1. The matter arises under the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Act 9 of 1955, hereinafter referred to assess the Act and the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules 1957, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The petitioner was running a touring cinema in S. F. No. 286/2 of Vadaseri village, Orathanad taluk, Thanjavur District. The touring cinema was run up to 12-4-1979. Even on 23-3-1979, the fourth respondent applied to the first respondent for the grant of a `No objection' certificate to locate a touring cinema in S. F. No. 297 of the same village. There is no dispute that if the running of the touring cinema of the petitioner as well as the touring cinema of the fourth respondent are to be permitted, they will be within the prohibited distance. Prior to Sept. 1979, sub-rule (2) of R. 109 of the Rules stipulated that after the period of three years exhibition as contemplated in sub-rule (1), there shall be a minimum interval of three months before a `No objection' certificate is granted for the same site. By G. O. Ms. No. 1138 (Home) Cinemas, dated 4-5-1978, the Government directed that there is no need for obtaining a fresh `No objection' certificate has already been obtained and in which site the touring cinema has completed its running for three years when an applicant proposes to run a touring cinema again on the same site. The Government further directed that the licensing authority shall, however, grant a C form licence for the new touring cinema on the same site only after a break of three months period from the date of closure of the previous cinema, on production of the necessary certificate under the Rules. The Government requested the Board of Revenue to send the necessary draft amendments to the Rules to that effect. The actual amendment to sub-rule (2) to R. 109 of the Rules was introduced by G. O. Ms. No. 2308 Home (Cinemas), dated 13-9-1979, by virtue of which sub-rule (2) of R. 109 stipulated that after the period of three years exhibition ass contemplated in sub-rule (1) there shall be a minimum interval of three months before the same site is again licensed. Earlier to the amendment of sub-rule (2) of R. `09, of the rules, the petitioner applied for the grant of a C form licence, on 27-8-1979. It must be pointed out that the applications of both the petitioner and the fourth respondent were dismissed in Nov, 1979, by the first respondent. There were appeals by both of them to the second respondent and by appellate orders, the matters got remanded to the first respondent. The first respondent, by order dated 23-9-1980, rejected the application of the petitioner and granted the application of the 4th respondent. The petitioner preferred appeals to the second respondent and he was not successful before the second respondent and the appeals were dismissed by order dated 20-1-1980. The petitioner filed a revision to the third respondent and the third respondent by order dated 6-2-1981, rejected the revision. The petitioner has prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorified mandamus to quash the order of the third respondent dated 6-2-1981 and to further direct the issue of a C form licence to him for running a touring cinema as sought for by him.
2. It is unnecessary to go into the merits of the contentions of the parties, because I am inclined to sustain the primary ground of attack projected by Mr. S. Ramalingam, learned counsel for the petitioner, against the order of the third respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the third respondent while exercising the power of revision, is practically functioning as a quasi-judicial authority and in the instant case, the third respondent has rejected the application of the petitioner without assigning any reason, except for stating that it sees no ground for interference in revision. For a proper consideration of this contention, it has become necessary to refer to S. 9-B of the Act, which deals with powers of revision. The said section reads as follows-
"9.B. Powers of revision by Government-
(1) The Government may on their own motion or on application, call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in respect of any proceeding under S. 5(7) or S. 9-A(1) to satisfy themselves as to the legality of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein, and, if, in any case, it appears to the Government that any such proceeding, decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for consideration, they may pass orders accordingly.
Provided that every application to the Government for the exercise of the powers under this section shall be preferred within such time as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed.
(2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub-sec, (1) unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representations.
(3) The Government may stay the execution of the decision or order pending the exercise of their power under sub-sec, (1) in respect thereof."
3. Rule 47-A of the Rules delineates the procedure for entertaining a revision and it reads as follows-
"47-A, (1) The Government may entertain an application for revision against the decision of the appellate authority under S. 5(7) or S. 9-A(1) of the act. Such application for revision shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of the appellate authority;
Provided that, the Government may admit an application for revision preferred within a period of two months after the expiry of the prescribed period of thirty days aforesaid, if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring the application for revision within the prescribed period.
Provided further, that in computing the periods aforesaid, the time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority shall be excluded;
Provided also that, where an application for revision is presented within the prescribed period of thirty days aforesaid, but is returned by the Government for representation in the prescribed manner, and if such an application for revision and within the date if any, specified by the Government for the representation of the application for revision so presented shall be deemed to have been presented within the prescribed time for the purpose of this rule-
(2) An application for revision preferred under sub-rule (1) shall be submitted in duplicate in the form of a memorandum with as many extra copies as there are respondents impleaded in the case, setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to the order which is the subject of revision and shall be accompanied by the original or a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority.
(3) The application for revision shall be signed by the petitioner or by his authorised agent and presented to the Government at any time during the office hours on any working day or sent by registered post acknowledgment due. The authorisation of the agent to present the application for revision shall be in writing and shall accompany the application for revision unless the agent holds a power of attorney.
(4) A fee of rupees two hundred shall be paid in respect of each application for revision and the memorandum of application for revision shall be accompanies by a treasury receipt for the amount of the fee due on the application for revision. No court fee stamp need be affixed to the memorandum of application for revision.
(5) If an application purporting to be an application for revision is found by the Government to be inadmissible for want of jurisdiction, the entire fee paid in respect of such application for revision may be refunded to the petitioner. The application for such refund shall, however, be made by the applicant within one month from the date of receipt of the orders of rejection of his application for revision.
(6) If an application for revision is not filed after the fee has been remitted into the treasury, the entire fee so remitted may be refunded to the applicant. The application for such refund shall, however, be made by the applicant within one month from the date of remittance."
4. A perusal of the provisions extracted above leaves no room for doubt that the Government, while exercising the powers of revision, should exercise the same in a quasi-judicial manner, Section 9-B (1) of the Act enjoins upon the Government to call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in respect of any proceeding under S. 5(7) or S. 9-A(1) to satisfy themselves as to the legality of such proceeding, or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision passed or order made therein Under S. 5(7) of the Act, any person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority referred to in that section is entitled to file an appeal to the appellate authority may make such order in the case as it may think fit. Under S. 9-A(1) of the Act, an appeal is maintainable against the decision of the licensing authority revoking or suspending a licence. The proviso to S. 9-B(1) stipulates that the revision application shall be preferred within such time as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a such fee as may be prescribed. Sub-sec (2) of S. 9-B further prescribes that no order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub-sec, (1) unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representations. Rule 47-A (1) prescribes 30 days as the time limit for preferring a revision. The first proviso thereto confers a power on the government to condone the delay up to two months if sufficient cause is shown. The second proviso thereto speaks about computation of the period of limitation, by excluding the time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority. Rule 47-A (2) lays down that an application for revision shall be submitted in duplicate in the form of a memorandum, setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to the order, subject matter of revision and further states that it shall be accompanied by the original or a certified copy of the order of the appellate authority. It further contemplates furnishing of extra copies of the revision application as there are respondents impleaded in the case. Rule 47-A (4) stipulates payment of a fee of rupees two hundred for a revision application. The furnishing of copies is obviously meant for service of the same on the respondents to obtain their reaction and comments to the revision application. Otherwise, it would be an empty formality and the provision is certainly not meant for that. The comments or objections of the respondents, if filed, would also be before the Government, when they consider the revision application. Neither the section nor the rule circumscribes or prescribes any limitation with regard to the points to be urged in revision by the aggrieved party. Equally so, the scope of the revisional power of the Government appears to be wide enough to consider not only the materials already placed before the appellate authority, but also fresh materials that may be brought to their notice. There is no inhibition that could be spelt out to that effect either in the section or in the rule. In fact, the power is conferred to investigate about the legality, the correctness, or the propriety of any proceeding or decision of the appellate authority. In doing so, the Government can definitely take note of materials, though not placed before and considered by the appellate authority, but which are relevant to the questions in issue, and brought to the notice of the Government in revision. The entire scheme of the provisions posits a judicial procedure and hence it has to be stated that the Government, while dealing with the revision under the Act read with the rules, acts as a quasi judicial tribunal. Then the question is as to whether it is incumbent upon the third respondent, while disposing of the revision, to pass a speaking order assigning reasons. In this context, I feel obliged to refer to some of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
5. In M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, , a Bench consisting of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court, dealt with a case arising under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957, and Mineral Concession Rules 1960. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, repelled the contention of the learned Solicitor General appearing for the Central Government that if the Central Government is to give its reasons, it will obstruct the work of the Government and will lead to unnecessary delays and declined to accept the stand that on this ground, the Central Government could be exonerated from the obligation to give reasons when it functions judicially as a tribunal. The following passages in the judgment of the learned Judges do throw light on the question-
"The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees considerations. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimises arbitrariness it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made; and it also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal. The conception of exercise of revisional jurisdiction and the manner of disposal provided in R. 55 of the rules are indicative of the scope and nature of the Government's jurisdiction. If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if its discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard............ That apart, when we insist upon reasons, we do not prescribe any particular form or scale of the reasons depend upon each case. Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional tribunal shall give its own reasons succinctly but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons, the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those reasons. What is essential is that reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal. The nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. In the present case, neither the State Government's nor the Central Government's order discloses the reasons for rejecting the application of the appellant. In the circumstances, the Central Government's order is vitiated, as it does not disclose any reasons for rejecting the revision application of the appellant."
6. Bachawat, J. speaking for himself and Mudholkar, J. did not accept the broad proposition that the revising authority was bound to give fuller reasons. The ratio, as expressed by Bachawat, J. runs as follows-
"The reason for rejecting the revision application appears on the face of the impugned order. The revision application was rejected, because the Central Government agreed with the reasons given by the State Government in its order, dated December 19, 1961, and the application did not disclose any valid ground for interference with the order of the State Government. In our opinion, the Central Government, acting under R. 55, was not bound to give in its order, fuller reasons for rejecting the application, ...............Having stated that there was no valid ground for interference, the revising authority was not bound to give fuller reasons. It is impossible to say that the impugned order was arbitrary, or that there was no proper trial of the revision application." (pp, 674, 675, 676 and 677).
7. In Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , a case which arose under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957, and Mineral Concession Rules (1960), a Bench consisting of five learned Judges of the Supreme Court, reiterated the position that in exercising its powers of revision under R. 55 the Central Government discharges functions which are quasi judicial. There the order passed in revision read as follows-
"I am directed to refer to your revision application dated 14-12-1964 and letter dated 28-1-1966 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein, the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh rejecting your application for grant of mining lease for asbestos over an area of Ac, 113.50 in Brahmanapalli village, Cuddapah district, Andhra Pradesh. Your application for revision is, therefore, rejected."
8. In quashing the said order, the Supreme Court observed as follows-
"The decisions of Tribunals in India are subject to supervisory powers of the High Court under Art, 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of Supreme Court under Art, 136. It goes without saying that both the High Court and the Supreme Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed curtly by the use of the single word `rejected', or `dismissed'. Ordinarily, if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the application of one party and rejecting that of the others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government. Supreme Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision. But, when the reasons given in the order of the State Government are scrappy or nebulous and the Central Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, Supreme Court, in appeal may have to examine the case denote without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government. If the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying those reasons which according to it are sufficient to uphold the order of the State Government, Supreme Court, in appeal may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds which weighed with the Central Government in upholding the order of the State Government. In such circumstances, what is known as a `speaking order' is called for." (page 1606)
9. In Mahabir Prasad v. State of U. P., , a Bench
consisting of two learned Judges of the Supreme Court, while delineating the attributes of a quasi-judicial order, observed as follows-
"Recording of reasons in support of a decision by a quasi-judicial authority is obligatory as it ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on ground of policy or expediency. The necessity to record reasons is greater if the order is subject to appeal." (page 1302)
10. In Travancore Rayons v. Union of India, , two
learned Judges of the Supreme Court dealt with the character of an order to be passed by the Central Government in revision under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and referred to other decisions of that court holding that where the Central Government, exercising powers in revision, gives no reasons, the order will be regarded as void, and further observed as follows-
"In this case, the communication from the Central Government gave no reasons in support of the order the appellant company is merely intimated thereby that the Government of India did not see any reasons to interfere with the order in `appeal'. The communication does not disclose the `points' which were considered, and the reasons for rejecting them. This is a totally unsatisfactory method of disposal of a case in exercise of the judicial power vested in the Central Government. Necessity to give sufficient reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the problem to be solved, and the mental process by which the conclusion is reached in cases where a non-judicial authority exercises judicial functions, is obvious. When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, this court would require to be satisfied that the decision has been reached after due consideration of the merits of the dispute, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations of policy or expediency. The court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two ground; one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or this court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested which the judicial power." (pp. 865-866)
11. In Chowgule & Co. v. Union of India, , two learned Judges of the Supreme Court dealt with a case under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and Mineral concession Rules, 1960, where the order passed was similar to the one dealt with in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, and the following passage in the judgment has got to be noted-
"One cannot but remark that orders rejecting such applications appear to be made on a formula which is well known to the department. In our view departments cannot be allowed to perform their tasks so perfunctorily in disposing of claim of parties to valuable rights and it is incumbent on them to indicate the ground on which the revision applications are disposed of unless the State Government had already in its order of rejection given the grounds and the Union Government referred to such grounds in its capacity as a revising authority." (page 2025)
While propounding the above decision, the learned Judges relied on the ratio in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, .
12. In Rangnath v. Daulatrao, three learned Judges of the Supreme Court, while dealing with an order passed by the State Government on a statutory appeal under S, 2-A (2) of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams and Cash Grants Act 1954 (8 of 1955), observed as follows-
"As has been repeatedly pointed out by this court the State Government ought to have disposed of the Statutory appeal of the appellant filed under Section 2-A(2) of the Abolition of Inams Act, by a speaking order. It may not be possible in all cases to say that a nonspeaking order is bad or invalid on that account alone but when an order is liable to be challenged under Art, 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts do insist that an appeal of the kind filed by the appellant should be and ought to have been disposed of by a speaking order giving some reasons in its support."
13. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India, , a matter arising under Tariff Act, 1934, three
learned Judges of the Supreme Court reiterated the position that a quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons in the following terms:-
"It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons.
The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." (pp 1785-1785)
14. In Tara Char v. Delhi Municipality, , three
learned Judges of the Supreme Court dealt with a case of disciplinary action. There, it was contended that the disciplinary authority, exercising quasi-judicial functions, should give reasons in support of its order even if it concurs with the findings arrived at by the enquiring officer with regard to the charge. This contention was repelled by pointing out that although it may be necessary for the disciplinary authority to record its provisional conclusions, in the notice calling upon the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it differs from the findings arrived at by the enquiring officer with regard to the charge, it is not obligatory to do so in case the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the enquiry officer. the learned Judges of the Supreme Court distinguished the cases in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, ; Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India,
and Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v.
Union of India, , amongst other cases, on the grounds that they have nothing to do with disciplinary proceedings.
15. There are observations in Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India, , that the judgment inBhagat Raja v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , in effect overrules the judgment of the majority in M. P. Industries Ltd v. Union of India, . In Tarachand v. Delhi Municipality,
, it is pointed out that such observations seem to have crept therein through some oversight. It further pointed out that Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , dealt with amended rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960, which provided a special procedure in regard to revisions, in contrast to the unamended Rule 55 which was dealt with in M. P. Industries v. Union of India, , and the wide observations in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, were justified on that account and the learned Judges in that context further opined that the observations in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India ( contain a correct statement of law. While doing so, the learned Judges in Tara Chard v. Delhi Municipality, also, to a great extent,
delineated the scope of the amended R. 55. On a comparison with the said R. 55, which was considered in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , I find that the scope of revisional power under S. 9-B of the Act, read with R. 47-A of the Rules, is similar to, if not wider than the power of revision under the amended R. 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960. In the said circumstances, it would be appropriate to follow and apply the ratio of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , to the present case. It would be inappropriate to apply the rule in Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipality, which was pronounced with regard to disciplinary proceedings, and that too, for a limited purpose to state that it is not obligatory for the disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to record reasons, when it concurs with the findings of the enquiring officer.
16. It is pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra, even in cases where the High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of that court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches, and the proper course for a High Court in such a case is to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger Benches of that court in preference to those expressed by smaller benches of that court, which practice hardened as it has into a rule of law, is followed by the Supreme Court itself.
17. The decision in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, is the one expressed by a larger bench consisting of five learned Judges of the Supreme Court. There are two reasons why the ratio expressed by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , should be applied to the instant case. On is, the view expressed was by a larger bench of the Supreme Court and the other is, the provisions dealt with by the Supreme Court in that decision are similar to the provisions, subject matter of consideration in the present case.
18. My attention has been drawn to a judgment of Ramanujam, J. in W. P. No. 10157 of 1981 (S. A. P. Guruswami Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu), judgment dated 20-10-1981, where the learned Judge, following the ratio in Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipality, , declined to entertain a writ petition impugning an order of the revisional authority under the Act on the ground , it was a non-speaking one. The judgment of the learned Judge cannot be followed as a precedent because it is a judgment per incuriam i.e., a judgment rendered on hearing only one side and as pointed out by Kailasam, J. as he then was in Abdul Malick v. Collector of Dharmapuri (1968) 1 Mad LJ 9 such judgment have no force as precedents. Even otherwise, the exposition of law in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , is explicit and I have
already stated the reasons as to why that principle should be followed in the instant case.
19. The necessity for giving reasons arises because the decision of the revisional authority is likely to be subject to scrutiny by this court under Art, 226 of the Constitution of India, as in the instant case. The appellate authority may assign reasons for rejecting the appeal. As stated by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, , some of those reasons may be good and some may be bad, and if the revisional authority merely endorses the order of the appellate authority without specifying reasons which, according to it, are sufficient to uphold the order of the appellate authority, it would not be an order passed in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. In the case of affirmance also by the revisional authority it must either express its own reasons or must refer to the reasons advanced by the appellate authority and then proceed to further express its concurrence. Even the majority view in M. P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, , was that the revising authority was not bound to give fuller reasons. The order of the revisional authority in that case expressed that there is no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government. Bachawat, J. speaking the majority view, held that the reasons for rejecting the revision applications appeared on the face of the impugned order and the revision application was rejected because the Central Government agreed with the reasons given by the State Government. It definitely indicates that reasons must be expressed by the revisional authority, though not fully, while affirming the order of the lower authority. As observed by Subba Rao, J. as he then was, in the above decision, what is essential is that the reasons shall be given by an appellate or revisional tribunal expressly or by reference to those given by the original tribunal and the nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily will depend upon the facts of each case. An analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above clearly indicates that a revisional authority, exercising quasi-judicial powers, cannot skip over the obligation of giving reasons. The reasons, as stated above, cane be independently given or by reference to those already given by the lower authority. that alone will demonstrate the application of the mind by the revisional authority and the factum of the decision having been reached after a due consideration of the merits of the case.
20. coming to the impugned order, it reads as follows-
"The Government have examined the revision application in the reference second cited filed by Thiru G. Alagiri against the proceedings of the erstwhile Board of Revenue in the reference first cited. On examination of the connected records the Government do not see any ground to interfere on behalf of the revision application. The Government therefore, reject the revision application in the reference second cited."
The said order does not give any reasons independently; it does not even refer to the reasons recorded by the appellate authority; and it does not even refer to the decision of the appellate authority, and further states that it agreed with the said decision. Such an order exposes a total lack of application of the mind on the part of the third respondent to the matter in issue, which is definitely vital to the parties concerned. The disposal of the revision of the petitioner by the third respondent is perfunctory and highly unsatisfactory and does not conform to the norms as discussed above. This obliges me to interfere in writ proceedings. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the matter will stand remitted back to the third respondent for it to consider and dispose of the revision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. There will be no order as to costs.
21. Learned counsel for the fourth respondent points out that the order of stay was vacated by this court on 6-3-1981, and the fourth respondent is actually running the touring cinema in the site in question and it will be inequities if this position is disturbed pending decision by the third respondent afresh. Taking not of the fact that the fourth respondent is already running the touring cinema, the status quo as on date shall prevail till the disposal of the revision afresh by the third respondent.
22. Petition allowed.