1. The 2nd defendant sued the 1st defendant for recovery of her husband's share of the family properties alleging that her husband and 1st defendant were divided. The Original Suit No. 708 of 1919 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Penukonda was compromised by which she admitted there was no division, accepted three acres and odd absolutely for herself, and gave up the rest of the property moveable and immoveable. The Courts below found that the compromise was binding on the parties to it and no fraud on the 2nd defendant (the then plaintiff) has been proved but that the 2nd defendant and the 1st defendant colluded and entered into the compromise, by which she obtained a benefit personal for herself and it is not binding on the plaintiff who is the reversioner. In all such cases the questions (1) whether the compromise of the widow is bona fide, and (2) whether the compromise amounts to an alienation depend on the true facts as found in the later suit on the terms obtained by the widow in the compromise, i. e., whether she was surrendering any portion of her rights as now ascertained with reference to the facts and how much, whether she was reserving any benefit for herself personally as opposed to the estate, and lastly, whether the real facts were known to her. That she obtained a benefit peculiar to herself should be a good proof of want of bona fides. [See Imrit Konwar v. Roop Narain Singh (1880) CriLR 76 distinguished; Ramasumran v. Shyam Kumari (1922) 1 Pat 741 : 44 MLJ 751].
2. In the first place as to the three acres obtained by the widow it is clear that the compromise in this case cannot be upheld on the footing of a family settlement for the widow did not act for herself and the enlargement of her personal estate cannot bind the reversioner. The antecedent title, with reference to which she got the three and odd acres, was that of her husband and plaintiff still remains a reversioner for that property [Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain I.L.R. (1911) A 356 : 21 MLJ 645.
3. Coming to the rest, the Courts below have found that the facts are such that the compromise could not be bona fide. The 2nd defendant went to Court on the footing that there was a division but abandoned it for no apparent reason whereas the division is now completely established and must have been known to her [see Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran I.L.R. (1886) A 365 ]. The decision in Mndan Lal v. Chuttan Singh (1912) 10 ALJ 101 is a decision on the facts. In Bihari Lal v. Dand Husain I.L.R. (1913) A 242 the Lower Appellate Court found there was a bona fide settlement and the finding was accepted by the High Court. In Kodakkarai Nadan v. Nadakkannu Nadan (1921) MWN 342 there was no finding when the case came up originally before the High Court. A finding on the question whether the compromise was bona fide was called for.
4. The District Judge found it was bona fide and the finding was accepted by the High Court. As to Kambinayani Timmap v. Kambinayani Subbaraju I.L.R. (1910) M 473 : 20 MLJ 204, it is enough to observe that Imrit Konwar v. Roop Narain Singh (1880) 6 CLR 76 and Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran I.L.R. (1886) A 365 were concurred and that I cannot agree with all other observations in it. It seems to me that whenever a compromise by which the widow surrenders property to which she is entitled on the true facts has been found to be not bona fide, it amounts to an alienation.
5. It may be that in Kambinayani Timmaji v. Kambinayani Subbaraju : (1910)20MLJ204 the compromise was bona fide.
6. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.