Raghava Rao, J.
1. In this appeal by defendant 2, in a suit for partition by the undivided sons of defendant 1, the point taken for the appellant is that the person under whom he claims as devisee--one C. Seetharamanjaneyulu--acquired, at the sale by the Official Receiver in the insolvency of defendant 1, not merely the interest of the insolvent in the joint family estate as would be the case under the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Ramasastrulu v. Balakrishna Rao, I. L. R. (1943) Mad. 83: A. I. R. 1942 Mad. 682, but also the interests of the sons, the plaintiffs, as well, by reason of Act (XXV  of 1948), which as pointed out in the ruling of this Court in Ammanna v. Ramakrishna, I. L. R. (1949) Mad. 904: A. I. R. 1949 Mad. 886 has altered the law as laid down by the Full Bench and altered with retrospective effect. The point so taken has not been, as indeed it could not be, resisted by the learned advocate for the respondents l and 2. A question of ultra vires in relation to Act XXV  of 1948 was raised recently before another Bench of this Court (Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Aiyar JJ.) in A. S. No. 473 of 1946 which was decided adversely to the contention that it was ultra vires the Legislature. Mr. Ramachandra Rao for the contesting respondents urges that that point may also be noted as one raised by him before us. He further asks that we may grant him leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We accordingly note the point of ultra vires that he has raised, but shall take up this matter for consideration tomorrow on the question whether leave to appeal can be granted by us even now or only by means of a separate petition.
2. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances without costs.
3. The memorandum of objections shall stand dismissed with costs.
(This appeal having been set down this day for orders, the Court made the following order:)
4. Raghava Rao J.--We have heard arguments on the question whether we are to certify that the present case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is pointed out to us that a certificate was granted by another Bench of this Court, before which the question of ultra vires of Act (XXV  of 1948) was raised.
5. It is agreed that there need be no separate petition for the certificate now sought. We accordingly certify that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution, namely, whether Act XXV  of 1948 is ultra vires the Dominion Legislature which passed it.