1. Under a compromise decree in the Sub-Court, North Arcot, dated 30th October 1927, the zemindar of Punganur was directed to pay the plaintiff arrears of maintenance at Rs. 30 per mensem and future maintenance at Rs. 40 per mensem and in the event of his fail-lure to pay the maintenance amount due as aforesaid the plaintiff was at liberty to execute the decree and recover the amount. The plaintiff applied for execution on 27th April 1927 for arrears of maintenance from 1st March 1922 to 1st March 1925. The zemindar pleaded adjustments amounting to Rs. 5,527-7-0. The question was then raised whether under Order 21, Rule 2 (3) such adjustments being uncertified could be recognized by the executing Court.
2. The case law applicable to this question has been exhaustively cited by the learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. A. C. Sampath Ayyangar but the parties are agreed that all the law relevant to this case is correctly set forth in Lodd Govinda Doss v. Rajah of Karvetnagar  29 M.L.J. 219 p. 226. Where no intimation is conveyed by the decree-holder, it is doubtful whether the Court itself can start an enquiry on the ground that the decree-holder should have certified payment or adjustment. The Court may be seized of the question either from intimation conveyed by the decree-holder or from the judgment-debtor within the prescribed period, In the present case it is clear that the judgment-debtor gave no information, and it only remains to consider whether the decree-holder can be said to have done so.
3. He stated in his execution application that payments had been made from time to time, but they were for the period previous to 1st March 1922 and the maintenance from 1st March 1922 to 1st March 1925 was due. This runs very much on all fours with Lodd Govinda Doss v. Rajah of Karvetnagar  29 M.L.J. 219 where the decree-holder admitted that payments had been made but stated that they had been appropriated towards the expenses of management; and it was held that the truth of the assertion was a legitimate subject for inquiry.
4. It is quite obvious that neither party will be prejudiced by the order of the learned District Judge directing further inquiry; and in the light of Lodd Govinda Doss v. Rajah of Karvetnagar  29 M.L.J. 219. I am not prepared to uphold the technical objection that the Court is precluded from inquiring into the payments admitted under Order 21, Rule 11, because there is no direct certification under Order 21, R, 2. The case where a judgment-debtor pleads payments totally denied by the decree-holder is entirely different from one where the decree-holder himself admits payments, but seeks to explain them away.
5. The appeal is dismissed with costs.