1. If there were reason to suppose that the false statement of the 1st defendant that he was not a benamidar substantially influenced the Subordinate Judge in giving the decree now sought to be set aside, then we should agree with the Lower Appellate Court and dismiss the second appeal. But reading Exhibit II, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, we find no reference whatever is made to the above false statement. The Subordinate Judge solely on the strength of the fact that the sale certificate stood in the name of the 1st defendant, plaintiff in that case, cast the burden of proof upon the 1st defendant in that case, and as the burden was not discharged gave a decree for the plaintiff in that case. He would apparently have given the same decree even if the plaintiff in that case had not gone into the box. In Venkatappa Naick v. Subba Naick 29 M.k 179 there seems to have been no question that the perjury led to the passing of the decree. We are not prepared to hold that a decree obtained by a plaintiff is liable to be set aside merely because some false evidence has been given on the side of the plaintiff. It must be shown further that the evidence substantially influenced the judgment: We, therefore, reverse the decree of the District Judge and restore the decree of the District Munsif with costs in this and the Lower Appellate Court.