1. The first point taken in this petition is that an Additional District Magistrate has no authority, unless specially empowered by designation by the Local Government, to pass an order of sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code.
2. It is not disputed in this case that by G.O., dated 9th October 1874, the Local Government has empowered all District Magistrates to pass orders of sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and that by G. O., dated 24th of January 1922, it conferred on Mr. Senneck 'all the powers of a District Magistrate.' This last power is conferred under the provisions of Section 10(2), Criminal Procedure Code, which enables the Local Government to appoint an Additional District Magistrate and to confer on him 'all the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code'. The ordinary powers of a District Magistrate under that Code are set out in Schedule III(D) which makes no reference to Section 197. Petitioner contends that the scope of the powers conferred under Section 10(2) is limited by its language to the powers set out in Schedule III(v). On consideration, I am of opinion that this view is too narrow. Under the first G.O. noted above, the Magistrate had, on the date of the second G.O., the power to pass an order of sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code, and was exercising that power under that Code, it was in fact then one of the powers of the District Magistrate exercised by him under the Code which, therefore, may be passed on by the Local Government under Section 10(2) to the Additional District Magistrate. To view the point from another angle, Section 197 authorises the Local Government to designate some officer as the officer empowered under Section 197, just as Section 10(1) by virtue of which designation he is empowered to exercise inter alia the powers set out in Schedule III(v) and Section 10(2) authorises it to transfer to the Additional District Magistrate all the powers it has conferred under the Code on the other officer designated by it as District Magistrate. I, therefore, hold that this contention of petitioner must fail.
3. The next point taken is that no reasons have been stated for granting the sanction. The only authority in point quoted before me is Queen-Empress v. Samavier 16 M. 468 3 M.L.J. 227 : 2 Weir 220 which does not lay down that the officer must state his reasons, but only that the sanction order must refer to some definite offence, and not be so vague that it is obvious that the sanctioning officer has not come to a decision of his own that reasonable grounds existed for the prosecution. The analogy of Section 195 will not be in point, for in the case of that section a special appeal lies, and thus something in the nature of a judgment has to be written by the original Court. In cases under Section 196, no reasons are necessary and the order to, prosecute is sufficient. Action taken under Section 197 is more of the nature of executive than judicial action, see Kalagava Bapiah, In the matter of 27 M. 54 : 2 Weir. 227, I am not prepared to hold that the lower Court acted with any irregularity in not recording reasons.
3. The next point is that the sanction has been granted after and not before the complaint. For the decision of this point sufficient facts have not been put before me. If this sanction is going to be used to validate a trial on a complaint already laid without sanction, then petitioner's point would be good, though it would be a point more properly taken before the Trying Court. But if a complaint is going to be laid in consequence of this sanction, then petitioner has no valid objection to it.
4. As to the petitioner having received no notice before sanction was granted, that is unnecessary. See Kalagava Bapiah, In the matter of 27 M. 54 : 2 Weir. 227.
5. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere in this case and dismiss the petition.