1. The tenant is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. The respondent herein is the landlord as at present; his father (who is now no more) filed the eviction petition against the petitioner herein for the purpose of getting additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
2. The petitioner herein has been a tenant under the father of the respondent herein occupying a portion, viz, a small shop portion measuring 2' x 5' in premises No. 16 Govindappa Naick St., G. T. Madras, on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. The petitioner is carrying on a business in the said portion as electrician. The father of the respondent was carrying on business in stationery and general stores in a portion in the ground floor of the said premises, No. 16 Govindappa Naick St., and required the portion in the occupation of the petitioner herein also, bona fide for his additional accommodation. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition.
On appeal to the Third Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, eviction was ordered on the finding that the respondent required the building under the occupation of the petitioner bona fide for his additional accommodation. The appellate authority has taken into account the increase in the business turnover of the respondent and has come to the conclusion that the business of the respondent requires additional accommodation.
3. It cannot be said that the decision arrived at by the appellate authority is not based upon any evidence. The appellate authority has discussed the bona fides of the requirements of the respondent as also the balance of convenience as between the parties and after properly appreciating the evidence on record and taking into consideration the balance of convenience, has ordered eviction.
4. The present revision petition is against the order directing the petitioner to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in the occupation of the respondent. I find no infirmity, or illegality or irregularity or impropriety in the decision arrived at by the appellate authority.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the benefit of the eviction cannot enure to the present respondent, inasmuch as he is the son and legal representative of the petitioner in the eviction petition. According to the learned counsel, the benefit is personal in nature and once the person who filed the eviction petition is no more, there cannot be any order in favour of his legal representative. For this proposition, he cites the decision in Mohammed Ibrahim v. Rahiman Khan, : (1947)2MLJ419 . Tyagarajan J., held in that decision that an order of the Rent Controller directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of his house on the ground that the landlord desired to occupy the house himself is one for the personal benefit of the landlord and is not capable of execution after the death of the landlord at the instance of his legal representatives.
In the abovesaid case, the landlady filed the eviction petition on the ground of owner's occupation. The said petition was filed under the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945. The landlady who got the eviction order before the Rent Controller on 12-9-1945, confirmed by the appellate authority on 10-10-1945, died on 6-11-1945. Application for execution of the eviction order was made by her legal representatives before the Sub-Judge, Guntur. Both the Courts below found that the order was executable in view of Sec. 7-A(5) of the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945. On further appeal, Thyagarajan J., after discussion the facts of that particular case, and observing that the landlady required the house for her own use and as such the same was a personal right, allowed the same. The learned Judge also held--
'My decision, however, does not mean that if in future there are circumstances which would entitle the legal representatives to ask for eviction against the tenant, they would not be in a position to do so on a proper application being made to the Rent Controller. My decision is only with reference to the order appealed against.'
It is significant to note that the decision rendered in the above case was only in respect of the facts arising in that particular case. Further, throughout the eviction proceedings, the landlady was alive and eviction from the house was asked for, for the benefit of the landlady. But as far as the present case is concerned, it is for the business purpose of the landlord the premises was asked for. The landlord died pending the appeal filed by him before the appellate authority. Even before an order for eviction was passed by the appellate authority reversing the order of the Rent Controller, the respondent herein was brought on record after due notice. It was in the presence of the respondent the order of eviction was passed, after hearing both the parties. Absolutely no objection was taken throughout to the effect that the order of eviction cannot be passed since the right was a personal right of the eviction petitioner. In view of the facts stated above, it is clear that the facts of the case in : (1947)2MLJ419 , are not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is too late in the day for the petitioner herein to put forth a case as if the right is a personal one.
6. As rightly pointed out by Thiru M. A. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the respondent, there is an enabling provision in Sec. 27 of the Madras Buildings (Leave and Rent Control) Act. Sec. 27 reads--
'1. Any application made, appeal preferred, or proceeding taken, under this Act by or against any person, may, in the event of his death, be continued by or against his legal representatives.
2. Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act by or against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives.'
There is absolutely no analogous provision in the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945, which was the relevant Order while the decision in : (1947)2MLJ419 , was rendered.
7. Apart from the fact that the decision in : (1947)2MLJ419 , related to a case a owner's occupation, as contrasted to the case in the present petition, which is only for additional accommodation, it cannot be taken that the said decision lays down a general proposition to the effect that whenever any petition for eviction on ground of owner's occupation is filed, the same has to be taken as one giving a personal right in favour of the eviction-petitioner.
8. Dwarkanath v. Amarnath, AIR 1957 Nag 100 is a decision of a single Bench of the Nagpur High Court, wherein it has been held as follows:
'Clause 13(3), C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949, contemplates a personal need of the landlord as a ground for grant of permission to terminate the tenancy. Where, therefore, the house wholly vests in another, whether by sale or by partition, his own need for the house comes to an end. In such a case his successors cannot be deemed to be his representatives for purpose of his need. He cannot, therefore, claim to continue the proceedings on the basis of his predecessor's need. His proper remedy is to make a separate application for that purpose as the old cause of action does not survive after the transfer.'
The above Nagpur case arose out of the dismissal of the petition to implead the petitioner therein as the person entitled to continue the petition filed for owner's occupation. The petitioner therein got the property by virtue of a family partition. It has been held in that case that the right is one of personal in nature and hence it cannot be said to have accrued to the petitioner who was the revision petitioner in that case. I do not think the facts of the present case are the same as those in the decision cited above.
9. Section 10(3)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act contemplates that a landlord may apply requiring eviction of the tenant for his additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on. Based on that provision, the present eviction petition was filed by the landlord for additional accommodation for the purpose of his business. Even subsequent to the demise of the landlord, who preferred the eviction petition, his business continues, and his legal representatives are entitled to carry on the business. The purpose for which the additional accommodation was asked for is still there and cannot be said to have been lost after the demise of the person who filed the eviction petition. The definition of 'landlord' in the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is wide enough to include the present respondent. The petition to implead the respondent as the legal representative of the deceased landlord had been ordered even prior to an order of eviction passed in favour of the respondent. Considering all these aspects, I do not find there is any difficulty in finding that the respondent herein is entitled to the benefit of the eviction order passed by the appellate authority.
10. Thiru M. A. Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the respondent, has also cited decisions on the question of relative hardship in a petition for additional accommodation. I do not think there is any necessity to refer to those decisions since I am of the view that the finding of the appellate court as regards facts is correct.
11. Taking into consideration all these aspects of the case, it is clear that the respondent is entitled to have to benefit of the eviction order passed, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 10(3)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
12. It has also been submitted before this court that the landlord i.e., the respondent, has already taken possession of the premises in the occupation of the petitioner herein. There is no question of any grant of time in view of the fact that the landlord, respondent herein, has already taken possession of the suit premises.
13. In these circumstances, the civil revision petition is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.
14. Petition dismissed.