1. This is a revision petition against a decree passed in a suit brought under Section 9, Specific Relief Act. The facts which led up to the suit were as follows: Ono Appala Ramaswami was the manager of a joint Hindu family property. The plaintiff's case was that he had been holding lands under Appala Ramaswami as a tenant from 1919 until the latter's death in 1928. After his death quarrels arose amongst the members of the family and a partition suit, O.S. No. 66 of 1928, was filed before the Subordinate Judge, Masulipatam. The plaintiff alleged that Raju Naidu, son of Appala Ramaswami, leased the suit properties to him for the year 1929 by Ex. C dated 3rd February 1929. A receiver was appointed in the suit and plaintiff had therefore to get a fresh lease from the latter which he got from Telugu New Year's day, 1929 at the rate of Rs. 65. He stated that the defendant forcibly dispossessed him of the property and filed a suit on 24th September 1929. The defendant asserted that he was in possession as lessee from another member of the family under a deed, Ex. 1 dated 4th February 1929, and that the plaintiff had surrendered his possession. The Court found that the plaintiff was in possession and decreed the suit. Against this order the defendant (petitioner) filed this civil revision petition. The first objection raised in revision is that as the plaintiff's tenancy under Ex. C was for only one year, he could not be put in possession of the properties on the date of the decree, 10th August 1931. To this it is replied that in a suit under Section 9, Specific Belief Act, the Court cannot go into the question of title. This is not even a case of landlord and tenant, but one of competing tenants on the death of the managing member of a family backed up respectively by certain members of the family who are at variance. No case has been quoted to me which would justify the argument raised. The sole question before the Court is one of possession, and evidence of lease deeds, etc., is merely adduced as proof of possession and not as proof of title nor as to the length of time for which the parties may be entitled to hold. The second argument is that the prayer in the plaint para. 18,
the defendant be ejected from the suit land and possession be delivered to the plaintiff in its existing condition with its standing crop,
is equivalent to a prayer for mesne profits which cannot be granted in a suit of this nature. It is argued that standing crops are movables under Section 2(13), Civil P.C. Section 3, T.P. Act, and Section 2(9), Registration Act. But for the respondent it is pointed out that, since there is no definition of immovable or movable property in the Specific Belief Act, we must turn for the definition to the General Clauses Act; and Section 3(25) of that Act says:
Immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
and Section 4 states this definition in Section 3 applies unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context to all Acts of the Governor-General in Council made after 3rd January 1868. It is clear therefore that this definition must be (applied to the Specific Relief Act. In connexion with this may be quoted Narasimham v. Venkiah 1916 Mad. 1142 and Venkataramayanim v. Basavayya (1913) 21 I.C. 213. Vide also the remark in Mulla's Section 2(13), Civil P.C. The plaint does not ask for mesne profits and as, under the Act, standing crops must be held to be immovable property, it is but a reasonable request of the plaintiff to ask to be put in possession of them. The cases quoted on the other side, Abdul Kader Rowther v. Uthumansa Rowther 1927 Mad. 722 and Thavasi v. arumugam 1916 Mad. 328 are not really relevant. In the first, mesne profits were actually asked for; in the second, the question was whether, when a claim for mesne profits had been made in the suit (under the Specific Relief Act) and not granted, it could be claimed in a separate suit. Since I hold that standing crops are not mesne profits, it is unnecessary to discuss the question as to whether, if the decree were for mesne profits, it can be allowed in part and set aside in part. It was finally suggested that the decree had awarded mesne profits as damages, but I have seen the decree and it contains nothing about mesne profits as damages and in fact it seems to be unexceptionable in form. This revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs.