Pandrang Row, J.
1. This is an appeal from the decree of the District Judge of Cuddapah, dated 13th March 1933, confirming on appeal the order of the District Munsif of Proddatur, dated 19th July 1932 in E.P. No. 984 of 1931, which was an application made under Rule XIV-5 (b) of the Rules framed by the Local Government under Section 43, Co-operative Societies Act of 1912, The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies made an award or decree for the amount claimed against one M. Ramaswamiah for a sum of Rs. 4,400 odd and application was made to the District Munsif of Proddatur for the purpose of its being enforced. Rule XIV-5(b) is to the following effect:
The decision or award (of a Registrar) shall be enforced on application to the civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the decision or award. That Court shall then enforce the decision or award as if it were a decree of the Court.
2. It is clear that the subject matter of the decision or award was the liability of the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 4,400 odd to the Co-operative Building Society who made the application. The subject matter was thus beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif of Proddatur which is limited to Rs. 3,000. It is clear therefore that the District Munsif to whom the application was made had no jurisdiction to enforce the decision or award which was in excess of his pecuniary jurisdiction. The point is very clear, and it is a matter of surprise that this was not perceived by the District Munsif of his own accord. Objection was taken to his jurisdiction but it was not made very clear that the objection was on the ground that the subject matter of the decision or award exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. Some misunderstanding arose because objection was also taken at the same time to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar to make the award. The contention of the appellant was put in the following words:
As the decree in question was passed when no reference was or could be pending before the Deputy Registrar, it was passed without jurisdiction. It is therefore null and void. The decree is therefore not executable, nor is it executable by this Court.
3. The last few words appear to adumbrate an objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. But the significance of those words was not perceived, and the District Munsif only dealt with the question whether Deputy Registrar had jurisdiction to pass the decision or award or make the decree in question, and having answered this question in the affirmative, he came to the conclusion that he had nothing else to do but to enforce it. Objection on the score of pecuniary jurisdiction was taken expressly in the lower appellate Court, and in fact that was the only point taken during the appeal and argued before the lower appellate Court. That objection was overruled on the curious ground that the objection was one which came within the provisions of Section 21, Civil P.C., and could not therefore be entertained because it was not made in the first Court, that is to say, at the earliest possible opportunity. Even assuming that the objection had not been made in the first Court, it is obvious that Section 21, Civil P.C., relates to objections as to place of suing and it has nothing to do with any objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. It is therefore clear that the provisions of Section 21, Civil P.C., to the effect that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice, do not apply to the present case. The learned District Judge has dealt with the objection on an entirely unsustainable ground under the belief that the objection was one to which Section 21, Civil P.C., applied. The objection really was to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, and as the objection was clearly well founded it ought to have been allowed. The objection is one which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the original Court to whom the application was made, and the objection which has to be allowed has the result that the Court to which the application was made was not competent or had no authority to deal with it. That being the case the application should have been dismissed in limine on this ground, if not by the first Court, at least by the lower appellate Court. This civil miscellaneous second appeal must therefore be allowed with costs in this Court and in the Courts below, and the application of the Co-operative Building Society dismissed. (Leave to appeal refused)