(1) The only point urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that the lower appellate court went wrong in holding that Act 30 of 1956 gave no right to the appellant to question the sale. A few facts may be stated to appreciate the point raised by the learned counsel. A decree was obtained against the father of the appellants and in execution of that decree the property was brought to sale and purchased by the decree-holder himself. On the date of the sale, Central Act 30 of 1956 had not come into force. The appellant who is one of the daughters of the judgment-debtor contends that the sale in execution was being contested by her mother and the contest raised by the mother was ultimately decided in favour of the decree-holder by this court after Act 30 of 1956 came into force, and consequently by reason of the pendency of the proceedings regarding the validity of the sale it is urged that the sale must be deemed to have become valid only on the date when this court decided the matter in favour of the decree-holder.
(2) I am unable to accept this contention. The fact that the right of the daughter to claim a share in the property came into existence only after the sale took place is sufficient to show that she is not competent to question the sale. Act 30 of 1956 gives a new right to a daughter to claim a share in her father's property and that right can operate only from the date when the Act comes into force. Admittedly the sale took place long prior to Act 30 of 1956, came into force. The mere pendency of a litigation questioning the sale of the property of her father would not give the appellant any right to contend that the sale became valid only at the close of litigation. Nor could the principle of lis pendens, be applied to this case. The appeal is dismissed.
(3) Appeal dismissed.