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Janab N.S. Sattar Sahib Vs. State of Madras, Represented by the Secretary, Home Department, Fort St. George, Madras and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. No. 276 of 1951
Judge
Reported inAIR1952Mad605; (1951)2MLJ656
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226
AppellantJanab N.S. Sattar Sahib
RespondentState of Madras, Represented by the Secretary, Home Department, Fort St. George, Madras and anr.
Appellant AdvocateM.K. Nambiar, ;Naseem Amiruddin and ;R.S. Venkatachari, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateAdv. General, ;K. Bhashyam and ;T.R. Srinivasan, Advs.
Excerpt:
writ of certiorari--practice--order of inferior tribunal--quashing of, by high court on any ground not dealing with merits of the case--inferior tribunal should rehear the application--motor vehicles act, indian (iv of 1939), section 64-a; when an order of an inferior tribunal, on an application properly made to them, is quashed by the high court by a writ of certiorari on any ground which does not deal with the merits of the case, it is not only permissible, but it is also incumbent on the inferior tribunal to take up the application and rehear the same. - - .....board, and subba rao, j., quashed this order of government by his order dated 1st august 1951. the learned judge quashed the order on the ground that it disclosed 'ex facie' that they passed their order after reading a petition from certain congress workers which was not strictly permissible in law. though the government did not say that they acted upon the petition inasmuch as they did not say that the petition in no manner influenced them in coming to a conclusion, it could not be said that that petition might not have influenced the government in passing their order. as matters extraneous to the application pending before them had been taken into consideration, the learned judge was of the opinion that their order should be quashed.2. the question which now arises on an application.....
Judgment:
1. By their order dated 17th April 1951, the Government of Madras, set aside an order of the Central Road Traffic Board, and Subba Rao, J., quashed this order of Government by his order dated 1st August 1951. The learned Judge quashed the order on the ground that it disclosed 'ex facie' that they passed their order after reading a petition from certain Congress workers which was not strictly permissible in law. Though the Government did not say that they acted upon the petition inasmuch as they did not say that the petition in no manner influenced them in coming to a conclusion, it could not be said that that petition might not have influenced the Government in passing their order. As matters extraneous to the application pending before them had been taken into consideration, the learned Judge was of the opinion that their order should be quashed.

2. The question which now arises on an application taken out for a writ of 'mandamus' by the party who was successful before the Government on the prior occasion is whether after the quashing of their order, the Government should take up the application filed before them under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and rehear the same. We have no doubt whatever in the matter that when an order of the inferior tribunal on an application properly made to them is quashed by this Court by a writ of 'certiorari' on any ground which does not deal with the merits of the case, it is not only permissible, but it is also incumbent on the inferior tribunal to take up the application and rehear the same. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State very properly admitted this position and stated that the Government was prepared to deal with the application before them in the light of the judgment of this Court. In these circumstances it is not necessary to grant a mandamus' as pointed out by Lord Goddard, C.J., in his recent judgment in 'REX v. NORTHUMBERLAND COMPENSATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL', 1951-1 K B 711 at p. 724. The learned Chief Justice says:

"Once the order is abashed it follows that the applicant will be able to go back to the appeal tribunal."

In this case, once the order of the Government is quashed the applicant will be able to go back to the Government acting under Section 64-A.


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