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In Re: Maruthapali Goundar - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1937Mad356
AppellantIn Re: Maruthapali Goundar
Cases Referred and Shadi Lal v. Emperor
Excerpt:
- - 2,000 with two sureties each for a like sum. it is a general charge that he has been committing such acts and breaches of the peace and will continue to do so, a charge akin to the charge in proceedings for taking security for good behaviour......it appears to me that you have been committing and will continue to commit breaches of peace and wrongful acts likely to lead to breaches of the peace or disturbance of public tranquillity unless you are restrained from doing so, you are hereby directed to show cause, etc.2. it will thus be found that the preliminary order does not mention that the counterpetitioner was likely to commit any particular or definite wrongful act or breach of the peace. it is a general charge that he has been committing such acts and breaches of the peace and will continue to do so, a charge akin to the charge in proceedings for taking security for good behaviour. it does not appear that there was any information before the magistrate to show that the counterpetitioner was likely to commit any particular.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Pandrang Row, J.

1. The petitioner in this case is the Village Munsif of Kalianai and he was ordered by the Joint Magistrate, Dindigul, to furnish security for keeping the peace for one year by executing a bond for Rs. 2,000 with two sureties each for a like sum. That order was confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge of Madura. So far as the evidence in the case goes the findings of the Magistrate have not been seriously attacked in the course of the hearing of this petition, but it has been contended that the preliminary order itself was without jurisdiction and that this is not really a case to which the provisions of Section 107, Criminal P.C., apply. The preliminary order which was passed on the 29th March 1935, gives details of the information received by the Magistrate and in substance runs as follows:

Whereas from information laid before me it appears to me that you have been committing and will continue to commit breaches of peace and wrongful acts likely to lead to breaches of the peace or disturbance of public tranquillity unless you are restrained from doing so, you are hereby directed to show cause, etc.

2. It will thus be found that the preliminary order does not mention that the counterpetitioner was likely to commit any particular or definite wrongful act or breach of the peace. It is a general charge that he has been committing such acts and breaches of the peace and will continue to do so, a charge akin to the charge in proceedings for taking security for good behaviour. It does not appear that there was any information before the Magistrate to show that the counterpetitioner was likely to commit any particular breach of the peace or that he was likely to commit any particular wrongful act which was likely to lead to a breach of the peace. The information was entirely confined to the past acts of the counterpetitioner and there was nothing to show that he was contemplating doing anything in particular which would involve a breach of the peace. The object of Section 107 is to guard against apprehended breaches of the peace or wrongful acts which might probably lead to a breach of the peace. The view taken of this section so early as 1876 by this High Court is to be found in Queen v. Kader Khan (1882) 5 Mad 380; there the Magistrate called upon certain persons to show cause why they should not be bound over to keep the peace because complaints had been made against them that they were constantly creating disturbance in certain bazaars, and they were required to enter into bonds for keeping the peace. The High Court expressed the opinion that the act of which information is given and in respect of which security is required must be an act which is shown to be in contemplation at the time of the information given and not merely one a repetition of which may be expected or apprehended from past misconduct of the kind without anything further. This ruling is directly applicable to the present case, and no subsequent case in which it was departed from or modified has been brought to my notice by the learned Public Prosecutor.

3. On the other hand from the decisions quoted on the side of the petitioner, viz. Pir Ali v. Emperor AIR 1920 Pat 550, Sheikh Jinuat Chowdry v. Sheikh Husen (1903) 7 CWN 32 and Shadi Lal v. Emperor AIR 1931 Lah 191, it would appear that, so far as proceedings Under Section 107, Criminal P.C. are concerned, information regarding past acts alone would not be enough to justify an order requiring a person to show cause why he should not be directed to furnish security for keeping the peace and that something more is necessary, viz. the likelihood of the commission in the near future of a particular breach of the peace or a wrongful act likely to lead to a breach of the peace. In this case there was no information before the Magistrate and no evidence before him to show that the counterpetitioner was about to do any such thing in future. Both the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge have proceeded on the basis that if a man has been doing various acts involving a breach of the peace in the past that by itself is sufficient to justify an order directing the man to furnish security for keeping the peace. The preliminary order itself is one which cannot be justified in view of the provisions of Section 107, Criminal P.C., and the order directing the petitioner in the High Court to furnish security for keeping the peace must therefore be regarded as having been passed without jurisdiction. That order is accordingly annulled and the bond executed by the petitioner will also be annulled.


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