Yahya Ali, J.
1. The question that is common to both these petitions is whether the prayer asked for in the plaints in O.S. Nos. 178 and 179 of 1943, on the file of the District Munsiff's Court, Guntur, amounted really to asking for a declaration that the orders complained of were ultra vires and illegal or whether they amounted to asking also for a restoration of the respective plaintiffs to the archaka's office.
2. It is conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that for ascertaining this the mere form of the prayer will not be looked into but the substance thereof. In the plaint in O.S. No. 178 the prayer is for a declaration that the order dated 18th December, 1940, by the trustee and the order dated 12th July, 1942, of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board regarding the plaintiff's dismissal are ultra vires of their powers and wholly illegal, unjust and void and hence do not affect the right of the plaintiff to the office of archaka in the suit temple. This idea of a declaration to the effect that the order does not affect the plaintiff's right to the archaka's office was also mentioned specifically in the same terms in paragraph III 6 (f) of the plaint as also in paragraph V. Likewise in the plaint in O.S. No. 179 of 1943, the Prayer is for a declaration couched in the same terms and that part of it which seeks for declaration that the plaintiff's right to the office of archaka is not affected, is repeated in two other places.
3. It is argued by Mr. Kameswara Rao that what the plaintiff intended to ask for was only a bare declaration concerning the illegal and ultra vires nature of the orders in question and that he did not intend to ask for his restoration to the office. The general reading of the plaints and the particular form in which the declaration has been asked for does not however support this contention. Holding then that in substance both the plaints prayed for the plaintiffs' restoration to the archaka's office, the question in whether the order of the lower Court returning the plaints for presentation to the proper Court is correct.
4. In Vasireddi Veeramma v. Butchayya (1926) 52 M.L.J. 381 : I.L.R. 50 Mad. 646 it was held that where the subject-matter is so related to things which have a real money value that the relief asked for will affect these, then the value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is to be taken as the market value of the property affected. In Dalrus Banoo Begam v. Nawab Sayeed Asgur Ali Khan (1875) 23 W.R. 453 the learned Judges observed:
They (the plaintiffs) ask not only that the defendant may be declared to have wasted the endowment and thereby to have betrayed her trust, but also that she may be turned out of her Mutavalleeship and they, the plaintiffs, be appointed in her room. The plaintiffs say that what they claim does not admit of being properly estimated by a money value, but this is not so. Under the towleutnamah mutavallees were to receive six twenty-eighths of the produce of the estate, a very considerable sum; and the plaintiffs' claim to this suit as an appurtenance to the office of mutavallee was easily to be estimated in money.
In the second plaint, the averment was made that the plaintiff's father had a two-third share in the archakathwam and as a result of a family partition, the plaintiff became entitled to two-ninth share in the same and that as per the established usage of the temple, plaintiff was getting his term of service performed by his brother since 1938 on an undertaking that the said Srinivasacharyulu should enjoy his share of income also in the inam for a term of five years and perform his terms of service during that period. There is therefore a direct reference to the emoluments and profits of the office. Having regard to the rulings cited above and the various recitals in the respective plaints and the declaration asked for and the relation that exists between the office and the emoluments attached thereto, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by the Courts below. Both the civil revision petitions are dismissed. Full costs in C.R.P. No. 1102 of 1944. No costs in C.R.P. No. 1103 of 194.4.