Abdur Rahman, J.
1. An order was passed by the President of the District Board of Guntur on the 7th February, 1939, appointing defendant 1 as temporary President to conduct an election of the President of the Panchayat Board of Inukollu (Ex. XXV). Notices to the members of the Panchayat Board intimating that the election of the President would be held on the 25th February, 1939, are stated to have been issued on the 16th February, 1939, Exs. XII to XXIII. It was alleged on behalf of the first and second defendants that certain proceedings took place on the date mentioned in which the second defendant was elected to be the President. An order was passed by the Government of Madras on the 12th May, 1939, G.O. No. 1879 (Ex. VIII), holding that the second defendant was validly elected. It is not necessary for me to refer to any more letters written by or on behalf of the Inspector of Municipal Councils subsequently. But before the election was held on the 25th February, 1939, a suit was instituted by the plaintiff against defendant 1 for an injunction restraining him from holding an election. A temporary injunction was also asked for but it was not granted. After the so-called election the second defendant was impleaded by an order of this Court passed in C. M. P. 2481 of 1939 on the 6th June, 1939, as a party to the suit.
2. The main question that has to be decided now relates to the maintainability of the suit. The plaintiff alleged that in point of fact there was no election. The first Court, the District Munsif of Bapatla held against the plaintiff but on appeal his judgment was reversed by the Subordinate Judge and the suit decreed. The second defendant has consequently come up to this Court in second appeal.
3. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that:
The Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
4. In order to determine therefore whether the present suit is not maintainable in a Civil Court, I have to decide whether the .cognisance of the present suit is either expressly or impliedly barred. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that Section 19' of the Madras Local Boards Act read along with Rule 1 framed by the Local Government constitutes the bar and the Civil Courts are not entitled to adjudicate on this question. The oontention on behalf of the plaintiff really is that there was no election at all. He is not objecting to the election on the ground of any irregularity but denies the election having been held on the 25th February, 1939. Section 19 of the Act provides that the election of appointment of a President of a Local Board shall be notified in the prescribed manner. This obviously has no application at the present moment. Rule 1 framed by the Local Government under the Local Boards Act reads as follows:
Save as otherwise provided, no election held under the Act whether of member, President or Vice-President of a local board shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with these rules to the election Commissioner as defined by Sub-rule 2 by any candidate or elector against the candidate who has been declared to have been duly elected (hereinafter called the returned candidate).
5. It assumes that an election was held under the Act and if an election is admitted to have been held, there is no doubt that the procedure would be as provided for by this rule and it could not be called in question except by an election petition. But as pointed out above, that is not the dispute in this case. The contention is that no election was held. This rule does not debar a Civil Court from going into the question whether an election was in point of fact held or not. If the Court comes to a finding that an election was held, it must at once stay its hands and allow the procedure under Rule 1 to take its normal course. If, on the other hand, it comes to a decision that no election was held, its duty is equally clear. It must grant a declaration that no election was held. It is not necessary for me to go into the question as to what would happen to the notification issued by the Local Government declaring that an election was actually held or what the result of that particular election was. No authority has been shown to me that this declaration by the Local Government is final in regard to the factum of election and cannot be questioned in a Civil Court. In the absence of any such provision, the provision contained in Section 9, Civil Procedure Code, must be allowed to have its full effect. My attention was drawn by learned Counsel for the appellant to Section 234(3) where it is laid down that the action of the Local Government in regard to certain matters mentioned in that section would be final and binding on the authorities mentioned in that section. That section has no application to the present case. It clearly shows that, whenever the Legislature wished to make a decision by the Local Government final, it said so. Nothing has been said in the Act declaring a notification by the Local Government under Section 19 to be final in regard to the factum of election and, in the absence of any such provision, it is impossible to hold that the Civil Courts have no power to adjudicate on that question.
6. A feeble attempt was made towards the end to contend that the Local Government should have been impleaded as a defendant in the case, but no such objection was ever raised at the time when the suit was taken up for trial and it is impossible for a party to raise an objection regarding non-joinder for the first time in second appeal. I would therefore hold that the Civil Court was entitled to entertain the present claim and adjudicate on the question whether the election was held or not. The lower appellate Court's finding that the election was not held in fact is a finding of fact and binds me in second appeal. It would therefore follow that the suit for declaration was rightly decreed. As regards the injunction my attention was drawn by learned Counsel for the appellant to Section 295(a) of the Act, but under that section an injunction cannot be issued for the preparation or publication of the electoral rolls or for the conduct of any election. We are not dealing either with the preparation or publication of electoral rolls or with the conduct of any election in this case. If we were, Section 225(a) of the Act would certainly apply. But unfortunately for the appellant we are not. In view of the fact that the lower Court came to the decision that the election was not held, not only was a decree for declaration correctly passed by the Court, but the relief as to injunction was rightly granted. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
7. Leave to appeal refused.