1. It is not disputed that, if the covenant or condition which gives plaintiff a cause of action were a covenant to be implied under Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Article of limitation applicable would be 143. Even if the covenant in the present case amounts to a contract to the contrary within the meaning of Section 119, as was held of a similar covenant in Second Appeal No. 663 of 1916, the period of limitation would appear to be the same, for the contract to the contrary in this case merely limits the option provided by Section 119 and is in effect a specific contract of the same nature as one of the contracts implied in Section 119. We do not think this question was considered in S.A. No. 1663 of 1916, to which one of us was a party, for it appears to have been assumed in that case that if there was a specific contract of any kind, Article 113 would apply. The covenant in this case is in the nature of a condition subsequent and the action is based on a breach of that condition and, therefore, Article 143 is applicable and the suit is within time.
2. The further contention for the respondent that he cannot be bound as he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice can be met by the fact that the transferee can obtain no larger estate than his transferor.
3. The second appeal is accordingly allowed with costs both here and in the lower Appellate Court and the District Munsif's decree restored.