M. Anantanarayanan, O.C.J.
1. It is sufficient to deal with this revision proceeding within a restricted compass. The first ground on which the revision proceeding is pressed, viz., that the application in the Revenue Court for the eviction of the cultivating tenant (revision petitioner) was first heard by one officer, then by his successor, again subsequently by the first officer, so that there has been a change in the personnel of the officer presiding over the Revenue Court, which disentitles either officer to make a final order, is without substance. The argument may conceivably have some force, if the Madrs Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act (1955) and the Rules framed thereunder in 1955, were wholly without a provision for a contingency of this character. On the contrary, Rule 8(i) of the Rules framed under the Act by G.O. No. 66c,, Revenue, dated 13th February, 1956, specifically declared that:
Every Court constituted under the Act shall have the powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits.
2. That attracts the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the relevant Orders, and, we have specific provision in Older 18, Rule 15(1), Civil Procedure Code, for the successor of a Judge who is prevented by death, transfer or other cause from conducting the trial of a suit, not merely to validly proceed with the action, but also to deal with the evidence recorded by the predecessor. Since this rule applies, there has been no irregularity in the trial of the eviction petition, which would justify interference in revision.
3. But it appears to me that the other ground on which the revision is pressed is substantial, and will have to succeed. On this aspect, we have to take the facts as rendered evident, in the record, which is conclusive. The learned Revenue Divisional Officer states that time was granted to the revision petitioner for payment of arrears of rent' on or before 5th March, 1965 ', failing which the eviction was to be directed. On 5th March, 1965 itself, the Court made an order for eviction, and the record shows that the name of the tenant was called in Court ' at about 5 p.m.' and he was found absent. Nor was he represented by anyone. The precise point came up for consideration before Natesan, J., in Ganapathy Padayachi v. Dharmapuram Mutt (1965) 2 M.L.J. 14. The learned Judge referred to Janakumara Nainar v. Periaswamy Goundan and Ors. : (1948)2MLJ368 M. Ct. Muthiah v. Deputy Controller of Estate Duty, Madras : (1964)1MLJ279 which itself followed Perumal Nadan v. Sivamanji Nadachi I.L.R.(1916) Mad. 583 Muthu Chettiar v. Narayana Chettiar 55 M.L.J. 274 : I.L.R.(1927) Mad. 672 and Chinniah Chettiar v. T. Kumaraswamiah : (1933)64MLJ431 . The broad principle is that where a Court fixes a date for the fulfilment of a certain condition the person on whom that obligation is imposed will have the whole of that day for complying with that order. It is true that the name of the revision petitioner was called ' at about 5 p.m.'. But, that does not necessarily imply that he could not have still complied with the earlier direction to deposit or pay the arrears on that date. Of course, if the Court had made the order on the next day (6th March, 1965), the order will be unassailable. Under the circumstances, I am constrained to allow the revision, and to set aside the order of eviction. But, as it is not clear to me that the revision petitioner paid the arrears of rent, or offered to do so even immediately thereafter, I think that the proceeding will have to be allowed with costs of the respondent.