1. The plaintiff is the appellant. One Subroya Udpa died in the year 1876 leaving a daughter Venkamma, and daughter-in-law, Satyabhama, the widow of this predeceased son, Krishna Udpa. Venkamma adpoted Subroya Adiga, who conveyed the suit properties to the appellant by a registered deed of sale, dated 5th January 1911. Satyabhama sold the suit properties to the 1st defendant's father and died in the year 1901. Venkamma died in the year 1901 and the appellant sues to recover possession of the property, on the ground that he represents the adopted son of Venkamma who as daughter's son of the last male holder became entitled to the properties on her death.
2. Both the lower Courts have found that Satyabhama took adversely to Venkamma and that her adverse possession commenced in the year 1876. They dismissed plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation on the ground that adverse possession against Venkamma barred the reversioner also.
3. We are of opinion that the decision of the lower Courts cannot be supported on this point. In considering the authorities on the subject they have failed to notice that while under the Limitation Act of 1859 dispossession of a female owner caused time to run not only as against her but also against the reversioners, Act IX of 1871 and the subsequent Acts gave the reversioners a fresh starting point from the date of the death of the female limited owner.
4. The present case clearly falls within the ruling of the Privy Council in Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai 23 B.K 725 where their Lordships held that Article 144 has no application to suits governed by Article 141 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act.
5. In Venkataramayya v. Venkatalakshmamma 20 M.K 493 it was held that under Article 141 of the Limitation Act the reversioners had 12 years from the date of the death of the last male holder' s daughter. Though the Allahabad High Court, was at one time disposed to treat the decision in Ram Kali v. Kedar Nath 14 A.K 156 as overruled by Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram 22 I.A. 25 and to treat adverse possession as against the female heir as barring reversioners, that view has not found favour after the decision of the Privy Council in Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai 23 B.K 725. In Amrit Dhar v. Bindesri Prasad (1901) A.W.N. 133 and Jhamman Kunwar v. Tiloki (1903) A.W.N. 93 their Lordships after distinguishing Lachhan Kunwar's case 22 I.A. 25, held on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai 26 I.A. 71, that Article 141 gave a fresh starting point to the reversioner on the death of the widow and that a suit brought by the reversioner will not be barred even though the widow was not in possession within 12 years before her death. Reference has been made by the respondent's Vakil to Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram 22 I.A. 25 where their Lordships of the Privy Council inclined to the view that adverse possession against the widow would bar the reversioners, but as pointed out in Venkataramayya v. Venkatalakshamamma 7 M.L.J. 204 the rights of the reversioners had become barred under Act XIV of 1859 before the provisions of Act IX of 1871 had come into force. Similarly in Mahabir Pershad v. Adhikari Koer 23 C.K 942 adverse possession had ripened before the passing of the Act IX of 1871. Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothur Mohun Goswami 21 C.K 8was a case where the plaintiff's mother representing the estate brought a suit which was dismissed as barred and the decree was held to be binding on her son as res judicata. In Sham Koer v. Dah Koer 4 Bom. L.R. 547 : 6 C.W.N. 657 : 29 I.A. 132 the widows being only entitled to maintenance had no life-interest in the estate and adverse possession commenced from the death of Bhan Nath Singh, who was a member of an undivided Hindu family.
6. We are of opinion that the suit is not barred by limitation and reverse the decree of the lower Court arid remand the appeal for disposal on the other issues raised. Costs will abide and follow the result.