1. The above revision is filed assailing the orders of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, in I. A. 260 of 1981 in A. S. No. 179 of 1978, dated 26-7-1982. It appears from the facts of the case and also as argued, by the respective counsel that the Petitioners filed O. S. 105 of 1975 before the District Munsif, Sivaganga, against the respondents herein for a declaration of title to the suit property and for an injunction. Defendants 4 to 7 in the suit submitted to a decree. The suit went ort and ultimately came to be dismissed on 25-7-1978. 1 am repeating this' date because the first respondent Meenakshi Achi purchased the suit property measuring 3.12 acres in entirely from defendants I and 2 on 20-7-1978, immediately after the dismissal of the suit. In the meanwhile, the petitioners who lost 0. S. 105 of 1975 preferred A. S. No. 179 of 1978 before the Sub Court, Sivaganga. When the first respondent herein who is a purchaser of the suit. property came to know that an appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs, she filed I. A. 260 of 1981 to implead her self as a party to the appeal. It was contended by her in the said interlocutory application that defendants 1 and 2 in the suit who had the right. title and interest, had sold the Property to her, that is, she who has to contest the appeal as she had purchased the property, for defendants I and 2 have no interest in contesting the matter as they have sold their entire interest in the property to the first respondent. herein. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the application. It is against this order the above revision is filed.
2. Mr. K. Alagiriswami, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, contends before me that the purchaser of a property pendente lite has no right to be impleaded as a party to the-appeal. He relies on the decisions
in Annapoorni Ammal v. Jayavelu Mudaliar, : (1974)2MLJ285 and in Doraikannu Asari v. Nataraja Chetti, : (1951)2MLJ26 . The main question that has to be considered in this case is, whether the person who has purchased the property, particularly in entirety, from defendants 1 and 2 is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the appeal which is filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners herein. Natarajan. J. in Annapoorni Ammal v, Jayavelu Mudaliar, (1974) 2 Mad 285, has clearly observed, in Para 3 of the judgment thus-
'A conspectus of all the rules in Order 22 will show that the order predominantly deals with cases where there is change of status due to the totality of the interest of a party in pending suit passing on to another person or totally abetting under certain circumstances,'
I respectfully agree with the observations made by Nataraian. J.
3. In the present case, defendants 1 and have sold their right, title and interest they had over the suit property in entirety, to the first respondent herein. There is a change of status due to the sale of the, totality of the interest which defendants 1 and 2 had over the property. Defendants 1 and 2 have no more interest due to the, sale effected by them to the first respondent herein. Under the circumstances, and in view of the fact that the first respondent becomes the sole and absolute owner of the property which is the subject matter of the suit, she is a necessary and proper party to the appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that the transfer of the property in question pending- his suit is hit by Section 52 of the T. P. Act, and hence the order of the Court below is not sustainable. But, in my opinion, that is a matter to be gone into in the appeal or in the suit and not in the impleading petition.
5. The learned counsel then argues that even if the first respondent is a necessary party in the appeal, the application to implead herself as a party to the appeal should have been filed under Order 22, Rule 10, C. P. C. and not under Order 1, Rule 10, C. P. C. According to the learned counsel, in so far as the order of the Court below is, on the application under Order 1, Rule 10, it has to be set aside on this ground alone. There is no doubt that the first respondent ought to have mentioned the correct Provision of law i.e., Order 22, Rule 10, C. P.C. in her petition to implead simply because a wrong provision of law was mentioned by the first respondent in the petition to implead herself as a party to the appeal, it cannot be a ground to reject the application. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C., has only to see whether, any injustice has been done to the petitioners by impleading the, first respondent as a party to the appeal or a flaw in law has been committed by the Court below.
6. On a careful perusal of the order Of the Court below, I do not find any violation of law or flagrant injustice done, to the petitioners in the impugned order of the Court below. Hence, there is no warrant for interference in this revision. Accordingly, this revision is dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs.
7. Revision dismissed