Sundara Ayyar, J.
1. The plaintiff is the endorsee of a promissory-note executed by the defendants in favour of two persons Muthammal and Chenga Reddi. The defendants denied that the plaintiff paid any consideration of the promissory-note. It does not appear that the plan tiff claimed in the lower Court to be a holder in due course. No issue was framed to try that question. The promissory-note, Exhibit A, states that it was executed in pursuance of the razinamah presented by the parties in Calendar Case No. 121 of 1909. That razinamah, Exhibit B, states that the amount for which the promissory-note was executed was due as consideration for compounding Calendar Case No. 121. In that case the executants of the promissory-note were charged with grievous hurt caused to one Gopal Reddi who had died previous to the complaint. It is not denied that the offence could not have been legally compromised except with the Consent, of the person to whom grievous hurt was caused, and the agreement to compound was therefore one prohibited by law. It was not contended in the lower Court that the consideration for the promissory-note was anything different from wljat is stated in Exhibits A. and B. The agreement to pay money evidenced by the promisssory-note appears therefore to be clearly illegal. The learned vakil for the respondents contends that, as the complainant would also in law be entitled to claim damages for the injury caused to Gopala Reddi, the claim to damages must also be taken to be at least part of the consideration for the promissory-note. But this case was not set up in the lower court, and no evidence was given in support of any such allegation; I must take it therefore that the consideration was merely the compounding of the criminal offence. Mr. Grovindaraghava Ayyar has drawn my attention to Sheikh Nubbee Buksh v. Mussamut Bebee Hingon (1867) 8 W.R. 412. Whether in that case the claim to damages was also part of the consideration for the document in-question, I cannot say; but if the learned judges meant to lay down that, even though it may not be proved that such was the case, an agreement to pay money in consideration of compounding a criminal offence could be supported on the ground that the party who executes the agreement would also be liable for damages, I am unable with all deference to follow that judgment. It is also argued that, as the executants of the promissory note would be liable in a Civil Court for damages, the ends of justice do not require that this Court should interfere. I do not think that this Court as a Court of Revision has any power to consider justice apart from such justice as the law recognises. I believe there are some cases where Courts have gone to the extend contended for by Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar, but, in the absence of any decision of this Court binding on me, I am not prepared to hold that I can refuse to interfere; on the ground that moral, as opposed to legal, justice is a ground for refusing, to interfere in revision. No doubt, mere errors of procedure or technical defects not affecting the legal justice of a case will not be encouraged by a Court of Revision; but when the law prohibits an agreement and requires that effect should not be given to it, I am of opinion that I am bound to interfere. The order of the Lower Court must beset aside and the plaintiff's, suit dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.