1. The tenant is the petitioner. The respondents-landlords filed apetition in R. C. 0. P. No. 7 of -1979 for an order of eviction against the petitioner under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) According to the case of the respondents the property in the occupation of the petitioner belonged to the joint family of respondents I to 3, their father and brother one deceased Gopalan. In 19o,the father renounced the world and became an ascetic and also released his share in the property in favour of his sons, the respondents 1 to 3 herein and Gopalan. Gopalan, the brother of respondents 1 to 3 and husband of the fourth respondent and father of respondents 5 and 6, died subsequently and the respondents became the owners of the property in question. The petitioner, according to the case of the respondents, became a tenant in respect of this property through one Venkatanathan. On an earlier occasion, an application for eviction in R. C. 0. P. No 14 of 1971 was filed by the first respondent herein against Venkatanathan since deceased, and the petitioner on the ground of willful default and that the petitioner is a sub-lessee under Venkatanathan and the application for eviction was allowed by the Rent Controller and the order was affirmed in appeal. But in C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973, it was held that the petitioner is a direct tenant of the first respondent and others. The respondents stated that the mother of respondents 1 to 3 is an old pious, religious and orthodox lady and lag anxious to spend the evening of her life at Kumbakonam with a view to take dips in the holy Cauvery and have the worship of the deity in the temple in order to secure salvation for her soul. It was also the further case of the respondents that the third respondent had been insaneior some years and that the doctors had advised that his recovery would be faster if there is a change of climate and environment and, therefore, the respondents bona fide needed the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for these purposes. The respondents further stated that in spite of the adjudication in C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973, the petitioner did not pay any rent from October 1973 till the end of 1978, though the tenancy commenced from May 1970 onwards and the default in the payment of rents committ4 by the petitioner was characterised as willful default. The respondents also stated that as regards the advance of Rs. 2,000/'- which was directed by the order in C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973 to be adjusted against the rents payable by the petitioner, it could not be so done because the petitioner instituted a suit in 0. S. No. 238 of 1973, District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam, against Venkatanathan and the first respondent herein and also obtained a decree against the said Venkatanathan. Alleging that in spite of several notices, the petitioner had not paid the rents and that such non-payment was willful, the respondents filed the application for eviction as, aforesaid under Sections 10(2)''M and 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act.
2. The petitioner, while accepting the status of the first respondent as landlord, disputed that of the respondents 2 to 6. According to the case of the petitioner, Venkatanathan, an agent of the first respondent required a sum of Rupees 2,000/- to be given as advance to be adjusted towards the future rents for the purpose of carrying out repairs to the building and that when the building was so let out in 1970, top petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 2,000/-. But Venkatanathan did not effect any repair, nor did he provide water tap- connection as optimized. In addition, the petitioner also claimed that municipal taxes, repair charges, water tap connection charges, additional electric deposits, etc. have all been paid by him and these amounts as well as the amount of Rs. 2,000/- have to be adjusted as against the rents payable by the petitioner. Referring to the proceedings initiated on the former occasion in R. C. - 0. P. No. 14 of 1971 by the Ist respondent herein, the petitioner stated that it was only on account of the stand taken by the first respondent regarding the advance amount of Rupees 2,000/-, the petitioner was obliged to institute the suit in 0. S. No. 238 of 1973 and obtained a decree against Venkatanathan and claimed that the costs in that suit has also to be adjusted towards the rent. The petitioner appended the details of the amounts paid and expenses incurred by him and according to this statement, the rent payable by the petitioner for the period in question would be Rs. 10,600/-, while the amounts expended by him in respect of the house in the payment of property taxes, water tap connection charges, repair charges, additional electric 1eposit, etc. totaled up to Rs. 10,928.46. In other words, the petitioner pleaded that there was an excess amount in a sum of Rupees 328.46 P. to his credit which had to be adjusted towards the rent for future months. The petitioner, therefore, contended that there was no question of any default much less wilful default in the payment of rents as claimed by the respondents. The requirement by the respondents of the premises in question for the purpose of the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 as well as for accommodating the third respondent was stated to be not bona fide. An objection that the petition for eviction is also bad for disjoined of- respondents 2 to 6 who are not landlords was also taken. On these grounds, the petitioner prayed for. the dismissal of the application for eviction filed by the respondents.
3. The learned Rent Controller (District Munsif), Kumbakonam, on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, held that the application filed by the respondents is maintainable and that the claim of adjustment made by the petitioner in respect of all the amounts detailed in the counter cannot be allowed and that even deducting such adjustable and allowable amounts as have been claimed by the petitioner, the petitioner owes considerable amounts to the respondents and that there was no justification whatever for the non-payment of the rents ever since the date of inception of the tenancy and that -such non-payment of the rents, in the circumstances of the case, would be nothing but willful. On the question whether the resp6ndents have established that they bona fide require the premises in the occupation of the petitioner, the Rent Controller took into account the circumstances of the case and on the evidence concluded that the respondents have established that they bona fide require the building for accommodating their mother. on these conclusions, an order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred an appeal in C. M. A- No. 43 of 1979 to the Appellate Authority (Sub Court) Kumbakonam. The Appellate Authority, on a consideration of the stand taken by the petitioner in the reply notice issued by the petitioner as well as in the course of the proceedings in R. C. 0. P. No. 14 of 1.971, held that the application for eviction at the instance of the respondents was maintainable, as the petitioner had admitted that the respondents would be the landlords in respect of the property in his occupation. On the question bf willful default, the Appellate Authority held that certain amounts claimed by the petitioner by way of adjustment could not be so adjusted as the expenditure was incurred by the petitioner without the consent of the respondents and that even after adjusting some of the payments made by the petitioner, the petitioner had not satisfactorily explained the non-payment of the rents for several years after the commencement of the tenancy and in that view held that the petitioner had committed willful default in the payment of rents. As regards the bona fide requirement of the respondents, the Appellate Authority concluded that it had not been established that the third respondent is an insane person and that for the purpose of accommodating him and also for the purpose of enabling the mother of respondents I to 3 to spend. the evening of her life at Kumbakonam, the premises is required bona fide. In view of the conclusions arrived at on the question of willful default, the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
4. The question of the maintainability of the application for eviction by the respondents herein has been found in their favour by the authorities below. Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not in any manner challenge this finding of the authorities below. Even otherwise, it is found from the terms of the release deed Exhibit A-1 dated 28-1-1063 that the father of respondents 1 to 3 Srinivasaraghavachariar had become an ascetic and had released his share in the property in favour of his sons, namely, respondents 1 to 3 herein and deceased Gopalan and, therefore, all the four sons became entitled to the property and after the death of Gopalan, the respondents 4 to 6 are also entitled to the share of the deceased Gopalan. It is thus obvious that the respondents are the persons who are entitled to the property and also entitled to receive rents there from and would undoubtedly be landlord in relation to the building in the occupation of the petitioner. Exhibit A-4 is the certified copy of the reply notice dated 5-1-1971 sent by the petitioner's advocate -n R. C. 0. P. No. 14 of 1971 and Exhibit A-5 is the counter filed by the petitioner in those proceedings. Under Exhibits A-4 and A-5, the petitioner has specifically taken up the position that the first respondent herein alone is not the owner of the premises and that it belongs to his other brothers as well. As a matter of fact, under Exhibit A-5, the petitioner has stated that the application filed by the first respondent in R.C.O.P. No. 14 of 1971 is bad for the non-joinder of the other brothers. In the course of the deposition of the petitioner who has been examined as R. W. 1, the petitioner has admitted the correctness of what has been stated under Exhibits A-4 and A-5. Under these circumstances, the objection raised by the petitioner that the application for eviction filed by the respondents is not maintainable cannot be sustained. The finding of the authorities below that the petitioner had accepted in the prior proceedings that all the brothers of the first respondent would be landlords and, therefore, the respondents I to 3 and the legal representatives of the deceased brother Gopalan who are respondents 4 to 6 would be landlords entitled to maintain the application, is perfectly correct and does not suffer from any infirmity.
5. The question whether the petitioner committed willful defaults in the payment of rents may be now considered. In the application for eviction, the respondents have stated that the petitioner came into possession of the property in May 1970 through one Venkatanathan and that the rents had remained unpaid from October 1973 till the end of 1978. In answer to this, the petitioner claimed that he is entitled to adjust the rents payable by him are, against the amounts expended by him and detailed in the counter filed by him. It is not in dispute that even since the inception of the tenancy, no amount had been paid by the petitioner towards rent to the respondents. It would be convenient to take up the items mentioned in the counter of the petitioner and to find out how far the petitioner is in order- in claiming an adjustment with reference to those amounts.
6. The first item mentioned by the petitioner is a sum of Rs. 2,000/- paid on 22-4-1970 by cheque as advance., It is found from the evidence that this cheque was cashed by one Venkatanathan who had been held to be the agent of, the first respondent in C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973. R. C. 0. P. No. 14 of 1971 was filed by the first respondent herein against Venkatanathan and the petitioner on the ground of willful default in the payment of rents and that Venkatanathan was the main tenant and the petitioner was a sub-lessee under him and, therefore, an order for eviction should be passed. Though the Rent Controller as well as. the Appellate Authority in C. M. A. No. 25 of 1972 upheld the contention~ of the first respondent herein, in C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973 disposed of on 16-1-1974, it was held that the Petitioner vase the tenant of the first respondent and that Venkatanathan merely functioned as the agent of the first respondent and that there was no default in the payment of rent. It was also further found that Venkatanathan had received the amount of Rs. 2000/from the petitioner as advance to be adjusted in future rents. Though this was the final adjudication in the Civil Revision Petition, yet, even during the pendency, the petitioner instituted a suit in O. S. No. 238 of 1973, in the District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam, for he recover of the sum of Rs. 2,000/against Venkatanathan and the first, respondent herein. The suit was decreed against Venkatanathan and was dismissed against the first respondent. The plaint in that suit has been marked as Exhibit A-7 and the judgment therein is marked as Exhibit A-9. Presumably, while disposing of C. R. P. No. 2418 of 1973, this court proceeded on the footing that the amount of Rs. 2,000/- received by Venkatanathan as advance would be available for adjustment. But the subsequent events, namely, the institution of 0. S. No. 238 of 1973, in District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam, and the obtaining of a decree for that amount against Venkatanathan rendered the adjustment impossible, with the result that it is not open to the petitioner to claim that that amount should be adjusted As against the rents payable by the petition & in -respect of his occupation of the premises belonging to the respondents here. The evidence of the petitioner examined as R. W. 1 also indicates that the amount of Rs. 2,000/advanced to Venkatanathan is shown in the loan account and that it is not mentioned that it was in respect of advance towards the' house. It is also the further evidence of R. W. 1 that he 'filed an application for executing the decree in 0. S. No. 238 of 1973 and that he did not file any full satisfaction memo therein. This evidence of R. W. 1 would clearly indicate that the sum of Rupees 2,000/- had nothing whatever to do with the advance as such and that even if it was paid to Venkatanathan as such, the petitioner had obtained a decree against him and had also executed that decree and had not entered a full satisfaction, with the result that the decree is (till outstanding. Under those circumstances, the amou4t of Rs. 2,000/- cannot be treated to be advance as such received by the first respondent in respect of the property and, therefore, adjustable towards rent at the instance of the petitioner.
7. The next two items in respect which the petitioner claims an adjustment are, (1) interest on the said amount of Rs. 2,000/- at 12 per cent per annum from 23-4-1970 to 31-1-1974; and, (2) interest from 1-12-1974 to 31-1-1979 at 6 percent per annum, amounting to Rs, 900/- and Rs. 610/- respectively. The suit in 0. S. No. 238- of 1973, District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam, as noticed already was dismissed against the first respondent and decreed only against Venkatanathan. The decree provided for the payment of interest at 6 per cent per annum -on Rs. 2,000/- from 1-2-1972 till the date of payment only against Venkatanathan. Since the suit had been dismissed against the first respondent, no interest payable on the amount decreed can be adjusted against the first respondent herein towards the rents payable by the petitioner. In addition, the petitioner has also not succeeded in establishing that there was, any agreement between him and the respondents that the petitioner is entitled to interest on the amounts decreed as against Venkatanathan and such interest is also adjustable as against the rents payable by the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to adjust the interest on the amount of advance of Rs. 2,000/-, namely Rs. 900/and Rs. 610/- towards rents payable by the petitioner.
8. The next item relates to the payment of municipal taxes in respect of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner from the second half year on 1973-74 to the first half year of 1978-79. No doubt, it will be the duty of the owner of the premises to pay the municipal taxes. But the petitioner has paid under Exhibit B-3 the tax due to the Municipality as an occupier, though the petitioner, in the course of his evidence would admit that no notice with reference to the payment of municipal taxes was sent to him in his capacity as an occupier and no distraint proceedings were also taken. Even though it does not appear that there was any agreement as such between the petitioner and the respondents with reference to the payment of municipal taxes, yet, since the primary liability for the payment thereof rests with the landlords-respondents and the liability had been discharged by the petitioner by payment amounting to Rs. 1.951.29 P., this payment must be given effect to and adjusted towards the rents payable by the petitioner.
9. The petitioner claims an adjustment of a sum of Rs. 162.17 P. with reference to charges paid for securing a water tap connection. The evidence of the petitioner in this regard is to the effect that he did not secure any permission in writing from anyone for Installing the water tap connection. It is also his further evidence that in the agreement no mention whatever was made as regards the water tap connection. Though the petitioner would now claim that Venkatanathan agreed to provide water tap connection even at the time when the tenancy commenced, the petitioner would admit that he did not give any notice to Venkatanathan complaining that no such water tap connection had been provided. It is also not the case of the petitioner that there was any agreement that the expenses incurred by him in connection with the securing of water tap connection can be adjusted towards the rent for the premises. Under these circumstances, the incurring of the expenditure by the petitioner in a sum of Rs. 162.17 P. cannot be held to be an expenditure which would be binding on the respondents and adjustable as such against the rents payable by the petitioner.
10. The next item, adjustment of which is claimed by the petitioner relates to costs incurred with reference to the institution of O. S. No. 238 of 1973, in District Munsif's Court, Kumbakonam. Even here, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any adjustment as against the respondents since the petitioner has admitted that the suit O. S. No. 238 of 1973 was decreed against Venkatanathan with costs. If the petitioner had secured a decree for costs against Venkatanathan, even according to him, it is not permissible for the petitioner to claim adjustment of the costs awarded under the decree in O. S. No. 238 of 1973 against Venkatanathan against the rents payable by the petitioner to the respondents.
11. The next item in respect of which the petitioner claims an adjustment is a sum of Rs. 655/- stated to have been spent for repairs effected. In order to substantiate this, the petitioner relies upon Exhibits B-6, B-7 and B-8, the carbon copy of the bill book belonging to his shop. No doubt, these documents may establish the supply of some planks, but there is nothing therein to indicate that the respondents or even Venkatanathan ever authorised the petitioner to carry out any repairs to the premises in question. The evidence of R. W. 1 is to the effect that the respondents had not authorised the petitioner to do any repairs. Equally, the evidence of the petitioner examined as R. W. .1 shows that no notice was ever given by him with reference to the need for repairs and that no proceedings were also initiated for the purpose of enabling the effecting of the repairs. If really repairs to the premises in the occupation of the petitioner were necessary, one would ordinarily expect the petitioner to have issued a notice to the respondents asking them to carry out the necessary repairs or at least the petitioner would have secured the authorisation from the respondents to carry out the repairs and to adjust the expenses incurred therein towards the rents payable. But no such document or authorisation is forthcoming. In addition, the petitioner has not made any attempt whatever to examine any of those persons who were employed in the carrying out of the so called repairs to the building. It has also not been established that the consent of the respondents was, taken to incur the expenditure for repairs and to adjust the same against the rent. Further, before the tenant can carry out the repairs at his expense, the procedure under S. 22 of the Act has to be followed by issuing a notice to the landlord to carry out the repairs within a reasonable time and if it is not so done, then the Controller should be moved, who thereafter, may direct the carrying out of such repairs by the tenant and the deduction of the cost thereof from the rent payable for the building. The proviso to S. 22 of the Act also limits the incurring of such expenditure towards repairs to one twelfth of the rent payable in respect of the building for a year. In the absence of a notice by the petitioner to the respondents calling upon them to carry out the repairs, it cannot be readily assumed that there was an omission on the part of the respondents to carry out the repairs which would justify the effecting of such repairs by the petitioner and deducting the amount so expended from out of the rents. Section 22 of the Act makes provision for such a case and even assuming that there was a refusal by the respondents, the petitioner cannot, without recourse to Section 22 of the Act, proceed to carry out the repairs and mulct the landlords respondents with the expenses of such repairs and claim an adjustment of such amounts as well. The claim of adjustment of Its. 655/- by the petitioner under this head is, therefore, not in order.
12. A sum of Rs. 45/- towards additional electric deposit made is sought 'to be adjusted by the petitioner against the rents payable by him. The person in whose name the connection stands is the person who is also liable to pay the deposit. The amount, therefore, should have. been paid by the respondents in the usual course. But instead it was paid by the petitioner. However, the respondents would claim that since the petitioner consumed more electricity, it became necessary to call for an additional deposit and, therefore, the respondents cannot be made to pay the excess deposit. The demand for 'additional deposit amount was stated to be due to the higher consumption of electricity. The deposit would also ensure to the benefit of the respondents. The petitioner's claim of adjustment with reference to this amount is in order.
13. A sum of Rs. 4,350/- is stated to have been deposited by the petitioner towards rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings in R. C. 0. P. No. 14 of 1971 and C. M. A. No. 25 of 1972. With deference to this claim, the Appellate Authority has pointed out, after verifying the concerned register, that the petitioner has paid four sums of Rs. 1,450/-, Rs, 400/-, As. 200/- and Rs. 200/- totalling to Rs. 2,250/- only
and not Rs. 4,3~0/- as claimed by the petitioner. The amount of Rs. 2,250/- so deposited by the petitioner has necessarily to be given credit to and adjusted' towards the rents payable by the petitioner. The claim of the petitioner to the extent of Rs. 2,250/- as against Rupees 4,350/- made by him, would be in order. Thus the petitioner is entitled only to claim an adjustment with reference to three items only and no more, namely, (1) municipal taxes paid to the tune of Rs. 1,951.29 P., (2) additional electric deposit Rs. 45/- and, (3) rents deposited into court Rs. 2,250/-, totaling to Rs. 4,246.29 P. Even' according to the petitioner, the rents payable since the inception of the tenancy is Rupees 10,600/-, out of which the petitioner is entitled to claim an adjustment only as regards Rs. 4,246.29 -P. There is no justification whatever for not paying the balance. It is necessary to point out that after the disposal of the Civil- Revision, Petition No. 2418 of 1973, the petitioner could have been expected to be regular in the payment of rents, but he did not do so. Indeed, the petitioner had admitted in the course - of his evidence that the adjustment was thought of only when a reply to Exhibit A-11 dated 3-12-1978 was sent and not before. R is thus obvious that not having paid any rent whatever for a period of nearly, 8 years ever since the inception of the tenancy, the petitioner entertained the idea of adjustment of the amounts only in 1978 and not before. This shows that the claim of the petitioner to adjust the rents is not bona fide at all and- has been thought of only as a device to cover up the laces on the part of the petitioner in not having-paid the rents for a very long period, while being fully aware of his obligation to pay the monthly rents to the respondents. The conclusion of the authorities below that the petitioner has committed willful default in the payment of rents has been clearly established by the evidence on record and the conduct of the petitioner.
14. It is now necessary to notice the contention of Mr. S. Govind Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the respondents that the Appellate Authority was in error in holding that - the- respondents have not made out their bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for their own use. On this aspect, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two grounds on which the rendents rested their application under See, 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act have not been made out and, therefore, the refusal by the Appellate Authority to grant an order for eviction is correct. A further point was also raised that it may not be open to the respondents who have succeeded in securing an order for eviction on one ground to challenge the correctness of the conclusion of the Appellate Authority to another ground on which such an order was refused. No doubt, the respondents are persons who have been affected by the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement, though the ultimate decision is in their favour. Having secured an order in their favour, it is not open to the respondents to prefer an appeal against ,the decision of the Appellate Authority an this point alone, as the ultimate order is in their favour. A landlord, who urges before the authorities below several grounds to secure an order for eviction against the tenant and succeeds in establishing one of such grounds and fails in the others and secures alternately an order to his favour, is nevertheless a person aggrieved with reference to these findings against him, if the ultimate decision of the authorities below is challenged by the opposite party. In addition, the functionaries under the Act are authorities with jurisdiction to enquire into applications for eviction, fixation of fair rent, etc. and though the entire gamut of the procedure applicable to civil courts below be applied to those authorities, yet,. rules of justice equity and good conscience should be invoked to relieve difficulties and assist situations like the present. In the instant case, the respondents were not able to persuade the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement which they urged successful1v before the Rent Controller. The respondents by the order of the Rent Controller, secured an order for eviction on two grounds and by the order of the Appellate Authority, one of those grounds was taken away, though the ultimate order was in their favour. It may even be stated that the respondents have been relieved of the right to an order of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement by the Appellate Authority. The respondents would, therefore, be persons aggrieved in so far as the finding on this aspect went against them before the Appellate Authority. Under these circumstances, is it not open to the respondents to sustain the order of eviction on the other ground as well? I am of the view that they can.
15. A decision reported in Seetaram v. Ramabai : AIR1958MP221 supports this view. Hidayathullah, Chief Justice of that court (as he then was) considered the question, who is a person aggrieved. Quoting with approval Lord Rachor in Ex Parte Official Receiver In re Reed Bowen and Co. (1877) 19 QBD 174 , the learned Judge observed that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him something which he had a right to demand. The learned Judge further observed as follows (at p 223):-'In our opinion, without having to decide whether 0. 41, R. 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies or not to rent control proceedings and appeals arising therefrom, we are quite satisfied that on general principles, a party who has an order in its favour is entitled to show that the order is justified on some ground which was decided against it by the Court below.'
Ramaprasada Rao, J. (as he then was) in O. Jayalakshmi Ammal v. K. Pattabhiramayya (C. R. P. No. 2597 of 1965, D/- 10-1-1969) (Mad) applied the aforesaid principles to a case where out of four grounds urged in support of an application for eviction, only one was found in favour of the landlady and the Appellate Authority in the appeal filed against the order of eviction declined to .go into the three grounds against the landlady and directed that the landlady should be given an opportunity to urge the other three points as well before the Appellate Authority. No doubt, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act is revoked (invoked - Ed.) by a person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority. But the scope of the exercise of the revisional powers is not merely restricted to the particular ground on which the decision is rested but extends to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed in the proceeding and this would include, in my View, the power to examine the correctness or otherwise of a finding adverse to, the respondents. It would, therefore, be undoubtedly open to the respondents to canvass the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of bona fide requirement and claim that the order of eviction should be rested on that ground as well.
16. The two grounds upon which the respondents projected their case under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act art that the mother of the respondents 1 the 3 is an Orthodox lady and a believer in gastric paradise (practice?) and eager to spend the evening of her life desiring worship of the Lord everyday and that the third respondent who ha s been insane for some years has been advised a change of place and environment so that he can recover. The petitioner disputed this requirement. The Rent Controller upheld this claim of the respondents, while the Appellate Authority rejected the same. The evidence discloses that the mother of the respondents-1-to 3 is an orthodox, pious and religious lady. Being the wife of a person who has renounced the world, -there is nothing unnatural in this bent of mind of the mother of respondents 1. to 3 and her desire to spend the rest of her lifetime in Kumbakonam giving her an opportunity to take dips in the Holy Cauvery and to worship her Istha Devata. The evidence of P. W. 1 would disclose that the mother is aged about 60 years and that she is capable of doing work and looking after herself. The Appellate Authority would appear to discountenance this claim of the respondents on the ground that it is improbable that an old lady should leave her sons at Madras and settle down with an insane son at Kumbakonam, without any male help. That would only be a general statement inapplicable to the facts of the present case as disclosed by the evidence. As stated already, the fact that the father of the respondents 1 to 3 had become a sanyasi must have influ6nced the mind of the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 to lead a highly religious and orthodox life for the rest of her lifetime and there is no evidence to indicate that the mother of the respondents 1 to 3 is depending upon the help of others even for her daily routine. On the other hand, the evidence points out that the mother of respondents 1 to 3 can look after herself and can do the work as Well by herself, and, therefore the circumstance that the mother of respondents 1 to 3 wants to settle down at Kumbakonam to spend the rest of her lifetime without any male help cannot be put against the requirement of the respondents for that purpose. The omission to mention this as a ground in 1971 in R. C. O. P. No. 14 of 1971 cannot be considered to be fatal to such a claim in the altered circumstances, which obtained in 1979. There is nothing wrong in a person, specially the wife of an ascetic, entertaining the idea of spending the rest of her lifetime devoting herself to the worship of God and other pursuits predominantly religious and orthodox. The requirement of the house in order to enable the mother of the respondents to do so cannot in any manner be characterised as not bona fide. No doubt, no satisfactory materials have been placed before the authorities below to show that the third respondent had been advised to have a change of place and that that would facilitate his improving and, therefore, the authorities below were quite right in not upholding the claim of bona fide requirement on this ground. However, there is absolutely no justification for the Appellate Authority to differ from - the conclusion of the Rent Controller with reference to the requirement of the respondents bona fide for the purpose of accommodating the mother of respondents I to 3 who wants to go to Kumbakonam. and spend peacefully the rest of her days in this world. The order of the Appellate Authority declining to grant an order for eviction on this ground cannot, therefore, be sustained and the respondents are entitled to an order for eviction on this ground as well. Consequent to the conclusions arrived at above, the order of eviction passed by the authorities below has to be upheld and the Civil Revision petition dismissed with costs.
17. Petition dismissed.