1. These are unnumbered appeals sought, to be filed by Srimathi M. A. Janaki (party in person) for whom Sri V. C. Srikumar has also appeared as amicus curiae at our instance, against the orders of Venkatadri J. in the application before him, declining leave to the petitioner to institute civil proceeding against the respondents shown in the petitions, Under Section 3 of the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act of 1949. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner (Shrimathi M. A. Janaki) has been declared a vexatious litigant by a judgment of a Bench of this Court, and that the Act governs, thereafter all proceedings sought to be instituted by her. It is further not in dispute that no such proceeding could be instituted by her, except upon leave of court obtained on application made for the purpose. Further, Section 3 of the Act lays down that the leave referred to shall not be given, unless this court 'is satisfied that there is prima facie ground for such proceedings.'
2. Venkatadri J. and Srinivasan J. (in other similar applications) have stated in their respective orders that they were not at all satisfied that 6uch prima facie ground for grant of leave existed. On this short conclusion, the applications have been dismissed.
3. We find that there are two objections, both proceeding to the root of the matter, which are fatal to the maintainability of the present appeals sought to be numbered. The first objection is that the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention 1) Act of 1949, which admittedly applies to the petitioner, contains no provision for instituting appeals against orders declining to grant leave to a declared vexatious litigant. As is well known, the remedy by way of appeal is a creature of statute, and not a common law right, and unless that remedy is expressly provided for, there can be no question of any intrinsic right to appeal. It is true that clause 15 of the Letters Patent was referred to by Sri V. C. Srikumar (amicus curiae); but we are unable to see that that provision applies. Undoubtedly, the orders of the learned Judge are administrative in character, declining to grant the leave, and they are in no sense judgments from which appeals would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Another objection, even more insuperable, is that the very appeals cannot be maintained by the declared vexatious litigant, without again obtaining leave of this court for the institution of such appeals. Admittedly such leave has not been obtained, and on this short ground also the unnumbered appeals are not maintainable.
4. Accordingly, the unnumbered appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.