T. Ramaprasada Rao, J.
1. The tenant is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. An interesting question has arisen in this petition regarding the interpretation of the First Proviso to Section 10(3)(iii)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Madras Act XVIII of 1960). Section 10(3)(a)(iii)(c) deals With the right of a landlord to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant occupying any portion of the building in which he is himself an occupant to put him in possession thereof if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of business which he is carrying or as the case may be. The section also makes it clear that the occupancy of the landlord may be either for residential or non-residential purposes and it provides him with the right notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10(3)(a). The proviso to Section 10(3)(iii)(c) runs as follows:
Provided that, in the case of an application under Clause (c), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
2. The short facts of this case are :-The respondent filed an application under the above section for directions before the Rent Controller to the petitioner herein for possession of a portion of the building in which the petitioner is carrying on a. coffee business. It is not in dispute that the respondent is carrying on in the very same premises electrical business, of his own. It is for purposes of expanding his electrical business apparently he sought for directions as above. The Rent Controller was satisfied that the requirement Was genuine, but observed as follows:
I am satisfied that the advantages that will accrue to the petitioner will outweigh the possible difficulty that will be suffered by the respondent, if eviction, is ordered.
3. The appellate authority who heard the appeal of the petitioner did not advert himself to this aspect at all, but considered the question whether the requirement Was genuine and concluded that the finding of the Rent Controller is justified. Against the order of the Appellate Authority the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.
4. Mr. Anandan Nair, learned Counsel for the petitioner, after inviting my attention to the opinion expressed by the Rent Controller in so far as it relates to the finding that is required in law under the proviso to Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (c), contends that the learned Rent Controller has not correctly appreciated the formula laid down by the Legislature while considering the application under the above section. According to him the sine qua non in such an application is that there should be complete subjective satisfaction that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord, In the instant case, the Rent Controller found that the advantage that will accrue to the landlord will outweigh the hardship that is likely to be caused to the tenant. This is a reversal of the legal requirement not only according to the intendment of the legislative provision but also in accordance with the common understanding of expressions used therein. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, would state that the formula as it appears now in the proviso Would apply only in cases where the Controller makes up his mind to reject the application and therefore in cases where the application is to be allowed by the Rent Controller the formula is not applicable.
5. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the respondent that the prescribed formula has to be invoked only in cases when the Controller decides to reject the application i.e., in a case where the Court dedides to reject the application after it makes up its mind that it cannot be allowed. It has to consider whether the application has to be allowed in the first instance and thereafter consider whether it has to be rejected. The word 'reject' appearing in the proviso is compendiously used, in my view, so as to take into its fold the expression 'allow' as well and ought not to be restricted literally to the word 'reject' as it appears there. If a literal interpretation of the word ' reject' has to be adopted, then the purpose and intendment of the beneficial legislation, namely, to protect the tenants who are likely to suffer hardship, would be ignored and indeed Would not be considered at all. Having regard to the essence of the benefit that the Legislature intended to confer on tenants from unreasonable evictions in the hands of the landlord, the Legislature has made this proviso. Laws have to be adopted to those cases which most frequently occur. This is not only a cannon of construction of statutes law, but also a principle of the common law. Viewing and reading the purpose and the content of the language of the proviso, I am of the view that the controller has to apply the prescribed statutory formula as above not only in cases when he decides to reject but also in cases when he decides to allow. There cannot be one formula in the case of rejection and another in the case when he decides to allow. This will lead to the authorities concerned reading the section in a manner in which it ought not to be.
6. Thus viewed, it appears to me that the Rent Controller has misapplied the formula and has not given a finding whether he has satisfied that the hardship Which may be caused to the tenant by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
7. The other aspect is that when the petitioner took up the matter before the Appellate Authority, the latter did not advert to this important submission said to have been made before him and has not even found one way or the other as the Rent Controller did. There is certainly a lacuna and the appellate order bristles with an error apparent on the face of the record. In the concepts of views it is absolutely essential that the Appellate Authority ought to have adverted to these circumstances and found applying the statutory formula, whether the hardship which may be caused to the petitioner by granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In the absence of a finding one way or the other, this. Court is unable to apply the mind to the facts of the case, and it is unnecessary for this. Court to embark upon an enquiry and find at this stage whether and what ought to be the correct finding in the circumstances of this case. It has therefore, become necessary for me to remit the subject for are consideration by the Appellate Authority in the light of the observations made as above. The order of the Appellate Authority is, therefore, set aside, and the matter remitted to his file for afresh disposal on its merits.
8. Learned Counsel for the respondent, however states that the petitioner has not paid rents for nearly eight months and a direction may be given to the petitioner to pay up the arrears of rent before the next hearing before the Appellate Authority. Mr, Anandan Nair also feels that this request is reasonable, and therefore I further direct that if the tenant (petitioner) pays up the entire arrears before the next hearing of the case by the Appellate Authority, this order of mine will stand. Otherwise this Civil Revision Petition will be deemed to have been dismissed. No costs.