Skip to content


K. Chinnakannammal Vs. Biharilal S. Lulla - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1985)2MLJ346
AppellantK. Chinnakannammal
RespondentBiharilal S. Lulla
Cases Referred(vide Associated Traders v. Abdul Hameed
Excerpt:
- - on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned rent controller found that the requirement by the petitioner of the premises in the occupation of the respondent by way of additional accommodation is genuine and bona fide and that the hardship that is likely to be caused to the respondent would not outweigh the advantage to the landlord and allowed the application ordering the eviction of the respondent. one is the expression 'additional accommodation' and the other is the expression 'as the case may be'.the word 'additional' is in common use and its meaning is very well understood by people generally as being something that is added to or put into a thing already in existence. later, the bench pointed out that for invoking section 10 (3) (c) of the.....orderv. ratnam, j.1. the landlady, who succeeded in securing an order for eviction before the rent controller on her application filed under section 10 (3) (c) of the tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act, 18 of 1960, as amended by act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') and lost before the appellate authority, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. the premises in the occupation of the respondent is a portion in the first floor in door no. 13, bo begum street, mount road, madras-2. the petitioner has two daughters and two sons. the first son of the petitioner, at the time of initiation of proceedings, was about 26 years and her second son was aged about 22 years. the first son of the petitioner was of marriageable age and the petitioner was seeking.....
Judgment:
ORDER

V. Ratnam, J.

1. The landlady, who succeeded in securing an order for eviction before the Rent Controller on her application filed under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and lost before the Appellate Authority, is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. The premises in the occupation of the respondent is a portion in the first floor in Door No. 13, Bo Begum Street, Mount Road, Madras-2. The petitioner has two daughters and two sons. The first son of the petitioner, at the time of initiation of proceedings, was about 26 years and her second son was aged about 22 years. The first son of the petitioner was of marriageable age and the petitioner was seeking alliance for his marriage. The second son of the petitioner was pursuing his studies. The petitioner stated that in the event of the marriage of her first son, more accommodation would be required to comfortably house the couple and also to accommodate other relations who may come and stay. The second son, according to the petitioner, also required a separate study room. Besides, of the two daughters of the petitioner, both of whom were married, one was living in Madras and she used to come and stay with the petitioner quite often and the other daughter, her husband and the members of her family used to come and stay with the petitioner during vacation and festival days and other family functions, which required more accommodation. Under those circumstances, the petitioner stated that she bona fide required the premises in the occupation of the respondent as and by way of additional accommodation and filed H.R.C.No. 1160 of 1979 under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act praying for. an order of eviction against the respondent.

2. In the counter filed by the respondent, he denied the requirement of the petitioner and stated that the portion already available with her was more than enough to accommodate all the members of the family comfortably even in future and that her requirement is not bona fide. A plea that the hardship that is likely to be caused to the respondent will outweigh the advantages to the petitioner by the granting of an order of eviction was also put forth. An objection that the petitioner is not under law entitled to evict the respondent, as he is occupying a non-residential portion was also raised. The respondent, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the application for eviction.

3. Before the Rent Controller (VI Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras, on behalf of the petitioner, Exhibits P-1 to P-7 were marked and her son was examined as P.W.1, while, on behalf of the respondent, Exhibit R-1 series was filed and the brother of the respondent was examined as R.W.1. A Commissioner was also appointed to make a local inspection and Exhibit C-1 is the report of the Commissioner with plans appended. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned Rent Controller found that the requirement by the petitioner of the premises in the occupation of the respondent by way of additional accommodation is genuine and bona fide and that the hardship that is likely to be caused to the respondent would not outweigh the advantage to the landlord and allowed the application ordering the eviction of the respondent. Aggrieved by that, the respondent herein preferred H.R.A.NO. 2267 of 1979 before the Appellate Authority (11 Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras. The Appellate Authority found that the application filed by the petitioner herein under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is not maintainable and that the requirement of the petitioner is not bona fide. On those conclusions, the application for eviction filed by the petitioner was dismissed. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition.

4. In support of this Civil Revision Petition, the learned Advocate-General first contended that the Appellate Authority had erroneously interpreted the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in M. Thirupathi Nadar and Sons v. Dr. S.L. Kantha Rao I.L.R. (1981) Mad. 128, and stated that the purpose for which the tenant in occupation had used the premises is really not very material, but that the nature of the building, whether residential or not, would be the determining factor. It was also pointed out with reference to the plan that the first-floor comprised of three rooms only and the building is a residential one and the available accommodation was insufficient and, therefore, there was no legal impediment in the way of the petitioner securing an order for eviction against the respondent with reference to the premises under his occupation for residential purposes, irrespective of the nature of the user to which the premises is put by the respondent. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that on a proper interpretation of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, additional accommodation can be secured by the landlord only for the same purpose for which the tenant is using the premises and not for others and, therefore, the petitioner is not in order in requiring the premises for residential purposes. Reliance was also placed upon the proviso as supporting this interpretation of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act.

5. Though earlier there have been some decisions of this Court having a bearing upon that question, all those decisions came to be considered in the context of the maintainability of an application for eviction with reference to Sections 10 (3) (a) (iii) and 10 (3) (c) of the Act in Thirupathi Nadar and Sons v. Dr. S.L. Kantha Rao I.L.R. (1981) Mad. 128. In that case the landlord was residing in the first-floor of a building, while the tenant was in occupation of the ground-floor carrying on business. The application for eviction was filed both under Sections 10 (3) (a) (ii) and 10 (3) (c) of the Act and the landlord required the ground-floor portion for the purpose of running a dispensary. The authorities below ordered eviction. In the Civil Revision Petition before this Court, the objection raised by the tenant was that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act alone would be applicable, in which case considerations of relative hardship would also be relevant and since there was neither plea nor evidence in support thereof, the application for eviction should be dismissed. In the context of considering this objection, the scope and requirements of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act was elaborately considered. It was pointed out that in the earlier decisions attention had not been paid to the qualifying words, 'residential and non-residential' occurring in the beginning of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and that even if the word 'building' occurring in Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is to be understood differently from its definition contained in Section 2 (2) of the Act, there is no test for ascertaining whether a building is a residential one or a non-residential one and that before Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act is invoked, it is imperative to make it clear whether a building is a residential one or a nonresidential one, as the purpose for which additional accommodation is required is in-extricably bound up with the nature of the building. Emphasising the aforesaid aspects, it was laid down that Section 10 (3)(c) of the Act has to be read distributively, one dealing with residential building and the other with non-residential building. The Division Bench further proceeded to state that if so read, it will read as under with regard to residential building:

A landlord who is occupying only a part of a residential building, may, notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes.

and as follows in so far as non-residential buildings are concerned;

A landlord who is occupying only a part of a non-residential building, may, notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for purposes of a business which he is carrying on.

Further, the scope of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act has been stated to be as follows:

Whatever meaning we attribute to the word 'building' occurring in Section 10(3)(c), before Section 10 (3) (c) can be invoked, the first thing that has to be ascertained is whether the building is a residential building or a non-residential building. If it is a residential building, the landlord can obtain additional accommodation only for the purpose of his residence. If it is a non-residential building, the landlord can obtain additional accommodation only for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on. This conclusion flows from the use of the two expressions occurring in the Section. One is the expression 'additional accommodation' and the other is the expression 'as the case may be'. The word 'additional' is in common use and its meaning is very well understood by people generally as being something that is added to or put into a thing already in existence...having regard to the dichotomy between the residential building and the non-residential building expressly provided for in the sub-Section itself, eviction can be sought only for the purpose of residence if the building is a residential building and only for the purpose of carrying on a business if the building is a non-residential one.

Later, the Bench pointed out that for invoking Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, the following conditions must be satisfied:

In the case of a residential building additional accommodation can be obtained only for residential purpose. In the case of a non-residential building additional accommodation can be obtained only for purposes of business which the landlord is carrying on.

Finally, it was pointed out that Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act did not have any application in that case because the landlord did not require additional accommodation for purposes of residence, but wanted it for running his dispensary. It is significant that even according to the decision of the Division Bench, the user to which the premises is put by the tenant is not a determining or decisive factor in the consideration of a request for additional accommodation under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act, but it is the occupation of a part of a residential or non-residential building by the landlord that would be relevant.

6. It is in the light of the above said principles that the correctness of the order of the Appellate Authority has to be tested. In the course of paragraph 6 of its order, the Appellate Authority has referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in M. Thirupathi Nadar and Sons v. Dr. S.L. Kantha Rao I.L.R. (1981) Mad. 128, but it has not unfortunately made any attempt to understand and appreciate the reasoning of the decision and the final decision with reference to the facts which gave rise to that case. The Appellate Authority erroneously assumed that the position in law is well settled that a landlord in occupation of a residential portion of his building cannot require a non-residential portion from the tenant by way of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. On this assumption, the Appellate Authority had further found that the application for eviction filed by the landlady under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is not maintainable. The basis upon which the Division Bench rendered its decision and the interpretation put upon Section 10(3)(c) of the Act have already been set out. It is seen therefrom that whether the word 'building' is given the normal and ordinary meaning or the meaning as defined in Section 2 (2) of the Act, before Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act can be invoked, the first thing to be ascertained is whether the building is a residential building or a non-residential building. If it is a residential building, the division Bench has laid down that the landlord can obtain additional accommodation only for the purpose of his residence. Similarly, if it is a non-residential building, the landlord can obtain additional accommodation for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on. This is also reiterated by the Division Bench by setting out the conditions to be fulfilled for invoking Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act and in that context the Division Bench has laid down that in the case of a residential building, additional accommodation can be obtained only for residential purposes, while, in the case of a non-residential building, additional accommodation can be obtained only for purpose of a business which the landlord is carrying on. Finally, the Division Bench has stated, on the facts of that case, that as the landlord did not require additional accommodation of the ground-floor for purposes of residence, while he was living in the first-floor, but had required the ground-floor (which was put to a non-residential user) as and by way of additional accommodation for the purpose of running a dispensary and a clinic, the applicability of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act was ruled out. Unfortunately, the Appellate Authority has bestowed very scant attention to the facts giving rise to the decision of the Division Bench as well as the reasoning for the decision and had assumed that the user of the premises in the occupation of the tenant will have a material bearing upon the maintainability of the application under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. In other words, the Appellate Authority has completely misunderstood, misinterpreted and misapplied the Bench decision. On a correct and proper understanding and appreciation of the decision of the Division Bench, the relevant consideration, on the facts of this case, would be whether the landlady is in occupation of a part of a residential building and not whether the tenant is in occupation of a portion for non-residential purposes. This has been totally lost sight of by the Appellate Authority and that has led it to arrive at an erroneous conclusion regarding the maintainability of the application for eviction filed by the landlady under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act.

7. In this case, there is the report of the Commissioner Exhibit C-1 as well as a plan showing the first-floor of the building concerned in this Civil Revision Petition. It is seen from paragraphs 10 to 14 of the report of the Commissioner and his plan that there are three rooms in the rear portion and that the petitioner is using one room as a kitchen, the other as a pooja room and the third as a bedroom. The plan further shows a grilled verandah and a portion which is open to the sky and a bath-room and f.o.1 as well. The two rooms in the occupation of the respondent are located in the front portion of the first-floor abutting a balcony. No doubt, the Commissioner has observed in paragraph 20 of the report that the rooms are used for storing automobile goods. From the features disclosed by Exhibit C-1, it is at once apparent that the landlady is undoubtedly in occupation of a part of a building for residential purposes. The nature of the floor area under the residential accommodation of the landlady together with the existence of a verandah, balcony, bath-room, f.o.1 etc., establish 'that the first-floor is a residential building. Therefore, as per the decision of the Division Bench referred to earlier, the landlady can ask for additional accommodation only for residential purposes and she has prayed only for such additional residential accommodation in her application for eviction under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act. The proviso relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent does not, in my view, alter this position, for, at best it only enables the Rent Controller to decline to grant relief to the landlady in the event of its being established that the hardship caused to the tenant by the passing of an order for eviction would outweigh the advantage that may accrue to the landlady. Under those circumstances, the Appellate Authority was in error in having concluded that the application for eviction filed by the land-lady under Section 10 (3)(c) of the Act is not maintainable.

8. The learned Advocate-General next contended that the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority to the effect that the application for eviction lacked in bona fide is erroneous and unsustainable. Attention in this connection was drawn to the reasoning given by the Appellate Authority and it was pointed out that as per the report of the Commissioner and the evidence of P.W., another tenant was in occupation of a residential portion in the ground-floor and the landlady was not in possession of that portion and, therefore, the conclusion of the Appellate Authority regarding bona fides proceeding on the basis of suppression of materials by the landlady is unsustainable. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the landlady was in occupation of residential accommodation even in the ground floor and that had not been disclosed and that would suffice to reject the claim of the petitioner for additional accommodation as not being bona fide.

9. Again, on the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlady, the Appellate Authority, to say the least, has blundered. The Appellate Authority found lack of bona fides on the ground that the landlady has suppressed her occupation of a residential portion in the ground-floor and that even assuming that the ground-floor residential portion was in the occupation of a tenant, she had not filed an application for eviction against that tenant, but instead had launched proceedings against the respondent in occupation of non-residential portion. This was also characterised by the Appellate Authority as extraordinary and unnatural conduct on the part of the landlady. Here again, the Appellate Authority had totally misdirected itself in considering the question of bona fides and had failed to advert to the vital and important pieces of evidence establishing contra. Even according to the Appellate Authority, the dispute regarding the occupation of a portion in the ground-floor by another tenant arose only during the enquiry and had not been reflected in the pleadings at all. If there was no basis at all laid for any particular plea, the Court is not bound to consider it and on this short ground alone, the Appellate Authority should have declined to embark upon an investigation of a dispute not pleaded. Even assuming that it was open to the Appellate Authority to consider in the course of the enquiry a dispute not reflected in the pleadings, it is seen that the Appellate Authority had completely omitted to take into account clinching and relevant evidence in this regard and had brushed aside the same for no reason whatever. Too much reliance has been placed by the Appellate Authority upon certain voters' list as establishing that a residential portion in the ground-floor was not in the occupation of a tenant of the name of Mallika, It is common knowledge that many persons are omitted to be enumerated in the voters' list for a variety of reasons despite their having a fixed abode and residence. Therefore, the absence of the name of Mallika in the voters' list cannot be taken to be conclusive factor to establish that she was not a tenant of a portion of the ground-floor in the buklding. Likewise, the Appellate Authority has brushed aside the rent receipts issued to the respondent and two other tenants including the tenant in the residential occupation of a portion of the ground-floor on the ground that the collection of rent has been made by different persons for the three different tenants and that the son of the landlady was not a competent witness to give evidence regarding the collection of rents from Mallika with reference to her occupation of a portion in the ground-floor for residential purposes. The rent receipt book marked as Exhibit P-7 series commences from 1.4.1977 and runs upto 1.8.1979. The counter-foils show that when the receipts of payment of rent are issued, the signature of the tenant paying the rent had been taken. Under Ex.P-7 series, three tenants, namely, the respondent herein, Mallika and Balasubramaniam had paid rents for the period aforesaid. It is true that with reference to the receipts issued to Mallika, the receipts bear not only the full signature of the petitioner, but also the letters '(sic)' apparently referring to Chinnakannammal, the landlady. Merely from this, it cannot be inferred that the receipts relating to Mallika alone are not reliable, when the receipt book in its entirely contains the counter-foils with reference to all the three tenants including the respondent who had paid the rents and whose signatures had also been taken on the reverse of the counter-foils. It is significant that these receipts date from 1.4.1977 onwards, while the application for eviction had been filed only on 29.3.1979. It is difficult to believe that anticipating the initiation of eviction proceedings against the, respondent herein in 1979, receipts for payment of rent by Mallika had been got up and issued to her by the petitioner even from 1.4.1977. It is further significant that not even a suggestion was put to P.W.1 to the effect that the receipts were got up. The Appellate Authority was, therefore, in error in having discarded the receipts Exhibit P-7 series and those receipts show that Mallika was in occupation of a portion in the ground-floor for residential purposes and had been paying rents to the petitioner at least from 1.4.1977 onwards. The non-examination of Mallika is immaterial, for, the receipts under Exhibit P-7 series and the report of the Commissioner establish her tenancy. P.W.1 being the son of the petitioner who had issued the receipts is competent to speak to the issue of those receipts by his mother. The respondent has not gone into the box to deny that there is no tenant of the name of Mallika in occupation of a residential portion in the ground-floor. Only the brother of the respondent has given evidence and there is no knowing as to how he came to know that there is no tenant of the name of Mallika staying in the ground-floor. In any event, that is contrary to the documentary evidence in the shape of receipts Ex.P-7 series and cannot be accepted. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W.1 in the course of his cross-examination at the instance of the respondent is to the effect that Mallika is a relation of theirs and that she resides with her two children in the ground-floor portion and she had been paying rents under Exhibit P-7 series. He has also denied the suggestion that the petitioner is in occupation of a room in the ground-floor. Apart from this, there is the report of the Commissioner Exhibit C-1, which, in paragraph 7 clearly states that in the back portion a tenant by the name of Mallika Ammal is in occupation and that the portion under her occupation consists of a room measuring 11' x 8' 2' and a kitchen measuring 6' 6' x 9' 9' and a bath-room as well. The Commissioner also noticed photographs of some deities in the portion occupied by Mallika Ammal, intended for worship,. The Commissioner also noticed an oven with soot in the kitchen. Unfortunately, this part of the report of the Commissioner has been completely ignored by the Appellate Authority. Thus, the evidence available on record as well as an on the spot investigation by the Commissioner clearly establish that Mallika is in occupation of a portion in the ground-floor for residential purposes and has been paying rents to the landlady. The Appellate Authority had concluded that the tenancy of Mallika is a myth and, therefore, the petitioner is guilty of suppression and that would establish lack of bona fides. That conclusion, as pointed out above, is opposed to the evidence on record and cannot, therefore, be sustained at all. The evidence clearly makes out that Mallika is a tenant in occupation of a residential portion in the ground-floor and there is, therefore, no suppression whatever by the landlady of the availability of a residential portion in the ground-floor. Therefore, the conclusion of the Appellate Authority that the application for eviction filed by the landlady lacked bona fides is erroneous and unsustainable.

10. The bona fides of the requirement is made out by the evidence on record. P.W.1 has stated in the course of his chief-examination that his mother, his brother, his sister Vijaya, her husband and their two children and himself are living in the rear portion of the first-floor consisting of three rooms and that the available accommodation is inadequate and insufficient. He has also stated that after the death of his father in 1971, his sister and his brother-in-law continued to stay with them. There is no cross-examination at all by the respondent with reference to this. Even in the cross examination of R.W.1, he had admitted that there are many persons in the family of the petitioner and that he does not know the extent of accommodation available. It is significant that R.W.1 was unwilling to deny the number of members in the family of the petitioner as spoken to by P.W.1 or the insufficiency and inadequacy of the available accommodation. The unchallenged evidence of P.W.1 shows that seven members of the family of the petitioner including two children are obliged to use three rooms, one of which is exclusively used as a kitchen and the other as a pooja room, with the result that only one room is under the effective occupation of the members of the family of the petitioner and that room is found from paragraph 14 of the report of the Commissioner to be used as bed-room by the son-in-law. Undoubtedly, therefore, there is nothing wrong in the petitioner desiring to have more comfortable and. convenient accommodation for all the members of the family and in having come forward with an application for additional accommodation for residential purposes even with reference to the two rooms under the occupation of the respondent. The Appellate Authority was inclined to discountenance the claim of the petitioner that one of her daughters with her husband was residing with her on the ground that no ration card to substantiate the same has been produced. The non-production of a ration card is not very material. Earlier, the evidence given by P.W.1 with reference to the persons staying in the residential portion with the petitioner has been referred to and that has not been challenged at all by the respondent and in such a situation, it cannot be concluded that the daughter and son-in-law could only be casual visitors and for their accommodation, the respondent cannot be evicted. It is true that there is no evidence with reference to the visit of relations and sammandhis of the petitioner, but even assuming that they regularly visit the petitioner, that would not be a ground for additional accommodation. Nevertheless, having regard to the size of the family of the petitioner and the number of members comprised in it and taking into account the insufficient and inadequate accommodation now available, the petitioner has clearly made out her genuine need for additional accommodation and that need is established to be bona fide as the existing accommodation is insufficient for their comfortable living. The conclusion of the Appellate Authority that the requirement of the petitioner lacks bono fides and that the existing accommodation cannot be held to be insufficient is, therefore, erroneous and cannot be sustained at all.

11. Lastly, the learned Advocate-General contended that nothing at all had been stated by the respondent on the question of relative hardship and, therefore, the proviso cannot be put against the petitioner to refuse an order of eviction in her favour. Attention was also drawn in this connection to the decision in Chimanlal Royachand Mehta v. Doraiswami Ayyar (1955) 1 M.L.J. (S.N.) 68, to the effect that it was for the respondent to prove that the hardship will be so great that an order of eviction ought not to be granted. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent maintained that the respondent would suffer great hardship in the event of his being evicted.

12. The question of relative hardship relevant for consideration in accordance with the proviso to Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act would properly arise only when the application for eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for additional accommodation is held to be maintainable. When such an application is dismissed as not maintainable, the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to render a finding whether the hardship that might be caused to the tenant by granting the application would outweigh the advantage to the landlord (vide Associated Traders v. Abdul Hameed : AIR1984Mad21 . Despite this, towards the concluding portion of paragraph 9 of its order, the Appellate Authority, while holding that casual visits by relatives cannot be accepted as a sufficient ground for evicting the tenant proceeded to state that in such a case the hardship to the tenant will outweigh the advantage accruing to the landlady. No doubt, in paragraph 7 of the counter, the respondent has generally stated that the hardship caused to him will outweigh the advantage to the petitioner, as he had established his business and the area is also predominantly one meant for the conduct of the automobile business. The evidence of R.W.1 does not establish that any serious, or great hardship would be caused to the respondent by an order for eviction being passed against him. It is not the case of the respondent that accommodation similar to the one now available to him is utterly impossible to be secured. The evidence of R.W.1 also does not make out that accommodation similar to the one now with the respondent is not available anywhere in the area in question. All that the respondent has to do is to be on the look-out for other similar accommodation, which has not been stated to be unavailable in the locality. It may be that the respondent may be obliged to pay slightly higher rent. But that cannot be considered to be such a great hardship of a kind on the respondent outweighing the advantage accruing to the petitioner by the passing of the order for eviction justifying the refusal of relief to the petitioner on the ground of relative hardship.

13. Thus, on a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, it has to be held that the Appellate Authority was in error in holding that the application for eviction filed by the petitioner under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for additional accommodation for residential purposes was not maintainable and that the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide and further that the relief should be declined to be given to the petitioner on the ground that the hardship to the respondent will outweigh the advantages accruing to the petitioner by granting an order of eviction in her favour. Consequently, the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. The. Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs throughout.,

14. The learned Counsel for the respondent prays that the respondent may be granted some time to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in his occupation to the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no objection to grant three months time to the respondent for doing so. Accordingly, the respondent is granted three months time from this day to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in his occupation to the petitioner, but this will be subject to the condition that the respondent should file an unconditional affidavit of undertaking to that effect before this Court within ten days from this day, failing which the order of eviction can be put into execution forthwith.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //