S. Mohan, J.
1. The defendant, who suffered a decree for possession in a suit filed by the respondent in O.S. No. 873 of 1975 on the file of IV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras which decree was confirmed on appeal in A.S. No. 100 of 1978, has come forward with this second appeal.
2. The respondents herein leased out 4-112 grounds of vacant land adjoining Agasthya Theatre, belonging to them, comprising premises No. 3931394, Thiruvottiyur High Road in favour of the appellant herein. The lease was for a period of 11 months on a monthly rental of Rs. 360 from 20th August, 1971, One of the terms of the lease was that he should not put up any construction without the express permission of the landlord. The lease was renewed for a period of 11 months from 1st August, 1972, and for another 11 months from 1st July, 1973, and by efflux of time, it expired by 31st May, 1974. By Exhibits A-3 and A-5, the tenant was called upon to vacate; but he did not. Therefore, it became necessary on the part of the plaintiff to file the suit.
3. The appellant, by way of defence, contended inter alia that the suit was not maintainable by a single partner and hence it is barred under Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. The lessee has spent a sum of Rs. 50,000 by levelling the ground, fencing etc. Therefore, he would be entitled to compensation. In any event, there was no valid notice to quit, as contemplated under sec-lion 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable and the notice Exhibit A-5, dated 17th August, 1974, was a valid one and complied with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On appeal, the findings of the trial Judge were confirmed. Hence, this second appeal.
5. The only point argued by Mr. Section Govind Swaminathan, learned counsel for the appellant before me is, on the terms of Exhibit A-5, dated 17th August, 1974, there cannot be a valid notice. Even though this may be technical, nevertheless if law permits him to raise this contention, it should be held in his favour. According to the learned counsel, since the appellant was called upon to deliver vacant possession of the property 'by 1st October, 1974' there is no 15 clear days' notice because the word used is 'by'. In support of his argument, the learned Counsel cites an unreported judgment of Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, rendered in Section Karuppannan v. Rangaswami Naidu C.R.P. No. 1516 of 1972, dated 4th April, 1974.
6. In opposition to this argument, Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the respondent would submit that in the instant case, the tenancy expired by efflux of time on 31st May, 1974, and thereafter, the question of issuing notice of termination of tenancy does not arise as required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even otherwise, Exhibit A-5 merely calls upon the, tenant to deliver vacant possession by the first of October, 1974, unlike the ruling cited. In matters of this kind, notice will have to be construed liberally is settled law, because it is after all for the convenience of the parties and to fix the position of the parties, technicalities cannot prevail. Lastly it is submitted that the ruling in C.R.P. No. 1516 of 1972 will have no application and it cannot be good law in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that in a case arising under the Rent Control Act, the provisions of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, would not apply.
7. In the instant case, I would like to refer to Exhibit A-3, which reads as follows:
We like to bring to your notice that the period of lease of the 4-112 grounds (10-011 sq. ft.) approximately of land leased out to you lying within the premises 3931394, Tiruvottiyur High Road, Mad-ras-81 is expiring by 31st May. 1974.
As per Clause No. 6 of the agreement, dated 25th June, 1973, entered into between us, you may vacate and give possession of the ground to us removing all the superstructures and electrical connections if you have put up if any, on or before the expiry date.
8. This is replied by the appellant/defendant under Exhibit A-4 as follows:
Received your letter, dated 27th December, 1973. We are aware that the lease period expires on 31st May, 1974
Therefore, it is very clear from the above that the appellant was fully aware that the lease period expired by 31st of May, 1974. Under these circumstances, the question of giving a further notice to vacate, as contemplated under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, does not arise. The decision reported in Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1550, is a clear authority for this proposition. It has been held:
The lease was a lease for a definite term and, therefore, expired by efflux of time by reason of Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. That being so, the service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, was not necessary.
Even assuming for the purpose of the case that a notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, is necessary, the question is whether it conforms to the requirement of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. What is stated in Exhibit A-5, dated 17th August, 1974, is as follows:
We hereby notify you that your tenancy is terminated and require you to vacate and deliver possession of our premises by 1st October, 1974.
According to the learned Counsel for the appellant because of the word 'by' which would mean 'on or before 1st October, 1974' and not 'by the mid-night of 30th September, 1974; hence the notice is bad in law. I am unable to agree. It is by the end of the month, namely, the end of September, 1974, the appellant was required to vacate. Therefore, it does conform. In any event, I am of the view that in matters of the kind, one cannot revel in technicalities, so as to defeat the very purpose and-the object of a notice, which is given only for the convenience of the parties and to put the parties on guard.
9. The ruling in C.R.P. No. 1516 of 1972 is easily distinguishable, because there the notice was to the effect 'on or before 31st December, 1970'. But here, it is not so. Besides, that ruling was rendered in a case, which arose under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Having regard to the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been held that in such a case arising under an Act, such as the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the special legislation alone will govern, to the exclusion of general legislation. Therefore, this ruling will not be of any assistance to the appellant herein.
10. In the result, I find no hesitation to confirm the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Accordingly, the second appeal will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Time to vacate till 31st January, 1982.