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Rajah Mahadeva Royal Y.B. Vs. Rajah Veerabasava Chikka Royal and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1942Mad368; (1942)1MLJ309
AppellantRajah Mahadeva Royal Y.B.
RespondentRajah Veerabasava Chikka Royal and anr.
Excerpt:
- - 5. in regard to the first point, although we are clearly of opinion that the documents ex......that it is not a decree of affirmance as we interfered with the lower court's decision in regard to costs is not sound in our opinion. the decree dismissing the suit was maintained by this court and it is immaterial if we have superseded the order passed by the trial court in regard to costs. the petitioner does not wish to appeal against the order directing the parties to bear their own costs, which is an order in his favour but in respect of the decree of dismissal of his suit that was passed against him.2. it is true that large stakes are involved in this appeal; but that in itself would be no ground for granting leave. what we have really to decide is whether any substantial question of law exists which would enable us to give a certificate as required by order 45, rule 3,.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The decree passed by this Court was one of affirmance although our conclusions on the two main questions of fact which were vital for the disposal of the appeal were diametrically opposed to what were arrived at by the trial Court in the suit. The suggestion by the learned Advocate-General that it is not a decree of affirmance as we interfered with the lower Court's decision in regard to costs is not sound in our opinion. The decree dismissing the suit was maintained by this Court and it is immaterial if we have superseded the order passed by the trial Court in regard to costs. The petitioner does not wish to appeal against the order directing the parties to bear their own costs, which is an order in his favour but in respect of the decree of dismissal of his suit that was passed against him.

2. It is true that large Stakes are involved in this appeal; but that in itself would be no ground for granting leave. What we have really to decide is whether any substantial question of law exists which would enable us to give a certificate as required by Order 45, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code that the case fulfils the requirements of Section 110, of the 'Code--the value of the subject-matter of the suit being far in excess of Rs. 10,000.

3. Two points have been urged on behalf of the petitioner:

(1) that certain material documents were incorrectly held by us to be inadmissible in evidence; and

(2) that we did not put proper value on the admission found in Ex. J., and that we were not justified in accepting or acting on an explanation when there was nothing on the record to support the suggestion made by us towards the end of page 358 of the judgment.

4. Taking the latter point first, we are of opinion that it does not raise a question of law. We considered the effect of the admission made in Ex. J., fully and gave to it such value as we considered it was entitled to; bat in. weighing the evidence, we took certain other documents, which were on the record, into consideration and came to the conclusion that the statement made by Somasekhara in Ex. J., was of very little value. This is a question of fact and not of law and would not justify us in giving a certificate on that ground.

5. In regard to the first point, although we are clearly of opinion that the documents Ex. JJJ, Ex. KKK, Ex. LLL and Ex. MMM were inadmissible' in evidence we feel that we would not be justified in dismissing this application, for leave on that ground as undoubtedly these documents are of great importance and if they are held to be admissible, they might affect the result of the appeal. Mr. Venkatarama Sastri, learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the contention in regard to their admissibility is flimsy and without any force and cannot be said to raise a substantial question of law. We were of opinion that there was no substance in the contention advanced by the learned Advocate-General; but if the words 'substantial questions' are to be understood in their being of substance to the parties, we must hold that the decision in regard to the non-admissibility of the documents is a substantial question which would entitle the petitioner to have a certificate.

6. For that reason, and for that reason alone, we must accept the petition and grant leave to appeal. No order as to costs.


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