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A.S. Vaithialingha Chetty Vs. Kullappa Naicken - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in59Ind.Cas.889
AppellantA.S. Vaithialingha Chetty
RespondentKullappa Naicken
Excerpt:
madras estates land act (i of 1908), sections 124 and 131 - sale for arrears of rent, application to set aside--notice to auction-purchaser whether necessary--auction-purchaser, right of, to be heard. - .....application for setting aside the sale was made no notice was given to the auction-purchaser. the divisional officer says that there is no section providing for giving notice to the purchaser. the collector says that he has no locus standi. i am unable to agree with either of them. it is a primary rule of jurisprudence that every body whose interests are affected should be given notice before an order to his prejudice is passed. the petitioner who has purchased the property at a valid sale has certainly a locus standi. the fact that no provision is specially made for giving notice may be due to the view of the legislature that courts, in setting aside a sale, would have recourse to the principles of natural justice, which demand that before a man's property is taken away from him he.....
Judgment:

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

1. Both the Collector and the Divisional Officer are wrong in saying that the petitioner herein was not entitled to be heard. He became the purchaser at an auction sale for arrears of rent. Prima facie he is entitled to hold the property as his and to demand the issue of the certificate under Section 124 in his favour unless the defaulting ryot had strictly complied with the requirements of Section 131 of the Estates Laud Act which enables him, on obeying these conditions, to move for setting aside the sale.

2. It is conceded that when the application for setting aside the sale was made no notice was given to the auction-purchaser. The Divisional Officer says that there is no section providing for giving notice to the purchaser. The Collector says that he has no locus standi. I am unable to agree with either of them. It is a primary rule of jurisprudence that every body whose interests are affected should be given notice before an order to his prejudice is passed. The petitioner who has purchased the property at a valid sale has certainly a locus standi. The fact that no provision is specially made for giving notice may be due to the view of the Legislature that Courts, in setting aside a sale, would have recourse to the principles of natural justice, which demand that before a man's property is taken away from him he should be heard. If he had notice, he could show that the conditions laid down in Section 131 have not been complied with. No one has more right to a hearing on this question than the purchaser. Under these circumstances, I am unable to agree with the conclusion come to by both the lower Courts. I express no opinion upon the contention raised before me that the requirements of Section 131 have not been complied with. It would be for the Divisional Officer, after giving notice to the auction-purchaser, to decide, whether in making the deposit, the defaulting ryot has complied with all the requirements of the law.

3. The decisions of both the lower Courts are reversed and the case remanded to the Divisional Officer for disposal in the light of the above observations. Costs will abide.


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