1. I cannot agree with Mr Ramakrishna Ayyar's contention for the plaintiff that the provision in Ex. A (of 1906) regarding the rate of compensation to be paid for improvements then existing is saved by the proviso to Section 19, Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act. In my opinion 'settling the amount of compensation' in that proviso does not include settling the rate of compensation Go be paid for existing improvements at some future date if they survive.
2. The District Munsif has awarded compensation in accordance with the lease,' Ex.-C of 1884 for improvements made before the date of the next renewal, Ex.-B, in 1897. The learned District Judge's view is that the entire force of the contract of 1884 has been destroyed by the renewal of 1897. He is not accurate in speaking of the renewal in 1897 as implying a surrender of the lease of 1884 as the term of that lease had already expired and we have no evidence of any year to year tenancy having come into force after its expiry. Section 5 (2), Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, though it provides that a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of his lease until the payment for his improvements is made shall hold as a tenant subject to the terms of his lease', has not, in my opinion, the effect of preventing the determination of the tenancy for other purposes by expiry of the term. And even when a renewal is taken after 1st January 1886 before the expiry of a prior lease granted before that date, the implied surrender of the prior lease need not render of no effect a contract in the prior lease regarding compensation for improvements. At the time of renewal the parties may enter into a contract that for the improvements then existing compensation shall be paid under the provisions of the Act or on terms more favourable to the tenant. But I see nothing in the Act or in general principles to prevent them from reiterating then that compensation for those improvements shall be paid at the rates fixed in the prior lease or from leaving themselves bound by silence to those rates for those improvements. However, it is not necessary to discuss these questions in detail, as in Rayarappa v. Kelappa Kurup  40 Mad. 594, it has been decided by a Full Bench that even after the 1st January 1886, parties who before that date had made a contract regarding the rates of compensation to be paid are bound by that contract. My attention has been drawn to S. A. 215 of 1924, in which Jackson, J., remarked that the ruling in Rayarappa v. Kelappa Kurup  40 Mad. 594, is not applicable to a case where there has been a renewal after 1st January 1886 and went on to say:
It does not cover a case where over and above the original contract another contract has been entered into after the passing of the Act.
3. With great respect I must point out. that this last statement appears to be mistaken. The statement of facts in the report of Rayarappa v. Kelappa Kurup  40 Mad. 594, shows that in that case there was a renewal in 1898, and an examination of the papers shows that there were also renewals in 1888. Mr. Krishna Variar for the defendants points out that those renewals are not mentioned in the opinion' of the Full Bench. That is so. But it is difficult to suppose that none of the five learned Judges of the Full Bench noticed that there had been renewals after 1st January 1886 and that the Full Bench would have failed to mention the renewals at all if they had in any way affected the questions referred for opinion. And it is indeed impossible to suppose that the learned Judges who made the reference to the Full Bench and the learned Judge who eventually disposed of that case in the light of the opinion of the Full Bench entirely overlooked such an obvious feature of the case.
4. Following Rayarappa v. Kelappa Kurup  40 Mad. 594, I must regard the District Munsif's decision that compensation for the improvements made between 1884 and 1897 must be fixed in accordance with the contract of 1884 as correct. The appeal is allowed and the District Munsif's decree is restored subject to the District Judge's finding in respect of Items 11, 12 and 15-18 with costs in this Court and the District Court.
5. The time for redemption will be extended to 6 months from this day.