1. The only question that has been argued is the question of limitation, the contention being that plaintiffs' cause of action arose on the ,date of the appellate decree declaring that defendants in that suit had no saleable interest in the land, i.e., 20th February 1911. Whether, therefore. Article 97 or Article 120 applies to the suit filed on 18th October 1917, it is out of time, if the starting point is 20th February 1911. The Subordinate Judge has taken the date of the High Court decree affirming, the Sub-Court decree as the date of the cause of action, but we think, he is wrong by reason of the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Hukum Chand Boid (Juscurn Boid) v. Pirthichand Lal Chowdhury 50 Ind. Cas. 444 : 21 Bom. L.R. 632 where it was held that, the starting point for limitation is the date of the first Court's decree and not the date of the appellate decree confirming the same. That principle has been applied by their lordships to a case under Article 97, but the j principle is equally applicable to suits under Article 120. In Jayanti Venkayya v. Damisetti Sathiraju 64 Ind. Cas. 470 an application for a final mortgage-decree under Article 181 was held not to come within the above principle on the ground that it was in its nature an application in execution and that, therefore, the specific provision of Article 182 should be applied. There is no such reason for not applying the principle of Hukum Chand Boid ; Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal Chowdhury 50 Ind. Cas. 444 : 21 Bom. L.R. 632 to the present case, and if it is applied, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. We, therefore, accept the appellants' contention, allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs throughout.