1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against our judgment and decree in App. No. 55 of 1945. The appeal was dismissed and the decree of the trial Court was affirmed. The value of the suit in the trial Court was over Rs. 10,000 and the value of the subject-matter of the proposed appeal to His Majesty in Council is also above that sum. We are asked to certify that this case fulfils the conditions of Section 110, Civil P.C. on the ground that the proposed appeal involves a substantial question of law.
2. The point for consideration in the Court below and in this Court was whether the petitioner had blended the properties (immoveables and outstandings) that had fallen to his share at the family partition with the immovable property and outstandings bequeathed to him under the will of his father-in-law and whether his subsequent acquisitions were his self-acquisitions or: belonged to the family consisting of himself and his only son, the respondent. The decision of the trial Court affirmed in this Court was that the petitioner had blended the two sets of properties and that the subsequent acquisitions were from the amalgamated fund. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that we relied on the fact that separate accounts were not maintained with regard to the two sets of properties and only one income-tax return was submitted, and the question whether these circumstances would justify an inference of 'blending' is, in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nutbehari v. Nanilal Das 24 and Sellamani Ammal v. Thillai Ammal 33 a substantial question of law.
3. The observation in Nutbehari v. Nanilal Das 24 relied on by the learned Counsel is this:
Even in the case of a kartha mixing his own monies with family monies the mere fact of a common till or a common bank account need of itself effect no blending so long as accounts are kept.
In the other decision there is no observation with regard to the accounts. One of the questions in that case walls no doubt whether the testator had blended his own estate with the ancestral estate, but their Lordships observed that it was not necessary to rehearse the principles of law applicable which had been expounded by the board in Nutbehari v. Nanilal Das as it appeared to them that the High Court had rightly applied those principles to the facts of that case. We have not based our conclusion on the mere fact that the petitioner did not maintain separate accounts. On the other hand, our conclusion was based on the nature of the account and the other circumstances of the case. The account maintained by the petitioner, in our opinion, is similar to that which their Lordships characterised as ' omnibus ' in Suraj Narayan v. Eatan Lal A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 12 on which decision the observation in Nutbehari v. Nanilal Das cited above was based. We found that the entries of receipts and expenditure in the account could not be traced to different funds. No attempt was made at the trial so to trace them; nor could the learned Counsel for the petitioner do so before us. In addition to this circumstance, there was the fact that as regards the income-tax returns, the petitioner had not made any distinction between the incomes from the two sets of properties. He admitted that he did not pay the tax separately for the income from the outstandings left by his father-in-law and he could not say from what fund the income-tax was paid. We considered that if he had really kept the incomes from the two sets of properties separate, he would certainly have in the returns shown the two incomes separately as such a course would have reduced the tax. There was then the fact that the relations between the petitioner and his only son, the respondent were cordial till a few years before the suit. Prom these circumstances and having regard to the decisions referred to in our judgment and also the ordinary course of human conduct, we came to the conclusion that the intention of the petitioner from the beginning was to blend the two sets of properties and that his present attitude was occasioned by the differences between his wife and the wife of his only son.
4. It has been settled that the test to be ap. plied in such cases is the intention of the person dealing with the properties and the various matters which may legitimately be considered by the Courts in order to determine what the intention of the person concerned was, have been indicated by their Lordships in more than one decision. It is' not stated that the proposed appeal could furnish an occasion for the enunciation of any fresh legal principle. Relying on Mathura Kurmi v. Jagdeo Singh : AIR1928All61 which was followed by the Lahore High Court in Mt. Umrao Bibi v. Ram Kishen A.I.R. 1931 Lah.753 it is contended for the respondent that no substantial question of law arises in this case. We consider that this contention has to prevail. In these decisions it (was held that where the principles of law on a point are well settled and the only question is the application of those legal principles to a particular set of facts, it cannot be said that a 'substantial question of law arises. We, with respect, agree with this view and consider that this case does not fulfil the requirements of Section 110, Civil P.C. The petition is therefore dismissed with costs.