Lower Courts have dismissed it, and, after carefully hearing the arguments of the learned vakil for the appellant, I am satisfied that the decision reached by the Lower Courts is correct.
2. One Vizanna died in 1888 leaving his widow Lingamma and two daughters, Kannamma and Sitamma. Sitamma predeceased her mother and we are not concerned with her. Lingamma died in January, 1914. During her lifetime, she made two sales and the present suit has been instituted questioning their validity. On the 8th of October 1890 Lingamma sold what is described as one and one-fourth vrithi (share) to one Garimilla Kurmayya (Ex. VI). The consideration for the sale is stated in the deed to be Rs. 500. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the sale can be upheld only to the extent of Rs. 207-12-0, one of the three items of consideration mentioned in the conveyance. The second transaction impeached is that evidenced, dated 20th March, 1894, by Ex. VI-A. The widow sold another one-fourth vrithi and house-site to the father of defendants 2 and 3. The deed mentions that the consideration was Rs. 500, but the learned Subordinate Judge has held that no part of it was utilised for any purpose which would be binding on the estate. These are the two transactions questioned by the plaintiff.
3. On the death of Lingamma, Kannamma, her daughter, the first defendant in the suit, executed in favour of the plaintiff a sale deed dated the 10th May, 1914, conveying to him such rights as she possessed in the suit properties (Ex. A). The sale deed was taken obviously with a view to file a suit and recover the properties from the possession of the vendees or their representatives.
4. In order to understand the grounds on which the decision of the Subordinate Judge is based, a few further facts must be stated. Kurmayya, the vendee under Ex.VI died, and on the 1st May, 1907, his representatives sold the property covered by Ex. VI to defendants 2 and 3 (Ex. II). The learned Subordinate Judge has found that this transaction was brought about by the plaintiff. He attested the sale deed and he identified the executant before the Registrar. It is in evidence that he himself advised defendants 2 and 3 to purchase the property. The plaintiff was at the time the nearest reversioner barring the 1st defendant and by his conduct he induced defendants 2 and 3 to purchase the property and part with the price. There is not the slightest doubt that he caused defendants 2 and 3 to believe that he approved of the sale and that such rights as he had, he was willing to give up. In these circumstances, the plaintiff would be clearly estopped from questioning the transaction. The learned vakil for the appellant has, however, argued that any representation that the plaintiff made was made in his character as a possible reversioner, that, in the present suit, he claims under the first defendant, and that he ought not to be held bound by an estoppel which would not attach to the first defendant. For this position, the learned vakil has relied upon Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh ILR (1918) C 566 : 1918 36 MLJ 68 but that very case shows that the argument is untenable on the facts as they exist here. At page 580 this passage occurs in the judgment: 'In their Lordships' opinion there is no estoppel. Besides, it should be observed that Hanuman did not acquire the property as a contingent reversioner to Maha Sundar.' In the present case, however, a perusal of Ex. A, the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff, shows clearly that the first defendant transferred to him her rights in the property on account of the fact that he happened to be the reversionary heir to the estate. The recital is very clear and admits of no doubt. I agree, therefore, with the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff cannot impeach the sale of the properties covered by Ex. VI.
5. Next, I proceed to deal with the second alienation effected by the widow, that is, the sale evidenced by Ex. VI-A dated the 20th March, 1894 in favour of the father of defendants 2 and 3. The facts connected with this transaction are these : Lingamma received Rs. 500 from defendants 2 and 3 and deposited the amount with Kondayya, the husband of Sitamma. with a direction that the sum should be paid to the two daughters on their attaining majority. The first defendant, after she became an adult, received a moiety of this Rs. 500, that is, Rs. 250, with another sum of Rs. 250 representing interest, from this Kondayya. She at that time was aware that her mother had sold the property to the father of defendants 2 and 3 under Ex. VI-A. She was further aware that the amount had originally been deposited with Kondayya for the purpose of a moiety of it being paid over to her. The transaction of sale was voidable. The first defendant was the reversioner who was entitled to question the transaction. With the knowledge of these facts, she received from Kondayya Rs. 500. By these acts the first defendant adopted and ratified the transaction. The plaintiff, who claims through the first defendant, has no higher right than the first defendant herself has. I agree, therefore, with the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff is bound to fail in respect also of the items to which Ex. VI-A refers.
6. It has been faintly suggested that Ex. VI-A was executed by Lingamma only as guardian of her minor daughters, Kannamma and Sitamma, and that, as on the date of the transaction, the daughters had a mere expectancy, a mere hope, of succeeding, the transaction is void. As a matter of fact however the document was not executed by her only as guardian of her daughters. The recitals in the document make this perfectly clear. The document moreover was signed by Lingamma in her individual capacity and not as representing her daughters. The argument that Ex. VI-A is void therefore fails.
7. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct. The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.