1. This is an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of North Arcot dismissing the suit brought by the plaintiffs, claiming under persons who were the next reversioners on the death of the widow of the last male owner, one Kitchama. The defence which the Subordinate Judge has upheld is that the properties, which formed part of the estate of the last male owner and were alienated by his widow in 1882, formed the subject of a compromise in the suit in 1886 by three of the presumptive reversioners at that time against defendants Nos. 2 to 4 who were stranger alienees and 5th defendant Jangamiah who was one of the co-reversioners and was himself at the time an alienee from the widow whose alienations were questioned in the suit. That suit was filed on the 2nd October 1886. Very shortly, afterwards in the next month, by Exhibits II and II(a), the stranger transferees from the widow transferred their rights to one of the plaintiffs-reversioners Varadiah, who is the present 1st defendant's father. It is suggested that these transfers which are in the identical terms were only transfers of the widow's interest, which the transferees have undoubtedly acquired under the sale-deeds, Exhibits III and III (a), but we cannot take that view. We think that there was an out and out transfer inclusive of the transferees' right to remain in possession during the lifetime of the widow. Subsequent to the transfers in favour of Varadiah and as part of the same transaction a petition, Exhibit I, was presented to the Court on 12th February' 1887 regarding the compromise of the suit as between the plaintiffs-reversioners and the alienees from the widow, defendants Nos. 2 to 5, and asking on this basis for the sole relief of a decree for costs against the 1st defendant, the widow whose alienation had given rise to all this trouble.
2. It is said that we cannot look at Exhibit I because it has not been registered. It was filed in the Court, in our opinion, as a compromise in the suit which was intended to bring the suit to an end and to relieve the Court from the necessity of trying the issues which arose in the case, and the Court ought, under Section 375, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, to have recorded it and passed a decree in terms of the compromise. What the Court actually did, is not clear because the records have been destroyed and the entry in the suit register against disposal is nil. It is quite clear, we think, that the Court accepted and acted upon the compromise, and in these circumstances we think that it did not require registration and that it is within the authority of the Privy Council decisions, Bindesri Naik v. Gaiiga Saran Sahu 20 A. 171 : 2 C.W.N. 129 : 25 I.A. 9 : 7 Sar. P.C.J. 273 : 9 Ind. Dec. 471 and Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni 1 Bom. L.R. 394 : 3 C.W.N. 485 : 26 I.A. 101 as explained in Natesan Chetty v. Vengu Nachiar 3 Ind. Cas. 701 Sellappa Koundan v. Gurumoorti 26 Ind. Cas. 79 and Manichammal v. Rathnamal 22 Ind. Cas. 35, This ruling is not in conflict with the decision in Ravula Parti Chelamanna v. Ravula Parti Rama Row 12 Ind. Cas. 317.
3. This being so, it is contended for the defendants that the 1st plaintiff, who claims as one of the reversioners of Jangamiah who was 5th defendant in that suit, and also as the transferee from Venkatasami who was one of the plaintiffs-reversioners, is estopped. It is clear from the terms of the compromise recorded in Exhibit I that Varadiah, one of the three plaintiffs-reversioners, was to keep the properties which he had purchased under Exhibits II and II(a) from the transferees from the widow and that Janpramiah, the 5th defendant, was to keep the properties which had been alienated to. him by the widow and renounced his right to the properties in the possession of the plaintiff-reversioner Varadiah. As regards the reversioner Venkatasami he got nothing himself under the compromise, hut he was a party to it and we think it was on the basis of his consent that Varadiah entered into the compromise. It he had not been a consenting party it would have been open to Venkatasami to go on with the suit and to have his chance of obtaining the relief prayed for in the suit. In these circumstances we think that the present 1st plaintiff both as representing Jangamiah the 5th defendant and Venkatasami one of the plaintiffs in that suit, is now estopped from disputing the settlement which was then arrived at. It follows that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is right and the second appeal is dismissed with costs.