1. We are unable to accept the finding of the District Judge that the first plaintiff is the only person interested in the contract. The agreement to sell, Exhibit A, expressly states that the contract is in favour of the first plaintiff and others, The case for the first plaintiff is that the others referred to in the document are the second and third plaintiffs, The case for the contesting defendant is that by others were intended the other plaintiffs, the sixth defendant and 20 other villagers. The only evidence is that of first plaintiff and first defendant. The first plaintiff says that the others means second, and third plaintiffs, and the first defendant in his evidence lays that 'others' means second and third plaintiffs, sixth defendant and 20 others. The sixth defendant in his written statement also says so. Having regard to the terms of the document, the written statement and the evidence in this case, we find it difficult to see how the Court can find that the first plaintiff was solely interested in the contract or how a decree can be passed in favour of the first plaintiff alone.
2. It is argued by the appellant's Vakil that evidence is not admissible to show who are meant by the term 'others' and that the contract is, therefore, unenforceable. Where a vendor agrees to sell land to several named persons and in drawing up agreement of sale the name of one person is mentioned and, without naming the rest, the the word 'others' is used, we can find nothing in the Evidence Act to prevent evidence from being let in as to the persons in whose favour the conveyance is to be executed. We do not think that any of the provisions of Section 91 or 92 are contravened nor does the case fall within Sections 93 to 97 of the Evidence Act.
3. As there is no dispute that the three plaintiffs are interested, and as the only point in issue between parties is whether the sixth defendant and 20 others are also interested, the lower Court was wrong in passing a decree in favour of the first plaintiff alone.
4. We reverse the decree and remand the appeal for disposal in the light of the above observations. Costs will abide the result. The Court-fee will be refunded.