1. The question is whether plaintiff's suits brought to recover on Policies of Insurance issued by Companies having their offices outside South Canada, were properly brought in the District. The lower Court held that they were not.
2. It is argued, first, that plaintiff could sue in South Canada, because the Companies' acceptance of the policy-holder's proposals was completed only by their communication to the plaintiff there. The lower Court did not find on the question where the communication took place, because this contention was not relied on before it. For the same reason we cannot consider it in appeal.
3. Next it is contended that plaintiff could sue in Sooth Canada, because the policy holder died there, and his death was part of the cause of action in each case. This contention is in accordance with the definition of the term 'cause of action' contained in Read v. Brown (1), which Courts in this country have adopted so frequently that vie do not fee! at liberty to depart from it. It is, moreover, supported directly by Cailland v. Champion (2) and is consistent with the reference to a part of the cause of action in Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure. We, therefore, accept it.
4. In these circumstances we do not deal with the alternative suggestion that the cause of action arose in part where the proposal was made by the insured person to the Company, or with the suggestion made in appeal against order No. 96 of 1913 that it was inconsequence of a special term in the policy constituted by the payment of the first premium.
5. The appeals are accordingly allowed, the lower Courts' decision being set aside with a direction to accept the plaints on re-presentation and deal with them according to law. Costs in this Court and in the lower Court to date will be costs in the cause and be provided for in the decrees to be passed.