S. Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.
1. The respondent was enrolled as an Advocate of the Madras High Court on 31-7-1950. He was subsequently appointed as a Sub-Magistrate. When he was employed in that capacity, he is alleged to have committed certain acts amounting to misconduct on the part of a Government servant. In respect of such conduct disciplinary proceedings were taken in the Andhra Stats where he was doing the duties of a Sub-Magistrate. In the departmental enquiry that was held the charges were held to have been proved; he was dismissed from service. Thereafter, the respondent wishing to resume practice as an Advocate intimated to the Bar Council of his intention. There was also a letter to the Registrar of this court from the respondent. That letter was duly communicated to the Bar Council which framed a number of charges, against the respondent which were-almost identical with the charges framed against him while holding the office of a Judicial Second Class Magistrate at Jammalmadugu in, the State of Andhra Pradesh, stating that by reason of such conduct, he was unworthy of being a member of the Bar.
2. The respondent filed a written statement denying that he was guilty of the offences with which he was charged. After some vicissitudes, the Tribunal of the Bar Council proceeded to enquire into the matter. Before the Tribunal, the respondent did not appear. The only material the Tribunal had was the record relating to the disciplinary proceedings which charged him with misconduct as a Sub Magistrate. The tribunal felt that the records available put beyond all manner of doubt that the respondent, as a Judicial Second Class Magistrate, behaved in the most reprehensible manner and was guilty of the offences of bribery with which he was charged. It also took the view that though the misconduct might have been committed while he was a Judicial Magistrate, those offences, if proved, would come within the mischief of Section 10[l) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926, in that they were of the category of 'other misconduct' contemplate in that section. The Tribunal has therefore reported that the respondent was guilty of the misconduct charged. In so doing, the Tribunal based its conclusion on the decision of the Privy Council in Advocate General, Bombay v. Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha where it was held that on an advocate being convicted of a criminal offence, such conviction would itself be evidence of misconduct within the meaning of Section 10(1). of the Bar Councils Act.
3. We are unable to accept that rule with respect to administrative enquiries. In the present case, there has been no criminal charge against the respondent in respect of the offence charged and consequently there has been no adjudication by the ordinary courts of the land in regard to that matter. What all we have is punishment inflicted upon the respondent after enquiry in disciplinary proceedings. There has been no attempt before the Tribunal to prove the offences themselves even prima facie and as such, we have no option but to refuse to accept the report and to remit the case for a further enquiry by the Tribunal. It has to be noticed that as Chapter V of the Advocates Act has come into force, this court's jurisdiction will hereafter be subject to the provisions of that Act. There is also the fact that the Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh might be interested in the matter regarding the application of the respondent; notice has vet to be given in regard to that matter. The' learned Advocate General realising that several matters require fresh. consideration seeks permission to withdraw the present complaint with liberty to initiate proceedings if necessary for the same purpose. We allow him to do so.