Raghava Rao, J.
1. The appellants before me are defendants 2 and 3 in the original suit which was one for a declaration that a surrender by defendant' 1, a Hindu widow, in favour of one Satyam as the then nearest reversioner who afterwards died, and a gift deed by Satyam to defendants 2 and 3 consequently are invalid against the plaintiff and the other reversioners to the estate of defendant 1's husband. The surrender deed (Ex. D. 1, dated 27th July 1937), the gift deed by Satyam (Ex. D-2 dated 31st July 1937), under which the appellants claim the property in their possession and another deed (Ex. D-3 dated 30th July 1937), a deed of sale by Satyam to a stranger of a small bit of the whole property surrendered for a small sum of Rs. 20 have been found by the lower appellate Court which confirmed the decree of the trial Court in the plaintiff's favour to be parts and parcels of a single and indivisible scheme by which defendant 1'a nominees, defendants 2 and 3, were to stand benefited. The trial Court's finding to use its language is that 'the surrender is not true and bona fide', and that therefore the gift in favour of defendants 2 and 3 is of no avail.
2. It is argued for the appellants by their learned counsel that they are Satyam's brother's widow and daughter as well as defendant 1's brother's daughter and daughter's daughter, and that their relationship to defendant 1, ought not, in view of their relationship also to Satyam himself, to prejudice them. The relationship may indeed be dual; but the finding of the Court below against the validity of the surrender and therefore of the later gift does not proceed on the sole basis of the appellants' relationship to defendant 1, as such. It rests on other facts too, and the finding cannot be disturbed on the ground urged.
3. It is next contended for the appellants that the lower appellate Court is wrong in applying the law as it has done to the facts found by it This is what the lower appellate Court has said in para. 15 of its judgment;
'The facts of this case appear to come within the principle laid down in Krishnamurthi v. Seshayya, 1944 1 M. L. J. 443: A. I. R. 1944 Mad. 439. It is true that in the present case there was a surrender of the whole estate and the surrender cannot be regarded as a device to divide the estate with the reversioner since the reversioner Satyam did not retain any part of the property but made a gift of it (except a small site covered by Ex. D-3) to defendants 2 and 3. The arrangement by which Satyam as consideration for the surrender promised to convey the major portion of the property except a small site to the nominees of defendant 1 equally offends the rule and falls within the principle enunciated In the above decision.'
The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the present case is covered by a ruling of this Court reported in Chella Subbiah Sastri v. Pattabhiramayya, 31 Mad. 446 and followed in Subbalakshmi v. Narayana lyer, 58 Mad. 150: A. I. R. 1934 Mad. 535. Reference is also made by learned counsel to Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage, latest edition, page 789, as showing that Chella, Subbiah Sastri v. Pattabhiramayya, 31 Mad. 446, is still good law and Subbulakshmi v. Narayana lyer, 58 Mad. 150: A. I. R. 1934 Mad. 535 has rightly followed it. True; but the point on which Chella, Subbiah Sastri v. Pattabhiramayya, 31 Mad. 446 is accepted in Mayne as good law is the point on which Subbulakshmi v. Narayana lyer, 58 Mad 150: A. I. R. 1934 Mad. 535 rightly follows it--namely that the widow's motive in making a surrender is immaterial and that therefore a surrender by her cannot be called in question on the ground of improper motive. That is also how the case is referred to at page 214 of the latest edition of Mullah's Principles of Hindu Law. Broadly speaking, the proposition so stated may be correct. But then, dealing with this case this is what Krishna Murthi v. Seshayya, 1944 1 M. L. J. 443; A.I.R 1944 Mad. 439 relied on by the lower appellate Court says;
'In that cage the whole of the widow's limited estate was conveyed to the next reversioner. Two days after the conveyance the next reversioner conveyed the greater part of the properties to the brothers of the widow, and thus fulfilled an undertaking which he had given to the widow. The surrender was held to be valid. Whether in view of the subsequent pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan, 42 Mad. 523: A. I. R. 1918 P. C. 196 and Sureshwar Misser v. Maheshrani Misrain, 48 Cal. 100: A. I. R. 1921 P. C. 107 the decision was correct may be doubted. The facts, however, clearly distinguish the case from the case with which we are dealing. The decision was based on the fact that there was an absolute surrender of the widow's estate to the reversioner which put him in a position to give a good title to a third party--the undertaking being regarded as relating only to the motive which actuated the widow and so irrelevant since, despite it, the reversioner could have retained the property for himself or conveyed it to whomsoever he pleased. In the present case the arrangement was one and indivisible and avoided the possibility that the reversioner might not fulfil the arrangement after the surrender to him had been made.'
4. With this view of Chella Subbiah Sastri v. Pattabhiramayya 31 Mad. 446, I respectfully agree. The argument or the appellants based on this decision must accordingly be repelled.
5. In the result the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
6. No leave.