Sadasiva Ayyar, J.
1. We are of opinion that in construing Exhibit B as granting only the kudivaram interest in the lands to the plaintiffs' ancestor, the lower Court misconstrued that document.
2. That document clearly alienates in perpetuity 125 rupees of the annual melvaram income in favour of the grantee under it and that grantee had thereafter, not to pay the 300 rupees which was 'the rent legally due upon it' (see definition of ryot in Section 3, Clause 15 of the Estates Land Act) but had to pay only the favourable kattubadi cist of Us. 175. Being the owner of a part of the melvaram right in the lands which formed part of the estate ryoti lands, he became owner of part of the estate, though the part owned by him did not itself come under the definition of 'Estate' in Section 3, Clause (2). The ratio of the decisions in Suryanarayana v. Ballayya Civil Revision Petition No. 895of 1910, Nukanna v. Sanyasi Naidu Second Appeal No. 168 of 1912, Appalanarasimhulu v. Sanyasi I.L.R. (1915) Mad. 33; 17 Ind.Cas. 120, Brundavanachandra Horischandra Raja v. Ramayya : (1914)26MLJ600 and Tungala Mallanna v. (Gottumukkala Ramaraju 23 Ind.Cas. 531, is that a person may not be the owner of an 'Estate' owing to the lands of which he is the owner not coming under the definition of the word 'Estate' but he may yet be a 'landholder' within the definition of Section 3, Clause (5), as owning the melvaram in a portion of an estate. In the case in The Baptist Missionary Society v. Rutnakaro Patro (1911) 2 M.W.N. 517, the definition of landholder is not referred to and considered in the judgment.
3. The plaintiffs being thus 'landholders,' tenants holding ryoti land under them for purposes of agriculture are ryots and cannot be ejected except by proceedings in a Revenue Court under the Estates Land Act (sections 151 to 153). The lower Court's decisions are reversed and the plaint will be returned to be presented to the proper Court. The plaintiffs must pay defendant's costs in all Courts,
4. It is clear from the grant (Exhibit B), and from the facts found by the lower Courts that the land in the enjoyment of the plaintiffs is not an estate falling under Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act as the grant had not been recognised by the British Government; and as it did not comprise one or more whole villages it further did not fall under the definition in Clause (e).
5. But it was undeniably a part of a permanently-settled estate and therefore if plaintiffs come within the definition of landholder in Section 3(5) the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court over a suit to eject a ryot was not ousted, following Brundavanachandra Horischandra Raja v. Ramayya : (1914)26MLJ600 , to which I was a party I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.